

Joint Publication 5-0



Doctrine for Joint Operation Planning



Revision
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This revised edition of JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operation Planning*, represents the latest in a series of updates to joint doctrine.

TEXT TO BE PROVIDED LATER

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Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Publication 5-0 is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by the Armed Forces of the United States in joint, ~~or~~ multinational, or interagency operations.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), as cited in references, and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, ~~subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands~~ the subordinate components and joint forces of combatant commands, and combat support agencies. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Covers the Types of Military Planning**
 - **Discusses Organization of and Responsibilities for Joint Planning**
 - **Covers the Concepts for Planning Joint Operations**
 - **Discusses Strategic Direction, to Include Interagency and Multinational Planning**
 - **Provides Guidance on Joint Operation Planning, Including Common Planning Activities and Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning**
 - **Covers Campaign Planning Fundamentals and Operational Design Process**
-

Types of Military Planning

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command.

Planning is performed at every echelon of command. It is conducted across the range of military operations. Military planning for joint operations includes four broad types of planning: joint strategic planning, security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning.

Joint strategic planning.

Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to the Armed Forces of the United States for security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning. It occurs primarily at the national and theater strategic levels to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in formulating political-military assessments, defining political and military objectives and end states, developing strategic concepts and options, allocating resources, and formulating strategic policy and planning guidance.

Security cooperation planning.

Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve US security interests and, as a result, build the right defense partnerships for the future. The Secretary of Defense identifies the goals of security cooperation, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and changes course when required to enhance effectiveness.

Joint operation planning.

Joint operation planning encompasses those planning activities associated with the preparation of campaign plans, operation plans (OPLANs) in complete format, operation plans in concept format, functional plans, and operation orders (OPORDs) by the combatant commanders. It also encompasses those joint planning activities of the Military Departments, Services, and combat support agencies that support the development of these OPLANs or OPORDs.

Force planning.

At the national strategic level, **force planning** is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Service Chiefs. At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all those activities performed by the supported combatant commander and subordinate component commanders to select forces and capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission in the manner identified in the approved concept of operations.

Organization and Responsibility for Joint Planning

Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by law and directive.

This fundamental responsibility extends in the chain of command from the **President and Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders and their subordinate commanders.** The Chairman transmits the orders of the President and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. The Chairman also oversees the activities of combatant commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff function in the planning process as advisers to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Although not within the branch of the chain of command used for purposes of operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, the **Military Services** participate in joint operation planning through execution of their responsibilities to: organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to the combatant commands; administer and support those forces; and prepare plans implementing joint strategic mobility, logistic, and mobilization plans.

Concepts for Planning Joint Operations

Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military operations.

The activities of the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) are integrated through an interoperable and collaborative **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**. The JOPES provides **uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures**, supported by modern communications and computer systems, to monitor, plan, and execute joint operations.

There is **a single integrated set of policies, activities, and procedures** applicable to both deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP). Deliberate planning and CAP produce different products under different circumstances, but they share common elements. The three JOPES elements are situation monitoring, planning, and execution.

Situation monitoring.

The **situation monitoring element** encompasses detecting and identifying actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decision makers, and determining threat capabilities and intentions. Multiple intelligence sources establish and maintain an understanding of threat, problems or potential conditions that affect our national interests. Situation monitoring is essential for successful planning and execution.

Planning.

The **planning element** encompasses translating strategic guidance and direction into OPLANs and OPORDs. Joint operation planning may be based on defined tasks identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance or Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to support national security objectives. Alternatively, joint operation planning may be based on the need for a military response to a current event, emergency, or time-sensitive contingency.

Execution.

Execution encompasses assessing military plans and implementing military operations. Execution begins with a decision by the President or Secretary of Defense to use a military option to resolve a crisis. It normally ends with the redeployment or redirection of forces or the resumption of normal operations in the operational area.

Joint operation planning encompasses the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations.

Mobilization is the process by which all or selected parts of the Armed Forces of the United States are brought to the necessary state of readiness for military operations or other national emergencies. It involves assembling and organizing the nation's resources to support national objectives across the full range of military operations.

Deployment encompasses the movement of forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific destination to conduct joint operations. It specifically includes movement within the continental US and the intertheater and intratheater movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them.

Employment encompasses the use of military forces and capabilities within an operational area to accomplish strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Employment planning provides the foundation for, determines the scope of, and is limited by, mobilization, deployment, and sustainment planning.

Sustainment encompasses providing and maintaining adequate levels of personnel, materiel, supplies, and services to support the planned levels of military activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity.

Redeployment encompasses the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area for the purpose of further employment. Redeployment also includes the return of forces and resources to their original location and status.

Demobilization encompasses the transition of a mobilized military establishment and civilian economy to a normal configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality.

Strategic Direction

It is at the national level where a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational security objectives.

The President and Secretary of Defense provide strategic direction and national resources to accomplish national military objectives. **Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.** Consistent with the strategic guidance contained in the President's National

Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense develops a national defense strategy that establishes broad defense policy goals and priorities for the development, employment, and sustainment of US military forces. Based upon the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops the National Military Strategy, which provides military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on how to employ the military in support of national security objectives. These national security, defense, and military strategies provide strategic direction for the combatant commanders and, in combination with the theater military strategy, provide guidance for planning campaigns and major operations within their operational areas.

Complex security challenges require the skills and resources of many organizations.

Many organizations are part of the **interagency process**. These include United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, regional and international organizations, and the agencies of partner nations. The large number and diversity of the organizations that can become involved in plans and operations will likely have different goals, capabilities, limitations, and operational philosophies. Despite these differences, the interagency process must bring together the interests of multiple organizations to be successful. In the absence of a comprehensive, overarching, and authoritative document that illustrates how nonmilitary governmental, nongovernmental and commercial organizations must operate in an interagency environment to achieve unified action, **success can only be achieved through close interagency coordination and cooperation.**

Joint operation planning will frequently be accomplished within the context of multinational operation planning.

Collective security is a strategic goal of the United States, and joint operation planning will frequently be accomplished within the context of multinational operation planning for multinational operations. There is no single doctrine for multinational action, and each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and OPLANs. US planning for joint operations must accommodate and complement such protocols and plans. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must also anticipate and incorporate such nonmilitary planning factors as domestic and international laws and regulations, including legal and policy restrictions on the use of various weapons and tactics.

Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in multinational and national channels. Multinational force commanders develop multinational strategies and plans in multinational channels. JFCs perform supporting joint operation

planning for multinational operations in US national channels. Coordination of these separate planning channels occurs at the national level by established multinational bodies or coalition member nations and at the theater strategic and operational levels by JFCs, who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters.

Common Planning Activities

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System establishes a single, integrated set of activities and procedures that define deliberate planning and crisis action planning.

Although certain decision authorities and planning products differ, the JPEC conducts joint operation planning by integrating concurrent actions required in three complementary interactive elements: Situation Monitoring, Planning, and Execution. Situation monitoring and planning apply to both deliberate planning and CAP while execution applies only to CAP. The elements are not mutually exclusive or discrete. They are iterative, continuous, and overlap throughout the joint operating planning process to respond to the continually changing nature of mission requirements.

Situation monitoring.

Situation monitoring encompasses two activities, situation development and situation assessment. During “Situation Development,” an event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and is reported through a variety of means to the National Military Command Center. In “Situation Assessment,” the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic implications of the crisis are weighed. A decision is made on a possible requirement for military force, and current strategy and OPLANs are reviewed.

Planning.

The planning element of the joint operation planning process includes all of the activities that the JPEC must accomplish to prepare for an anticipated operation. **It includes those activities required to prepare for the mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces leading up to, but not including, the actual movement of those forces.** When necessary or appropriate, joint operation planners also address disengagement, reconstitution, redeployment, and demobilization of forces, as preparation for these activities may have to occur early in the execution of the operation. Planning is initiated from a state of continuous monitoring of global events, recognizes the need for preparing military options that support national security objectives, and follows a collaborative, iterative planning process.

Joint operation planning must be flexible and responsive to dynamic conditions. Commands and organizations must be able to integrate data in order to provide actionable information to commanders and their staffs at the multiple echelons of command. **While the JOPES process remains fundamentally unchanged, conceptually, an environment that fosters sequential activities is no longer adequate.** Today's dynamic, fast-paced security environment demands that the JPEC be able to gather, review, integrate, and act upon information collaboratively.

Planning activities.

Planning activities include course of action (COA) development and plan development. A COA consists of the following information: **what** type of military action; **who** will take the action; **when** the action begins; **where** the action takes place; **why** (purpose); and **how** (method of employment of forces). **In COA development the focus is on the supported commander, who develops and submits a commander's estimate with COA recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense for review, approval, or modification. During plan development,** the supported combatant commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders, expands an approved or directed COA into a detailed joint OPLAN or OPORD necessary to execute the approved or directed COA when so directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. If required by the situation, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already in development.

Execution During Crisis Action Planning

Execution begins when the President or Secretary of Defense decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis.

Only the President or Secretary of Defense can authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue an execute order (EXORD). **The EXORD directs the supported commander to initiate military operations, defines the time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance** not provided earlier. The Chairman monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful completion of military operations. US Transportation Command manages common-user global air, land, and sea transportation, reporting the progress of deployments to the Chairman and the supported commander. **Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished or revised.**

Campaign Planning Fundamentals

Supported joint force commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of campaign plans.

Campaign planning is a primary means by which supported JFCs arrange for unified action and guide their subordinate and supporting commander's planning. It communicates the supported JFC's purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept of operations to subordinate and supporting commanders. **Campaign planning binds military operations together at the operational level.** Campaign plans are the operational extension of a supported JFC's strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by describing how the supported JFC intends to arrange a series of related operations in time, space, and purpose to accomplish strategic and operational objectives with available resources. A supported JFC's campaign plan provides the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination.

Guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a campaign plan. Campaigns are a part of other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military power is used in conjunction with other instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. Depending on the nature of the operation, a military campaign may be the main effort, or it may be used to support nonmilitary efforts. A **campaign must be coordinated with nonmilitary efforts** to ensure that all actions work in harmony to achieve the ends of policy. An understanding of the national strategic objectives is essential for campaign planning.

Operational Design Process

Theater-level campaign planning is inextricably linked with operational art, most notably in the design of the operational concept for the campaign.

While facilitated by such procedures as JOPES and commonly accepted military decision-making models, the **operational design process is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience and judgment.** The result of this process should provide the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means for the campaign.

The **elements of operational design** are tools to help supported JFCs and their staffs **visualize what the campaign should look like and to shape the commander's intent.** The emphasis applied to an operational design's elements varies with the theater's strategic objectives. Not only does the strategic environment affect operational design, other factors such as the

availability of host-nation support, the allocation of strategic mobility assets, the state of the theater infrastructure, and forces and resources made available for planning all have an impact on the operational design. In the final analysis, the goal of a sound operational design is to ensure a clear focus on the ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic centers of gravity, and provide for sound sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all available military and nonmilitary instruments of power to that end. The **key elements of operational design** are:

- (1) Understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objectives(s)).
- (2) Identifying both friendly and adversary sources of strength and key points of vulnerability (“critical factors”).
- (3) Developing an operational concept or scheme that will achieve the strategic objective(s).

CONCLUSION

Joint Publication 5-0 is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by the Armed Forces of the United States in joint, multinational, or interagency operations. It discusses all aspects of joint operation planning.

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CHAPTER I

PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS MILITARY PLANNING

“But in truth, the larger the command, the more time must go into planning; the longer it will take to move troops into position, to reconnoiter, to accumulate ammunition and other supplies, and to coordinate other participating elements on the ground and in the air. To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at as much of the ground as circumstances render accessible to him. He checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he intends to assign it. Then — having secured in almost every instance his subordinates’ wholehearted acceptance of the contemplated mission and agreement on its feasibility — only then does he issue an order.”

General Mathew B. Ridgway
The Korean War, 1967

SECTION A. TYPES OF MILITARY PLANNING

1. Introduction

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. Planning is performed at every echelon of command. It is conducted across the range of military operations. Military planning for joint operations includes four broad types of planning: joint strategic planning, ~~theater~~-security cooperation (~~TSC~~)-planning, joint operation planning, and force planning (see Figure I-1). Joint operation and campaign planning is the focus of this document.

2. Joint Strategic Planning

a. Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to the Armed Forces of the United States for ~~TSC~~-security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning. It occurs primarily at the national and theater strategic levels to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in formulating political-military assessments, defining political and military objectives and end states, developing strategic concepts and options, allocating resources, and formulating strategic policy and planning guidance. At the national strategic level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (~~CJCS~~), in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), performs joint strategic planning to:

(1) Provide advice and assistance to the President and Secretary of Defense regarding the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States and the preparation of policy guidance; ~~and.~~




Figure I-1. Types of Military Planning

(2) Provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on program recommendations and budget proposals to conform to priorities established in strategic plans.

(3) Transmit the strategic guidance and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands, Military Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is one of the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs joint strategic planning. The products of the JSPS provide the strategic guidance and direction for joint strategic planning by the combatant commanders and for the other categories of military planning. Chapter II, “Strategic Direction,” and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, provide additional information on the JSPS.

c. Based on strategic guidance and direction from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their assigned missions. Combatant commanders develop and modify strategic estimates continuously. They develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into concepts to meet strategic requirements objectives. Their strategic plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate strategic objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE) or rules for the use of force; establish constraints and restraints; and define strategic policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans.

d. Geographic combatant commanders focus their joint strategic planning on their specific areas of responsibility (AORs) as defined in the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP). Functional combatant commanders view their joint strategic planning problem-efforts as unconstrained by geography. Strategic planning for possible sequential or concurrent

execution of multiple operations across AOR boundaries outweighs the regional perspective of any single geographic combatant commander. The Secretary of Defense may task the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a functional combatant commander to conduct such global strategic planning.

e. ~~Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Chapter II, “Strategic Direction,”~~ discusses joint strategic planning by combatant commanders in greater detail.

3. Theater Security Cooperation Planning

~~a. TSC consists of a series of defense activities conducted by combatant commanders with allies, friendly nations, and potential coalition partners; and designed to support the US defense strategy, advance regional defense policy goals, and enable wartime operations. The aim is to shift emphasis from broad-based theater engagement to a more focused program of reciprocal bilateral and multilateral cooperation that advances US strategic interests. The Secretary of Defense identifies the goals of TSC, assesses the effectiveness of TSC activities, and changes course when required to enhance effectiveness. TSC goals include:~~

~~(1) Creating favorable military regional balances of power;~~

~~(2) Rendering U.S. forward forces increasingly capable of swiftly defeating aggression with only modest reinforcement;~~

~~(3) Advancing mutual defense or security arrangements;~~

~~(4) Building the capabilities of allies, friendly nations, and potential coalition partners for self defense and multinational operations;~~

~~(5) Expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to the President and Secretary of Defense; and~~

~~(6) Affording U.S. forces greater operational access, basing arrangements, and training opportunities.~~

~~b. TSC planning links the combatant commanders’ security cooperation activities with broad national security objectives established by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commanders plan, conduct, and support many activities that produce multiple benefits in readiness, modernization, and engagement. TSC planning identifies, prioritizes, and integrates these activities to optimize their overall contribution to national security. TSC activities are grouped into six categories:~~

~~(1) Multinational exercises, including those in support of the State Partnership for Peace Program.~~

~~(2) Nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) activities.~~

~~(3) Multinational training, including special operation forces (SOF) joint combined exchange training.~~

~~(4) Multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.~~

~~(5) Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs.~~

~~(6) Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.~~

~~e. Geographic combatant commanders prepare TSC strategies and plans for review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approval by the Secretary of Defense. The approved TSC strategies serve as the basis for TSC planning.~~

~~d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01, Theater Security Cooperation Planning, (currently under revision) sets forth guidelines and procedures for developing TSC strategies and plans.~~

~~a. Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve US security interests and, as a result, build the right defense partnerships for the future. The Secretary of Defense identifies the goals of security cooperation, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and changes course when required to enhance effectiveness. Security cooperation goals include:~~

~~(1) Creating favorable military regional balances of power.~~

~~(2) Rendering US forward forces increasingly capable of swiftly defeating aggression with only modest reinforcement.~~

~~(3) Advancing mutual defense or security arrangements.~~

~~(4) Building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.~~

~~(5) Expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to the President and Secretary of Defense.~~

~~(6) Providing US forces with greater operational access, en route infrastructure, basing arrangements, and training opportunities.~~

b. The Department's senior civilian and military leadership, not only the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs, focus their overseas activities on achieving the security cooperation goals identified by the Secretary of Defense. **Security cooperation planning links these overseas activities with security cooperation goals** by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating them to optimize their overall contribution to building defense relationships that promote specified US security interests. Security cooperation activities are grouped into six categories:

(1) Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program.

(2) Nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities.

(3) Multinational training.

(4) Multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.

(5) Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs.

(6) Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.

c. Security cooperation is that element of Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation that involves those activities that geographic combatant commanders conduct with others to implement the DOD *Security Cooperation Guidance*. Geographic combatant commanders prepare **security cooperation** strategies for review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approval by the Secretary of Defense. These strategies incorporate the military capabilities of the functional combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies, all of which ensure that their security cooperation activities align with the Secretary's security cooperation goals and support the **security cooperation** strategies of the geographic combatant commanders.

d. The approved **security cooperation** strategies serve as the basis for security cooperation planning. Collaboration among the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies is essential. The functional combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies communicate their intended security cooperation activities to the responsible geographic combatant commanders, execute their overseas activities in support of approved **security cooperation** strategies, and assist in the annual assessment of the effectiveness of their **security cooperation** activities in furthering security cooperation goals, priorities, and strategies.

e. The DOD *Security Cooperation Guidance* and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01, *Security Cooperation Planning* (currently under revision), sets forth guidelines and procedures for developing security cooperation strategies and plans.

4. Joint Operation Planning

a. ~~Joint operation planning is the focus of this document. Joint operation planning encompasses those planning activities associated with the preparation of joint operation plans, campaign plans, and operation orders for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs). Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain objectives for possible contingencies and responses to actual events. Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders.~~The President and the Secretary of Defense direct joint operation planning to prepare and direct American military power. Joint operation planning initiates synchronization of the joint force. Joint operation planning encompasses joint planners, the planning processes, automated tools, and the supported commanders planning products; campaign plans, operation plans, and operation orders (OPORDS). The term “operation plan” is a generic term that includes operation plans (OPLANS), operation plans in concept format (CONPLANS), and functional plans (FUNCPLANS). Joint operational planning also encompasses those joint planning activities of the Military Departments, Services, and combat support agencies that support development of OPLANS or OPORDS. Joint operation and campaign planning is the focus of this document.

b. The fluid and uncertain international situation demands a planning system that generates relevant plans with a full range and menu of feasible options that can be readily adapted to changing circumstances. The new adaptive planning concept was developed to provide a rapid, networked, and iterative planning system that produces flexible, focused, comprehensive, and feasible OPLANS. Adaptive planning is the systematic, on-demand creation and revision of executable plans, with up-to-date options, as circumstances require.

~~bc. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of operation plans in complete format (OPLANS), concept plans (CONPLANS), functional plans (FUNCPLANS), campaign plans, and operation orders (OPORDs) by the combatant commanders as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these operation plans or orders. These activities also incorporate the functions of the Military Departments, Services, and combat support agencies. The term “operation plan” is a generic term that includes OPLANS, CONPLANS, and FUNCPLANS. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain objectives for possible contingencies and responses to actual events. Joint operation planning is conducted within the branch of the chain of command~~

that runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and their subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs).

ed. At the national and theater strategic levels, joint operation planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of national security strategy and the development of force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish those tasks. With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President and Secretary of Defense translate policy into national military objectives. These national military objectives facilitate joint operation planning by the Chairman and the combatant commanders.

de. Combatant commanders plan at the national and theater strategic levels of war through participation in the development of national military strategy (NMS), and the development of theater estimates, strategies, and plans. The supported combatant commander normally participates in strategic discussions with the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with multinational partners. The supported combatant commander's strategy links US national strategy to operational activities.

ef. Joint operation planning at the operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives; it is the primary responsibility of supported combatant commanders and their subordinate JFCs. The focus at this level is on operational art — the employment of military forces to attain strategic objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. ~~Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence an adversary's disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Supported combatant commanders and their subordinate JFCs are primarily responsible for campaign planning.~~

fg. The tactical level focuses on the actual employment of military forces in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to adversaries. Tactics focus on fighting and winning engagements and battles.

5. Force Planning

a. At the national strategic level, force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under the administrative control (ADCON) that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Service Chiefs. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. In areas peculiar to special operations, USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operations forces (SOF), with the exception of

1 organizing Service components. Force planning at this level is outside the scope of this
2 publication. However, Chapter V, “Assessment,” discusses how joint operation planning
3 influences force planning.

4
5 b. At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all those activities
6 performed by the supported combatant commander and subordinate component commanders
7 to select forces and capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission in the manner identified
8 in the approved concept of operations (CONOPS). It also encompasses those activities
9 performed by force providers to source and tailor those forces and capabilities with actual
10 units. Chapter III, “Joint Operation Planning,” describes this aspect of force planning in
11 greater detail.

12 13 SECTION B. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR JOINT 14 PLANNING

15 16 6. General

17
18 Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by law and
19 directive. This fundamental responsibility extends in the branch of the chain of command
20 from the **President and Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the**
21 **Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders and their subordinate**
22 **commanders.** The Chairman transmits the orders of the President and the Secretary of
23 Defense to the combatant commanders. The Chairman also oversees the activities of
24 combatant commands. The JCS function in the planning process ~~in their capacities~~ as
25 advisers to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and Secretary of Defense.
26 Although not within the branch of the chain of command used for purposes of operational
27 direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, the **Military Services** participate in
28 joint operation planning through execution of their responsibilities to: ~~(a)~~ organize, train,
29 equip, and provide forces for assignment to the combatant commands; ~~(b)~~ administer and
30 support those forces; and ~~(c)~~ prepare plans implementing joint strategic mobility, logistic,
31 and mobilization plans. However, **the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the**
32 **combatant commanders, and subordinate JFCs** have primary responsibility for
33 **planning the employment of joint forces.** ~~Their responsibilities provide the framework for~~
34 ~~joint operation planning doctrine. Subordinate JFCs apply this doctrine to joint operation~~
35 ~~planning activities at their level.~~

36 37 7. The President and the Secretary of Defense

38
39 The ultimate authority for national defense rests with the **President** as commander in
40 chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The President is assisted by the NSC, which
41 is the principal forum for the development of national security policy. The **Secretary of**
42 **Defense** is the principal assistant to the President for all matters relating to the Department of
43 Defense and is a member of the NSC. Only the President and the Secretary of Defense (or
44 their duly authorized alternates ~~or successors~~) are vested with the lawful authority to direct
45 the Armed Forces of the United States in the execution of military action, including the
46 movement of forces or the initiation of operations. In the planning process, the President and

Secretary of Defense issues policy and strategic guidance and direction. They may also review, approve, or modify joint operation planning products with the assistance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

8. Joint Planning and Execution Community

a. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in planning for the mobilization, ~~training, preparation,~~ deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces assigned or committed to conduct military operations are collectively termed the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands, the combatant commands and their ~~component subordinate~~ commands, and the combat support agencies, as shown in Figure I-2.

b. The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, organizes the JPEC for joint operation planning by establishing **supported and supporting command relationships among the combatant commands**. A supported ~~combatant~~ commander is identified for each planning task, and supporting ~~combatant~~ commanders, Services, and combat support agencies are designated as appropriate.




Figure I-2. The Joint Planning and Execution Community

1 Similarly, supported combatant commanders establish supported and supporting command
2 relationships among their subordinate commanders. This process provides for unity of
3 command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort
4 within the JPEC.

5
6 *See Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), and JP 3-0,*
7 *Doctrine for Joint Operations, for a more complete discussion of such command*
8 *relationships among combatant commanders and their subordinate commanders.*
9

10 | c. The **supported combatant commander** ~~is the JFC having~~ has primary
11 responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
12 (JSCP) or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation
13 planning, this term refers to **the commander who prepares campaign plans, operation**
14 **plans OPLANs, campaign plans, or OPORDs** in response to requirements generated by
15 the President or the Secretary of Defense.

16
17 | d. Supporting commanders provide ~~augmentation forces, assistance,~~ or other ~~support~~
18 ~~resources~~ to a ~~designated~~ supported commander(s) ~~or commanders~~. Such support is
19 provided in accordance with ~~Presidential direction in the UCP and~~ the principles set forth in
20 JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, and may include the preparation of
21 supporting plans. Under some circumstances, a commander may be a supporting
22 commander for one operation while being a supported commander for another.

23 24 9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

25
26 As the **principal military adviser** to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense, the
27 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is assigned specific responsibilities in the areas of joint
28 strategic planning and joint operation planning. In carrying out these responsibilities, the
29 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consults with and seeks the advice of other members of
30 the JCS and combatant commanders. Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the
31 President and the Secretary of Defense, and pursuant to ~~title 10, United States~~ Title 10, US
32 Code, **the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for:**

33
34 | a. Preparing **military strategy** and **assessments** of the associated risk. This includes
35 ~~the following:~~

36
37 (1) A NMS to support national objectives within policy and resource level
38 guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Such strategy will include the preparation of
39 broad military options with the advice of the other members of the JCS and the combatant
40 commanders.

41 (2) **Net assessments** to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the
42 United States and its allies as compared to the capabilities of potential adversaries.

43
44 b. Assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the **strategic**
45 **direction** of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the direction of operations
46 conducted by the combatant commanders.

1 c. Preparing **strategic plans**, including plans that conform to resource levels projected
2 by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to
3 be effective.

4
5 d. Preparing **joint logistic and mobility plans to support strategic plans** and
6 recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Military
7 Services.

8
9 e. Advising the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of **policy guidance** for the
10 preparation, review, and approval of joint ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs and security cooperation
11 plans.

12
13 f. Providing for the preparation and review of ~~joint operation plans~~ OPLANs and ~~TSC~~
14 security cooperation plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the
15 Secretary of Defense. During deliberate planning, ~~the~~ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
16 assigns planning tasks and resources and establishes planning relationships. The supported
17 combatant commander submits plans and or ~~COAs~~ strategic concepts to the Chairman of the
18 Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense for review, approval, or modification. In all
19 cases, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy reviews plans in parallel for adherence to
20 national strategic guidance and policy. In crisis ~~and military operations~~ action planning, the
21 Chairman orchestrates the development of ~~strategic options and~~ courses of action (COAs),
22 resolves conflicts in resources, provides recommendations and risk assessments to the
23 President and Secretary of Defense, conveys their decisions to the combatant commanders,
24 and monitors the deployment and employment of forces.

25
26 g. ~~Ascertaining the logistic support available to execute the joint operation plans of the~~
27 ~~combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will also review and~~
28 ~~recommend to the Secretary of Defense logistic guidance for the Military Departments and~~
29 ~~Services that enhances logistic readiness consistent with approved plans. Preparing joint~~
30 ~~logistic and mobility plans to support joint OPLANs and recommending the assignment of~~
31 ~~logistic responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those plans, and ascertaining~~
32 ~~the logistic support available to execute the joint OPLANs of the combatant commanders.~~
33 ~~The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will also review and recommend to the Secretary~~
34 ~~of Defense appropriate logistic guidance for the Military Services that, if implemented, will~~
35 ~~result in logistic readiness consistent with approved plans.~~

36
37 h. Advising the Secretary of Defense on the **critical deficiencies and strengths in**
38 **force capabilities** (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the
39 preparation and review of joint ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs and assessing the effect of such
40 deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policies.

41
42 i. Planning for **military mobilization**.

43
44 j. Reviewing the **plans and programs of the combatant commanders** to determine
45 their adequacy, consistency, acceptability, and feasibility for performing assigned missions.

1 k. Participating, as directed, in the preparation of **multinational plans** for military
2 action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations.

3 4 **10. Combatant Commanders**

5
6 a. The combatant commanders develop, ~~and~~ prepare, ~~and execute~~ joint ~~operation plans~~
7 OPLANs across the range of military operations. **During crises**, they expand and refine
8 existing ~~plans OPLANs, or~~ develop new ~~plans OPLANs as the basis for OPORDs, or, if the~~
9 scope of contemplated action requires, develop campaign plans. When military operations
10 are directed, combatant commanders plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to
11 accomplish assigned missions. Their joint operation planning responsibilities are described
12 in the UCP, JSCP, and JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. The other planning
13 activities of the combatant commanders include:

14
15 (1) Conducting strategic estimates.

16
17 (2) Assisting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing national
18 military strategy.

19
20 (3) Formulating ~~TSC—~~security cooperation and functional strategies in
21 conformance with national strategic plans.

22
23 (4) Developing campaign plans.

24
25 (5) Preparing and executing joint OPORDs.

26
27 (6) Identifying and planning for contingencies not specifically assigned by the
28 President, Secretary of Defense, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

29
30 (7) Preparing plans required to discharge responsibilities described in the UCP,
31 JSCP, and ~~the~~ JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

32
33 (8) Identify, assessing, and managing risks.

34
35 b. ~~Three of~~ Functional combatant commands are particularly relevant to joint operation
36 planning. US Transportation Command (USSTRANSCOM) and its component commands
37 plan and execute the transportation aspects of global strategic mobility operations and
38 provide centralized traffic management as well as providing deployable forces to support
39 intertheater and intratheater mobility. ~~The~~ US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has a
40 focus on transforming US military forces and ensures their readiness to support combatant
41 commands. USJFCOM, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and USSOCOM serve
42 as the joint force providers for of forces based in the continental United States (CONUS).

11. Services and ~~USSOCOM~~ United States Special Operations Command

The Services and USSOCOM **provide interoperable forces** for assignment to the combatant commanders. ~~and The Services provide or arrange for their administrative and logistic support.~~ The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. USSOCOM provides SOF with special operations-peculiar equipment, ~~material, materiel, supplies, and services, as well as Service common equipment specified in appropriate written agreements.~~ For joint operation planning, the Services and USSOCOM **make recommendations regarding the apportionment and allocation of forces and resources** to the Joint Staff. ~~and, u~~Upon the plan's approval, the Services and USSOCOM will identify the specific units and support to be allocated to source the combatant commanders' ~~joint operation plans.~~ The Services maintain Reserve Component forces for the expansion of Service capabilities and capacity in times of heightened military need, and prepare detailed mobilization, sustainment, and mobility plans containing the identification of the actual forces and support allocated.

12. Subordinate Joint Commands, ~~and Joint Task Forces,~~ and Joint Functional Component Commands

The commanders of subordinate joint commands, ~~and joint task forces (JTFs), and joint functional components~~ perform joint operation planning functions similar to those of the combatant commanders for their ~~specified assigned~~ missions or operational areas (OAs). ~~These JFCs They~~ accomplish these functions under the direction of the establishing authority, that established the subordinate joint command or JTF, using joint operation planning procedures established in this publication.

13. Service Component Commands of the Combatant Commands

~~The~~ Service component commands of the combatant commands perform joint operation planning functions both within the chain of command and under the ADCON of the Military Departments. Within the chain of command, the Service component commands recommend the proper force composition and employment of Service forces. They provide Service forces and support information for joint operation planning, prepare supporting or coordinating plans for ~~TSC security cooperation~~ activities, and prepare component-level ~~operation plans OPLANs~~ or OPORDs in support of taskings assigned to the combatant commands. Under the ADCON of their parent Military Department and Service, the Service component commands prepare and execute administrative and logistic plans to support operating forces.

14. Functional Component Commands

Functional component commands serve to ease the burden on the theater staff, free the JFC to focus more on strategic aspects of the campaign and provide a single air, land, or maritime headquarters for coordination with the other components. The JFC assigns

responsibilities to the functional component commands. Typical responsibilities include planning, organizing, coordinating, and executing functional area joint operations based on the JFCs CONOPS. Functional component commands typically exercise tactical control over functional capabilities/forces made available for tasking. Regardless of functional component commands within JFCs, Service component commands remain responsible for Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces: internal administration, training, logistics, and intelligence operations.

15. Joint Force Special Operations Component Commands

Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities establish theater special operations commands (TSOCs) as subordinate unified commands to serve as the joint force special operations component command (JFSOCC) of their unified command. Each geographic combatant commander (less Commander, United States Northern Command) has established a theater special operations command (TSOC) as a subunified command to serve as the functional special operations (SO) component for the theater. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization capable of performing broad continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities that are of strategic and operational importance to the geographic combatant commander. The TSOC is the prime mechanism by which a geographic combatant commander exercises command and control (C2) over SOF. When designated by the geographic combatant commander, the TSOC commander will function as a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). Similarly, subordinate JFCs may establish a functional joint special operations command or a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) JFSOCC to serve as the JFSOCC command element for all SO of the subordinate joint force. The JFSOCC normally exercises operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) over all assigned and attached forces SOF in order to enhance unity of effort of special operations SO throughout the joint force. USSOCOM provides special operations-peculiar support to the JFSOCCs, but and the Services with executive agency responsibility to provide their Service-common support. The JFSOCC reports to the JFC and is the principal adviser to the JFC for all special operations SO. The JFSOCC provides recommendations on organization and employment considerations for SOF and, when directed, prepares component-level operation plans OPLANs.

JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations; and JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, contain additional information on planning special operations.

16. Combat Support Agencies

a. Combat support agencies are Defense agencies so designated in law or by the Secretary of Defense that provide direct combat support to the combatant commanders and their designated components. Examples include the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Combat support agencies are differentiated from other Defense agencies in that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- (1) Provides for their strategic direction in support of military operations.
- (2) Assesses and exercises oversight of their readiness.
- (3) Provides for their participation in joint and multinational exercises.
- (4) Integrates their functional capabilities into the strategic and operation plans of the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. Combat support agencies are supporting agencies in the same manner as supporting combatant commands. Supported combatant commanders may assign them missions and tasks consistent with their assigned functions in ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs and OPORDs.

SECTION C. CONCEPTS FOR PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

17. Integrated Planning Process

a. Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military operations. The activities of the entire JPEC are integrated through an interoperable and collaborative **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**. The JOPES provides **uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures**, supported by modern communications and computer systems, to monitor, plan, and execute joint operations.

b. The JOPES provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making. When time permits, ~~the application of~~ the process is highly structured to support ~~the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans~~ iterative, concurrent, and parallel planning throughout the planning community to produce thorough and fully coordinated deliberate plans. In crisis planning, the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. During actual military operations, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. ~~under the centralized command of the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders. In all its applications, the JOPES process remains fundamentally unchanged. It provides a consistent and logical approach for integrating the activities of the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other members of the JCS, combatant commanders, and other members of the JPEC into a coherent planning and execution process to attain military objectives.~~

c. This edition of JP 5-0 ~~integrates the traditional five-phased deliberate planning process and six-phased CAP and execution process of JOPES into~~ provides a single integrated set of policies, activities, and procedures applicable to both deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP). Deliberate planning and CAP produce different products under different circumstances, but they share ~~three~~ common elements, as shown in Figure I-3. ~~The~~ The three JOPES elements are:




Figure I-3. Elements of Joint Operation Planning

1
2 (1) **Situation-Awareness Monitoring**. This element encompasses detecting and
3 identifying actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decision makers, and
4 determining threat capabilities and intentions. ~~The National Security Strategy (NSS) and~~
5 ~~NMS require the Armed Forces of the United States to maintain global vigilance~~
6 ~~continuously.~~ Multiple intelligence sources establish and maintain an understanding of
7 threat, problems or potential conditions that affect our national interests. Situation **awareness**
8 **monitoring** is essential for successful planning and execution. It provides information for
9 joint strategic planning and supports all organizational levels of the JPEC during joint
10 operation planning and execution.

(2) **Planning.** This element encompasses translating strategic guidance and direction into ~~operations plans~~ OPLANs and OPORDs ~~the various levels of detailed military plans and orders~~. Joint operation planning may be based on defined tasks identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) ~~or~~ and the JCSP-JSCP to support national security objectives. Alternatively, joint operation planning may be based on the need for a military response to a current event, emergency, or time-sensitive contingency. Deliberate planning is normally initiated by a ~~JSPS-CPG/JSCP~~ or a planning directive tasking. It is based on assigned planning guidance, derived assumptions, and apportioned forces and combat support activities. CAP is initiated to respond to a current event, emergency, or time-sensitive contingency. It is based on ~~assigned~~ planning guidance, actual circumstances, and assigned and allocated forces and combat support activities. In both cases, planning is initiated from a continuous monitoring of global events, recognition ~~for~~ of the need for a prepared military response to support the National Security Strategy (NSS), and follows a collaborative, iterative, planning process. In deliberate planning, the JSPS provides the process and products for situation monitoring.

(3) **Execution.** Execution encompasses ~~implementing~~ assessing military plans and ~~assessing~~ implementing military operations. Execution begins with a decision by the President or Secretary of Defense to use a military option to resolve a crisis. It normally ends with the redeployment or redirection of forces or the resumption of normal operations in the operational area.

~~d. Joint operation planning is a complex process that takes place in a knowledge-based collaborative environment. The emphasis is on sharing information iteratively and collaboratively throughout the process. This dynamic and flexible process reflects the current manner in which the JPEC acts in both deliberate planning and CAP situations. All echelons of command must collaborate to complete multiple tasks across a broad spectrum of activities. This broad range of activities includes data gathering and fact finding, mission analysis, preparation and distribution of planning guidance, development and refinement of force and support requirements, identification of forces and sustainment resources, and review and re-planning based on changes in assumptions or the current situation. Most planning activities are not independent events. They are dependent on other activities or the results of other activities and are performed or reviewed at multiple echelons of commands in overlapping timeframes. Concurrent execution may increase the tempo in which these planning activities must occur. Joint planning and execution are interdependent and are optimized when consistently integrating situation awareness.~~

~~e. Joint operation planning must be flexible and responsive to dynamic conditions. Commands and organizations must be able to integrate data in order to provide actionable information to commanders and their staffs at the multiple echelons of command. A JOPES environment that fosters sequential activities is no longer adequate. Today's dynamic, fast-paced security environment demands that the JPEC be able to gather, review, integrate, and act upon information collaboratively.~~

~~f. Collaboration in a knowledge-based environment is the cornerstone of the JOPES. Collaboration provides planners and operators worldwide with the ability to build a plan in components or sub-plans in parallel, and to integrate their products into the overall plan. Collaboration also provides planners with a “view of the whole” while working on various sections of a plan and provides them with the means to identify and resolve planning conflicts early.~~

18. Scope of Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning encompasses the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces, as shown in Figure I-4.

a. **Mobilization.** Mobilization is the process by which all or selected parts of the Armed Forces of the United States are brought to the necessary state of readiness for military operations or other national emergencies. It involves assembling and organizing the nation’s resources to support national objectives ~~in time or war and for military operations other than war across the full range of military operations~~. Mobilization may include activating all or part of the Reserve Components. Mobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services, in close cooperation with the supported combatant commanders and their Service component commanders.

b. **Deployment.** Deployment encompasses the movement of forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific destination to conduct joint operations. It specifically includes movement within the CONUS and the intertheater and intratheater movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them. Deployment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the ~~joint force providers supporting combatant commanders~~ and USTRANSCOM.




Figure I-4. Scope of Joint Operation Planning

c. **Employment.** Employment encompasses the use of military forces and capabilities within an operational area to accomplish strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Employment planning provides the foundation for, determines the scope of, and is limited by, mobilization, deployment, and sustainment planning. Employment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders and their subordinate and supporting commanders.

d. **Sustainment.** Sustainment encompasses providing and maintaining adequate levels of personnel, materiel, supplies, and services to support the planned levels of military activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies, and supporting commands.

e. **Redeployment.** Redeployment encompasses the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, ~~or to the CONUS~~ for the purpose of further employment. Redeployment also includes the return of forces and resources to their original location and status. Redeployment is primarily the responsibility of supported combatant commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the ~~joint force providers supporting combatant commanders~~ and USTRANSCOM.

f. **Demobilization.** Demobilization encompasses the transition of a mobilized military establishment and civilian economy to a normal configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It includes the return of Reserve Component units, individuals, and materiel stocks to their former status. Demobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services, in close cooperation with the supported combatant commanders and their Service component commanders.

g. Appendix A, “Scope of Joint Operation Planning,” provides greater detail on the full range of activities required to conduct joint operation planning.

19. Types of Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning can occur anywhere within the range of military operations and may be performed deliberately in a deliberate environment or under crisis action ~~conditions time constraints~~. Joint operation planning is directed, coordinated, and approved or reviewed at the national level to support strategic requirements, ~~which may be relatively anticipated or relatively unanticipated. In either case, t~~The Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigns planning tasks and relationships among the combatant commanders and apportion~~s~~ or allocat~~e~~s them the necessary forces and resources to accomplish those tasks. Deliberate planning, CAP, and campaign planning share common planning activities and are interrelated, as shown in Figure I-5. For example, campaign




Figure I-5. Types of Joint Operation Plans

1 planning and CAP for Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM were
 2 based on an existing (although not yet completed) deliberate plan.

4 20. Adaptive Planning

6 Adaptive planning is the systematic, on-demand, creation and revision of executable
 7 plans, with up-to-date options, as circumstances require. Ultimately, its purpose is no
 8 different than deliberate and crisis action planning – to provide relevant options to the
 9 Secretary of Defense and President. However, adaptive planning is designed to better
 10 respond to a post-cold war, continuously changing strategic environment. Adaptive
 11 planning places a premium on flexibility. Inflexible plans developed over lengthy time
 12 periods using static intelligence, assumptions, and force-flows are of little value in our
 13 current environment. If we truly are to provide “relevant” options to our leadership, our
 14 plans must “adapt” just as the world around them does. Expanded planning concurrency
 15 and collaboration are critical adaptive planning elements and enablers. Adaptive
 16 planning is not just a concept; we are developing plans under this construct today.
 17 However, we are still developing the enhanced automated systems and tools needed to
 18 bring to bear the full capability of adaptive planning.

20 2021. Deliberate Planning

22 a. When time permits, the JPEC uses deliberate planning to develop various levels of
 23 detailed joint ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs for a broad range of potential contingencies based

upon the best available information and using JSP-apportioned forces and resources. ~~apportioned for deliberate planning by the JSCP. Deliberate planning encompasses the JOPES activities associated with the development of joint operation plans for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of apportioned forces and resources in response to a hypothetical situation identified in joint strategic planning documents. Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. Deliberate planning most often applies to the conduct of combat operations, but can also apply to military operations other than war (MOOTW).~~ **Deliberate planning and its analysis determine the supportability of the national strategy.** Deliberate planning encompasses the JOPES activities associated with the development of joint OPLANs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of apportioned forces and resources in response to a hypothetical situation identified in joint strategic planning documents. Deliberate planning provides a foundation for, and eases the transition to, CAP. Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. To transition to CAP, deliberate planning assumptions must be examined and the plans adjusted accordingly to account for any differences between the assumptions and the actual circumstances at the time of the crisis. Work performed during the deliberate planning process allows the JPEC to develop the processes, procedures, and planning expertise that are critically needed during CAP.

b. Deliberate planning begins when a planning requirement is identified in the CPG/JSCP or a planning order, and continues until the requirement no longer exists. Plans are produced and continuously maintained to keep them relevant. Deliberate plans are prepared in prescribed cycles in accordance with formally established procedures that complement and support other DOD planning cycles. Deliberate planning is conducted to develop joint plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. A new deliberate plan usually begins with the publication of a change to the JSCP. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and establishes submission dates for joint operation plans. The Joint Staff can also direct out-of-cycle deliberate planning when circumstances warrant disruption of the normal planning cycle. Deliberate planning most often applies to the conduct of combat operations, but can also apply to military operations other than war (MOOTW)addresses military options requiring combat operations; however, plans must account for all phases of the operations equally – post-conflict operations are often the most complicated, lengthy, and crucial to the overall strategic success of any campaign. Deliberate plans are prepared in prescribed cycles in accordance with formally established procedures that complement and support other DOD planning cycles. Deliberate planning is conducted to develop joint plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. A new deliberate plan usually begins with the publication of a change to the JSCP. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and establishes submission dates for joint OPLANs. The Joint Staff can also direct out-of-cycle deliberate planning when circumstances warrant disruption of the normal planning cycle.

1 c. Deliberate planning is a **collaborative process** that engages the ~~commanders and~~
2 ~~staffs of the entire JPEC in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex plans~~
3 ~~for all contingencies identified in strategic planning documents, transition to and from~~
4 ~~military operations, and subsequent phases of an ongoing campaign. Deliberate planning~~
5 ~~activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel.~~ Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the
6 ~~Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, Joint commanders, and staffs of the entire JPEC in the~~
7 ~~development of relevant plans for all contingencies identified in the CPG/JSCP and other~~
8 ~~planning directives. Deliberate planning includes iterative activities between the Secretary~~
9 ~~of Defense, CJCS, and the combatant commander. Deliberate planning also includes JPEC~~
10 ~~concurrent, collaborative, and parallel joint planning activities. Joint operation plans are~~
11 ~~prepared and implemented by the combatant commanders, subordinate JFCs, and other~~
12 ~~designated component commanders under the strategic direction of the President and~~
13 ~~Secretary of Defense. These commanders prepare deliberate plans as directed in the~~
14 ~~CPG/JSCP or other planning directive. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,~~
15 ~~Services, and combat support agencies review those joint operation plans tasked in the JSCP~~
16 ~~for Secretary of Defense approval. Combatant commanders may direct the development of~~
17 ~~additional plans by their commands to accomplish assigned or implied missions. All~~
18 ~~operation plans developed on the initiative of the combatant commanders are submitted to~~
19 ~~the Joint Staff for JPEC review.~~–

20
21 d. ~~Joint operation plans are prepared and implemented by the combatant commanders,~~
22 ~~subordinate JFCs, and other designated component commanders who perform such planning~~
23 ~~under the strategic direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, as communicated~~
24 ~~through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These commanders prepare deliberate~~
25 ~~plans as directed in the JSCP. Combatant commanders may direct the development of~~
26 ~~additional plans by their commands to accomplish assigned or implied missions. When~~
27 ~~directed by the President or Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of~~
28 ~~Staff, the combatant commanders may convert deliberate plans into campaign plans and~~
29 ~~OPORDs for execution. Combatant commands continue deliberate planning even when~~
30 ~~engaged in actual contingency operations. However, many deliberate planning resources are~~
31 ~~often required for CAP and some deliberate planning may be interrupted or delayed until the~~
32 ~~contingency is stabilized or resolved.~~

33
34 e. ~~Combatant commands continue deliberate planning even when engaged in actual~~
35 ~~contingency operations. However, many deliberate planning resources are required for CAP~~
36 ~~and some deliberate planning may be interrupted or delayed until the contingency is~~
37 ~~stabilized or resolved.~~

38
39 e. The Joint Staff, Services, and combat support agencies review those joint operation
40 plans tasked in the JSCP for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approval. The Under
41 Secretary of Defense for Policy also reviews those plans for policy considerations following
42 their approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All plans developed on the
43 initiative of the combatant commanders are submitted to the Joint Staff for review upon
44 completion. When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense through the Chairman
45 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders may convert deliberate plans into
46 campaign plans and OPORDs for execution.

f. Chapter III, “Joint Operation Planning,” discusses deliberate planning in greater detail.

2422. Crisis Action Planning

a. CAP encompasses the JOPES activities associated with the time-sensitive development of joint ~~operation plans—OPLANs~~ and ~~orders—OPORDs~~ for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources in response to an actual situation that may result in actual military operations. ~~CAP is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.~~ While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, CAP is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. ¶There are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in deliberate planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. Usually, the time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible COA must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of US military force.

b. Within the context of joint operations planning and execution, a crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests. It develops rapidly and creates a condition of such national importance that the President or Secretary of Defense considers a commitment of US military forces—and resources—is contemplated to achieve national objectives to resolve the situation. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast breaking and requires accelerated decision making. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere.

~~c. Several characteristics of a crisis can be given. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast breaking and requires accelerated decision making. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. Whatever the nature or perceived magnitude of the situation, a crisis occurs when the President or Secretary of Defense considers a commitment of US military forces to resolve a situation. The use of US military force requires a decision by the President.~~

c. In a crisis, the situational awareness is dynamic, ~~with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from continuously fed by~~ the latest intelligence and operations reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and to the use of previous planning, whenever possible. ~~The principal players need to know what others are doing. All players need to know what is expected of them.~~

d. In such a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the JPEC uses CAP to adjust ~~and implement—~~previously prepared joint ~~operation plans—OPLANs~~ and convert them to executable OPORDs or to develop and execute OPORDs from scratch when no useful joint

1 | ~~operation plan-OPLAN~~ exists. The supported commander may also develop a campaign
2 | plan if warranted by the scope and duration of contemplated operations.

3 |
4 | e. CAP activities are common with deliberate planning activities, but CAP is based on
5 | dynamic real world conditions vice static assumptions. ~~They provide for the rapid and~~
6 | ~~effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for~~
7 | ~~consideration by the President or Secretary of Defense, and the prompt transmission of their~~
8 | ~~decisions to the JPEC. This ensures:~~

9 |
10 | ~~(1) Logical procedures are followed, from recognizing the problem, to preparing~~
11 | ~~and executing the OPORD.~~

12 |
13 | ~~(2) Exchange of information about the situation, its analysis, and alternative~~
14 | ~~military responses is rapid and effective.~~

15 |
16 | ~~(3) Military COAs are prepared for consideration by the President, Secretary of~~
17 | ~~Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a timely fashion.~~

18 |
19 | ~~(4) Decisions of the President and Secretary of Defense are rapidly relayed to the~~
20 | ~~combatant commander.~~The adaptive planning construct was developed to better facilitate a
21 | transition from deliberate to crisis-action planning.

22 |
23 | f. ~~Since each crisis is unique, it is unreasonable to expect to use a rigid set of rules in~~
24 | ~~response to every situation.~~ CAP ~~planning~~ activities may be performed sequentially or in
25 | parallel, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently.
26 | The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the
27 | planning and by the significance of the crisis.

28 |
29 | g. CAP provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant
30 | commanders a process for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of
31 | command to the President and Secretary of Defense. CAP facilitates the flow of information
32 | among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice from the Chairman of
33 | the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the analysis of military options. Additionally, CAP allows the
34 | President and Secretary of Defense to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately
35 | through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders, subordinate
36 | and supporting commanders, the Services, and combat support agencies to initiate detailed
37 | military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military
38 | options. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the operation.

39 |
40 | (1) CAP permits the JPEC to exchange essential deployment data rapidly and
41 | accurately in a crisis.

42 |
43 | (2) CAP provides an ability to develop an adequate and transportation-feasible
44 | military response during a time-constrained planning period.

45 |

(3) ~~JOPES-CAP~~ computer support offers the JPEC the capability to monitor strategic movement during execution of the plan.

(4) CAP accommodates the need for different degrees of detail, given the different amounts of time available for planning among the various command levels.

(5) CAP describes actions to be performed by the JPEC from the beginning of a crisis either through the commitment of US military forces or to the point where the need for military force ends and military activity is canceled.

h. Chapter III, "Joint Operation Planning," discusses CAP in greater detail.

~~22. Relationship of CAP to Deliberate Planning~~

~~—CAP procedures provide for the transition from planning of military operations to their execution. Deliberate planning provides the foundation for CAP by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing joint operation plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for hypothetical crises based on the best available information and using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be effective. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it unlikely that any deliberate operation plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds because every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished in the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decision making and execution planning during a crisis. During CAP, existing plans, if available, are expanded or modified to meet the crisis situation. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. Therefore, CAP procedures include the consideration and exploitation of deliberate planning whenever possible.~~

~~2223. Campaign Planning~~

~~Campaign planning is a hybrid that~~ may encompass aspects of deliberate, and crisis action, and TSC planning. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning, ~~and it may drive TSC~~ to establish the strategic conditions necessary for success. It is not a separate planning process, but provides a comprehensive framework for developing and organizing plans to achieve military objectives. Campaign planning continues through CAP, developing and refining subsequent phases of the campaign concurrently with the execution of the current phase. Supported commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the **supported commander's strategic vision of the arrangement of related military operations** necessary to attain national or theater strategic objectives. ~~If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through CAP, thus unifying both planning processes.~~ Pre-crisis analysis, planning,



The time-phased deployment of properly equipped forces to locations where they can best be used is a challenge that planning must solve to achieve national objectives.

1 and exercises provide the basis and framework for successful campaign planning in crisis or
2 conflict. Chapter IV, “Campaign Planning,” discusses campaign planning in greater detail.

3 4 5 | **2324. Types of Joint Operation Plans and Orders**

6
7 | Joint operation planning includes the preparation of ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs, campaign
8 | plans, and OPORDs, ~~as shown in Figure I-3 above.~~

9
10 | a. **OPLAN.** An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan containing a full description
11 | of the ~~concept of operations (CONOPS)~~ and all required annexes with associated
12 | appendixes, including a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. It identifies
13 | the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to

execute the plan. It provides estimates for their movement into the theater OA. An OPLAN can be used as a basis for rapid development of an OPORD or campaign plan. OPLANs are normally prepared when:

(1) The contingency has a compelling national interest, a specific threat, is critical to national security and requires detailed planning.

(2) The large scale of the contingency requires detailed planning.

(3) Detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness and resolve.

(4) Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.

(5) Detailed planning is required to determine the feasibility of the plan's CONOPS.

(6) Detailed planning is necessary to determine force and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

b. **CONPLAN without TPFDD.** ~~A CONPLAN is an operation plan OPLAN in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD.~~ A CONPLAN contains the base plan, the commander's CONOPS, and the required annexes and appendixes required by the JSCP CJCSI 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance), or deemed necessary by the supported commander. CONPLANs are generally developed to meet common type missions that may develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly different circumstances; ~~e.g., nonecombatant evacuation operations.~~ Unless directed in the JSCP, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

c. **CONPLAN with TPFDD.** A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for the phased deployment of forces. Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but that is not likely to occur in the near term. These conditions require planning associated with the employment aspects of the plan for a clear understanding of the supported commander's CONOPS. Phasing, centers of gravity (COGs), and commander's intent enhance a clear understanding of what forces are required and when they have to be deployed (e.g., TPFDD) in order to achieve the strategic objective. A CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be required where the primary purpose is force movement planning in support of multinational operations. In this case, the supporting US commander should consider and incorporate multinational ~~campaign~~ planning to the maximum extent possible. However, the level of detail contained in the supporting US CONPLANs is dependent upon

1 the detail of the multinational planning that these CONPLANs support; a campaign
2 orientation may not always be possible.

3
4 d. **Functional Plan.** FUNCPLANs are ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs in abbreviated format
5 that are normally developed for specific functions or discrete tasks such as ~~noncombatant~~
6 ~~evacuation~~, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, civil support, foreign humanitarian
7 assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, or continuity of operations.
8 FUNCPLANs ~~will be~~ written using the JOPES procedures and formats specified for a
9 CONPLAN (without a TPFDD).

10
11 e. **Supporting Plan.** Supporting combatant commanders, subordinate JFCs,
12 component commanders, and combat support agencies prepare supporting plans as tasked by
13 the supported commanders in support of their deliberate plans. These plans are developed
14 concurrently with the supported commander's plan. These commanders or agencies may, in
15 turn, assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans.
16 ~~Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the~~
17 ~~forces when the supported plan is implemented.~~—In the absence of instructions to the
18 contrary, supported commanders will review and approve supporting plans.

19
20 f. **Campaign Plan.** A campaign plan ~~is a plan for~~ contains a series-phased schedule of
21 related military operations and force requirements for each phase aimed at accomplishing a
22 strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. ~~Campaign planning may~~
23 ~~begin with or during deliberate planning but is normally completed during CAP.~~ Campaign
24 plans are further discussed in Chapter IV, “Campaign Planning.”

25
26 g. **Operation Order.** An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate
27 commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.
28 OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during CAP.

29
30 h. **Warning Order.** A warning order (WARNORD) is a JOPES planning directive that
31 initiates the development and evaluation of military COAs by a supported commander and
32 requests that the supported commander submit a commander's estimate.

33
34 i. **Planning Order.** A planning order (PLANORD) is a JOPES planning directive that
35 provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development before
36 the directing authority approves a military COA.

37
38 j. **Alert Order.** An alert order (ALERTORD) is a JOPES planning directive that
39 provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development after the
40 directing authority approves a military COA. An ALERTORD does not authorize execution
41 of the approved COA.

42
43 k. **Execute Order.** An execute order (EXORD) is a directive to implement an
44 approved military COA. Only the President and the Secretary of Defense have the authority
45 to approve and direct the initiation of military operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
46 of Staff, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense,

1 ~~issues may issue~~ an EXORD to initiate military operations. Upon receipt of such an
2 EXORD, combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs use EXORDs to implement the
3 approved CONOPS.

4
5 **1. Prepare to Deploy Order and Deployment Order.** The Chairman of the Joint
6 Chiefs of Staff, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or Secretary of
7 Defense, issues a prepare to deploy order (PTDO) or deployment order (DEPORD) to:

8
9 (1) Increase or decrease the deployability posture of units.

10
11 (2) Transfer ~~combatant command authority or operational control of~~ forces from
12 one combatant commander to another with the gaining combatant commander exercising
13 combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) or OPCON of the gained forces.

14
15 (3) Deploy or redeploy forces from one combatant commander's AOR to another.

16
17 (4) In the case of a PTDO, propose the day on which a deployment operations
18 begins (C-day) and the specific hour on C-day when deployment is to commence (L-hour).

19
20 (5) In the case of a DEPORD, establish C-day and the specific hour on C-day
21 when deployment is to commence (L-hour).

22
23 (6) Direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its
24 termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident.

25
26 m. Geographic combatant commanders can issue PTDOs and ~~DEPORDs to~~ deploy
27 assigned and attached forces within their AORs without authorization from the Secretary of
28 Defense, but they cannot employ forces without such authorization. Combatant commanders
29 should, in certain crisis situations, consult with the Secretary of Defense before deploying
30 assigned and attached forces within their AOR so as not to provoke an adversary or worsen
31 the situation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may incorporate PTDOs and
32 DEPORDs into other JOPES planning directives (e.g., WARNORDs, PLANORDs,
33 ALERTORDs, or EXORDs). However, deployment or preparation for deployment
34 frequently occur independent of these orders. Therefore, PTDOs and DEPORDs may be
35 issued separately at any point in CAP.

36
37 n. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I:*
38 *(Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*, provides the procedures and formats for all JOPES
39 planning directives.

40 41 **2425. Assigned, Attached, Apportioned, and Allocated Forces**

42
43 Joint operation planning uses four terms to define the **availability of forces and**
44 **resources for planning and conducting joint operations.** The four availability categories
45 are assigned, attached, apportioned, and allocated.

a. **Assigned.** ~~In joint operations, assigned forces and resources are those in being that have been placed under the combatant command authority (COCOM) of a combatant commander where such placement is relatively permanent. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of C2 is required or desired. The combatant commander exercises COCOM over forces assigned or reassigned by the President and/or Secretary of Defense.~~ The Secretary of Defense ~~assigns~~ directs assignment of forces to the combatant commands in the “*Forces For Unified Commands*” memorandum or a subsequent DEPOD. Forces ~~and resources~~ so assigned are available for the normal operations of that command.

b. **Attached.** ~~In joint operations, attached forces and resources are those in being that have been placed under the OPCON of a combatant commander or JFC for a relatively temporary situation. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces is expected to be of short duration will be temporary. The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over forces attached by the Secretary of Defense.~~ Establishing authorities for subordinate ~~joint unified~~ commands and JTFs normally will direct the delegation of OPCON ~~or TACON~~ over forces attached to those subordinate commands. ~~The administration and support of forces attached to a joint force remain the responsibility of the parent Service.~~

c. **Apportioned.** ~~Apportioned forces and resources are those assumed to be available for deliberate planning as of a specified date. The JSCP apportions major combat forces for deliberate planning. They may include those assigned, and those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for CAP. During force planning, combatant commanders assume that apportioned forces will be made available for execution.~~ The JSCP apportions capabilities (i.e., a carrier battle group). The Services then source those capabilities with specific units (groups, squadrons, etc.) Apportioned forces may develop a habitual operational or training relationship with a combatant command.

d. **Allocated.** Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the President or Secretary of Defense for CAP. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished in JOPES ~~planning directives orders~~. Allocated augmenting forces become assigned or attached forces when they are transferred to the receiving combatant commander. These forces may be different from those previously apportioned for planning and sourced by the Services for TPFDD development. Services are permitted to substitute forces at execution if apportioned forces are deemed unavailable. For example, unavailable units may be undergoing ~~transformation reconstitution~~, be experiencing significant readiness shortfalls, or already be supporting another operation.

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM: THE EARLY YEARS

In the National Security Act of 1947 the first listed duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was “to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces.” During the first five years following enactment of the basic legislation the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharged their planning responsibility in a rather unsystematic manner. Plans were drawn to meet particular contingencies but they were not prepared or revised on a regular schedule. The plans were not interrelated in a comprehensive system, nor were they scheduled to provide timely guidance for the necessary annual decisions concerning budgets, force levels, deployments, and mobilization.

Until late in 1949 the unsystematic approach to planning resulted from the relatively small size of the Joint Staff. The National Security Act Amendments of that year authorized enlarging the Joint Staff to 210 officers, more than double the number previously assigned, but not many months later the outbreak of the conflict in Korea imposed new requirements on the JCS supporting organization. Thus, although the Director, Joint Staff, had submitted recommendations for placing JCS planning on a systematic basis as early as December 1949, a formal JCS “Program for Planning” was not adopted until mid-1952.

On 14 July 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 84 which called for the preparation each year of joint strategic plans for the long-, mid-, and short-range. The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) would treat the five-year period starting on 1 July approximately five years after the approval of the estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was designed to translate US national policy into long-range supporting military strategy and objectives and also provide guidance for research by identifying desirable objectives for technical development.

The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the mid-range plan, would apply to the four-year period beginning 1 July three years after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to providing strategic guidance for the mid-range period, this plan would provide specific guidance for the pre-D-day development of the forces needed to support it and for the preparation of Service budget requests for the fiscal year beginning two years after the plan was approved. It would also provide guidance for mobilization planning by the Services and the Munitions Board. The plan would have three sections. The first would provide guidance for the preparation of the part of the annual budget dealing with the development of the US and allied military forces needed during peacetime and in military conflict short of total war. The second would guide preparation of the part of the annual budget devoted to supporting the US and allied forces necessary to conduct combat operations during the initial phase of general war. The

1

third would guide preparation of the part of the annual budget addressed to developing the additional forces and resources needed prior to D-day for the mobilization base and to meeting mobilization requirements during 48 months of general war. To assure the orderly implementation, the JSOP was to be ready for JCS consideration by 1 May each year, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to give their final approval by 30 June.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the short-range plan, assumed that D-day would occur on 1 July following JCS approval. It would guide the employment of available US and allied military forces under conditions of peace, in limited military conflict, and during the initial phase of general war. It would also guide the expansion of US and allied forces during the first 48 months of general war. The JSCP would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 1 November each year; they would complete action on it by 31 December.

From the first, this planning system failed to operate as anticipated. Under the schedule established by MOP 84, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have completed the following plans by the end of 1954: two Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates, covering the period from 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1964; two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, for D-days of 1 July 1956 and 1 July 1957; and three Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956. But the planning tasks had proved more exacting and the problems of coordination more extensive than expected, and progress had been hindered even more by the fundamental disagreements among the Services over strategic concepts that the effort revealed. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed only one plan, the JSCP for FY 1955, and this was finished more than three months behind schedule. Two plans were in progress at the end of 1954: the next JSCP, for FY 1956, and a Joint Mid-Range War Plan (JMRWP) for a D-day of 1 July 1957. No JLRSE existed even in draft form and none was in sight within the near future. To complete the two plans under preparation became the first order of business for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of strategic planning during the period 1955-1956.

SOURCE: Condit, Kenneth W., "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956," *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI*, Joint Staff Historical Office, 1992

2

CHAPTER II STRATEGIC DIRECTION

"In total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise line between military and non-military problems."

Winston Churchill
Their Finest Hour, 1949

1. General

a. It is at the national ~~strategie~~-level where a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational security objectives. The President and Secretary of Defense provide strategic direction and national resources to accomplish national military objectives. **Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and Defense-combat support agencies.** Consistent with the strategic guidance contained in the President's NSS, the Secretary of Defense develops a national defense strategy that establishes broad defense policy goals and priorities for the development, employment, and sustainment of US military forces. The national defense strategy may be published separately or as part of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) developed in the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review. Based upon the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops the NMS, which provides military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on how to employ the military in support of national security objectives. These national security, defense, and military strategies provide strategic direction for the combatant commanders and, in combination with the theater military strategy, provide guidance for planning campaigns and major operations within their OAs.

b. Activities at the national ~~strategie~~-level include:

(1) Establishing national and multinational military objectives.

(2) Sequencing initiatives.

(3) Defining the limits, synchronizing the efforts, and assessing the risks, costs, and consequences of specific actions and operations of all the instruments of national power.

(4) Developing global strategies to achieve these objectives.

(5) Ensuring national strategic unity of effort.

(6) Determining and analyzing threats to US national interests.

SECTION A. NATIONAL SYSTEMS

2. Introduction

Four interrelated **national-level systems influence and direct** the joint operation planning responsibilities identified in Chapter I, “Principles and Concepts.” The four national-level systems are the NSC system, PPBS, JSPS, and JOPES. This section briefly describes these systems. Chapter III, “Joint Operation Planning,” discusses JOPES in greater detail.

3. National Security Council System

a. The NSC system is the principal forum for the interagency deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national strategy and policy objectives. Although the actual structure of the NSC varies among administrations, the system typically includes a hierarchy of interagency committees and working groups. Those committees and working groups:

- (1) Develop policy options.
- (2) Consider implications.
- (3) Coordinate operational problems that require interagency consideration.
- (4) Develop recommendations for the President.
- (5) Monitor policy implementation.

b. Members of the Joint Staff participate regularly in the work of the NSC committees and working groups. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharges a substantial part of his statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman regularly attends NSC meetings and presents his views and those of the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares national security guidance that, with Presidential approval, implements national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for military planning and programming.

4. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

a. **General.** The PPBS is the **defense-wide system** that relates resources to strategy. **This system’s ~~ultimate~~ objective is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the operational requirements of the combatant commanders and the provisioning requirements of the Services and ~~Defense~~-combat support agencies.** The PPBS encompasses three phases:

b. **Planning.** The planning phase of the PPBS articulates the national policy, military strategy, and the force requirements necessary to support the national defense. In response to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the JCS, uses the JSPS to develop military objectives, strategy, recommended forces, options, assessments, and evaluation of risk. The Chairman submits input to the DPG in the ~~joint planning document (JPD)~~ and Chairman's program recommendation (CPR). The DPG furnishes the planning, programming and fiscal guidance of the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments, ~~Defense combat support Agencies~~, and USSOCOM for the development of the ~~F~~future ~~Y~~years ~~D~~efense ~~P~~lan (~~FYDP~~)-submitted in their ~~P~~rogram ~~O~~bjective ~~M~~emorandums (POMs). The DPG includes all the major planning decisions, strategy, and policies; therefore, the DPG is the link between planning and programming. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy develops the DPG in close coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, ~~Defense combat support Agencies~~, and combatant commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, the combatant commanders, and other members of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) conduct a final review before the Secretary of Defense approves the DPG.

c. **Programming.** The programming phase of the PPBS focuses on the development of POMs and the integration of those POMs into a coherent defense program to support the operational requirements of the combatant commanders. The combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services and ~~Defense combat support Agencies~~ and to USSOCOM for special operation-~~(SO)~~-peculiar requirements, and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of the integrated priority list-~~(IPL)~~. The Military Departments, ~~Defense combat support Agencies~~, and USSOCOM develop their POMs based on the combatant command requirements and strategic planning and programming guidance contained in the DPG. The POMs express the Services' total requirements and include risk assessments, as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the overall balance and adequacy of the composite POM force and support levels in view of the approved NMS and the requirements of the combatant commanders and documents his assessment in the Chairman's program assessment (CPA). After POM submission, the DOD components identify program issues for resolution by the DRB and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in an annual program review. The results of the program review are promulgated in the Secretary's program decision memorandums (PDMs). The PDM is the link between programming and budgeting.

d. **Budgeting.** The final phase of the PPBS is budgeting. Once the PDMs are received, the Military Departments, the ~~Defense combat support Agencies~~, and USSOCOM prepare their budget estimates for submission to the Secretary of Defense. **The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Chief Financial Officer prepares and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)** reviews the defense budget to ensure that it is consistent with fiscal guidance. The Chief Financial Officer documents **budget submission changes in program budget decisions (PBDs)**. During this final phase of budgeting, the

1 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the combatant commanders
2 assess the impact of PBDs on military capabilities. Their concerns are presented to the
3 Secretary of Defense. The Chief Financial Officer incorporates any **final changes** to
4 establish the DOD portion of the President's budget, which is **submitted to Congress for**
5 **funding**. Following a lengthy review and reclama process, Congress authorizes and
6 appropriates funds based on the President's Budget Estimate Submission. When the
7 President signs the Congressional appropriations bill into law, **the Services, Defense**
8 **combat support Agencies, and USSOCOM execute the budget** to procure forces and
9 capabilities.

10
11 e. CJCSI 8501.01, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the*
12 *Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and*
13 *Budgeting System*, describes participation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
14 combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff in the PPBS.

15 16 **5. Joint Strategic Planning System**

17
18 a. **General.** The JSPS is one of the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint
19 Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the combatant
20 commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities required by Title 10, US Code, and
21 further delineated in DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its*
22 *Major Components*. CJCSI 3100.01 A, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, describes the policy
23 and procedures governing the JSPS. The purpose and outputs of the JSPS are summarized in
24 Figure II-1.

INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

Figure II-1. Joint Strategic Planning System

1 b. **Joint Strategic Planning System Interactions.** The JSPS is a flexible ~~and~~
2 ~~interactive~~-system ~~that interacts with other national planning systems. It takes its lead from~~
3 ~~the NSC, offers intended to provide supporting~~ military advice to the ~~DOD-PPBS,~~ and
4 ~~provides~~ strategic guidance for use in JOPES. The JSPS provides the means for the
5 Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the JCS and the combatant
6 commanders, to:

- 7
- 8 (1) Review the national security environment and US national security objectives.
- 9
- 10 (2) Evaluate risks and threats.
- 11
- 12 (3) Assess the adequacy of current strategy and existing or proposed programs and
13 budgets.

1 (4) Propose military strategy, programs, forces and capabilities necessary to
2 achieve national security objectives in a resource-limited environment, consistent with
3 policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

4
5 c. The JSPS is also a formal means by which the other members of the JCS and the
6 combatant commanders carry out some of their statutory responsibilities. Therefore, the
7 JSPS process must establish the opportunity for their timely and substantive participation in
8 the development of every JSPS document. As programs are developed and resources
9 allocated, JSPS products and JSPS-related documents provide a means to evaluate
10 capabilities and assess the adequacy and risk associated with the programs and budgets of
11 the Military Departments and Defense Agencies and, where appropriate, propose changes to
12 those programs and budgets. Figure II-23 illustrates the relationship between various JSPS
13 products and JSPS-related documents s-interfaces.

14
15 d. **Contingency Planning Guidance.** The Secretary of Defense has a statutory
16 requirement to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with written guidance for
17 the preparation and review of contingency plans, including guidance on the This guidance
18 includes the relative priority of the plans, specific force levels, and specific supporting
19 resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be
20 effective. The CPG provides this guidance and directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
21 Staff to develop plans to carry out specific missions. The Under Secretary of Defense for
22 Policy prepares the CPG and coordinates it with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
23 and other DOD components before the Secretary of Defense submits it to the President for
24 approval. The CPG is a primary source document used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
25 of Staff to develop the JSCP. For priority plans, OSD also prepares Strategic Guidance
26 Statements (SGS). These SGS supplement the CPG with updated information and more
27 specific policy and regional guidance.

28
29 e. **Joint Strategy Review.** The central process of the JSPS is the **joint strategy**
30 **review (JSR)**. The JSR is the primary JSPS mechanism for the continuous study and
31 assessment of **the strategic environment to identify conditions or trends that may**
32 **warrant a change of the strategic direction of the Armed Forces**. The JSR continuously
33 gathers information; examines current, emerging and future issues, threats, technologies,
34 organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions; and reviews
35 and assesses current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives. The JSR facilitates the
36 integration of strategy, joint operation planning, and program assessment. When significant
37 changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified, **JSR issue papers are**
38 **presented** to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members of the JCS, and
39 the combatant commanders. These papers will provide arguments for proposed changes to
40 the NMS, ~~Joint Planning Document (JPD)~~, JSCP, and CPA.

41
42 f. **National Military Strategy.** **The NMS provides the advice of the Chairman, to the**
43 **President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense on how the United States should**
44 **employ its Armed Forces in support of the President's NSS. The NMS defines the**
45 **national military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these objectives,**
46 **and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The NMS is**




Figure II-2. Joint Strategic Planning System Interactions

designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the **DPG-defense strategy** and to guide the development of the JSCP. Following Secretary of Defense review, the NMS is forwarded to the President. The NMS may be used to determine the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position on matters of strategic importance to the President and Secretary of Defense.

~~g. **Joint Planning Document.** The joint planning document (JPD) provides the Chairman's strategy-based planning advice, broad programmatic advice, and priorities to the Secretaries of Defense to influence the initial drafting of the DPG. The JPD incorporates input from the combatant commands and Services.~~

1 | g. **Chairman's Program Recommendation.** The CPR provides the Chairman's
2 | specific, personal advice on programs and alternative budget proposals to the Secretary of
3 | Defense for use in finalizing the DPG programming guidance provided to the DOD
4 | components.

5 |
6 | h. **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The JSCP provides military strategic and
7 | operational guidance and direction to the combatant commanders and the Service Chiefs
8 | for the preparation of ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs and ~~TSC security cooperation~~ plans **based**
9 | **on current military capabilities.** It **apportions major combat forces and other**
10 | **resources to combatant commanders for deliberate planning**, based on military
11 | capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. **The JSCP provides the**
12 | **strategic direction required to** integrate the deliberate planning activities of the entire
13 | JPEC within a coherent and focused framework. The JSCP provides specific theater
14 | planning tasks and objectives; and delineates necessary planning assumptions; ~~and~~
15 | ~~apportions major forces and resources to the combatant commanders.~~ Based on policy
16 | guidance and tasks in the CPG, the JSCP is the link between joint strategic planning and
17 | joint operation planning. The major factors used in developing the JSCP are shown in
18 | Figure II-32. It is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
19 | Staff exercises his responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint ~~operation plans~~
20 | OPLANs. The JSCP and its supplemental instructions, as well as the administrative
21 | procedures governing its preparation, are described in detail in CJCSI 3100.01A, *Joint*
22 | *Strategic Planning System*.

23 |
24 | i. **JSCP Supplemental Instructions.** Supplemental instructions to the JSCP are
25 | published separately to provide additional planning guidance, capabilities, and amplification
26 | of taskings for planning in specified functional areas. JSCP supplemental instructions are:

- 27 |
28 | (1) CJCSI 3110.02, *Intelligence, Planning Objectives, Guidance and Tasks.*
29 |
30 | (2) CJCSI 3110.03, *Logistics.*
31 |
32 | (3) CJCSI 3110.04, *Nuclear ~~Operations.~~*
33 |
34 | (4) CJCSI 3110.05, *Psychological Operations.*
35 |
36 | (5) CJCSI 3110.06, *Special Operations.*
37 |
38 | (6) CJCSI 3110.07B, *Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents;*
39 | ~~and Herbicides;~~ and Nonlethal Weapons.



Figure II-3. Developing the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

- (7) CJCSI 3110.08~~B~~, *Geospatial Information and Services*.
- (8) CJCSI 3110.09, *Information Operations*.
- (9) CJCSI 3110.10, *Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems*.
- (10) CJCSI 3110.11, *Mobility*.
- (11) CJCSI 3110.12, *Civil Affairs*.
- (12) CJCSI 3110.13, *Mobilization*.
- ~~(13) CJCSI 3110.14, *Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)*.~~
- (13) CJCSI 3110.15, *Special Technical Operations*.

1 (14) CJCSI 3110.16, *Consequence Management*.

2
3 j. **Chairman's Program Assessment.** The CPA provides the Chairman's
4 assessment to the Secretary of Defense on how well the Service and Defense Agency POMs
5 conform to established DPG priorities. It also recommends specific alternative program and
6 budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense for use in resolving Service and Defense
7 programming issues. The CPA summarizes the views of the Chairman on the balance and
8 capabilities of the POM force and the support levels required to attain US national security
9 objectives.

10
11 k. **Joint Military Net Assessment.** Although not formally part of the JSPS, the joint
12 military net assessment (JMNA) is JSPS-related. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
13 in coordination with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders, prepares
14 the JMNA annually and submits it to the Secretary of Defense for his approval and
15 submission to Congress in conjunction with the submission of the defense budget. The
16 JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense's statutory duty to submit to Congress an **annual**
17 **comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed**
18 **Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.**

19
20 l. **Logistics Support Analysis.** Although not formally part of the JSPS, **the logistics**
21 **support analysis (LSA) provides a broad assessment of key logistic capabilities** by
22 documenting the results of a process that assures an integrated evaluation of key logistic
23 capabilities, identifying logistic support shortfalls and assessing the risks, and **providing a**
24 **baseline for the ~~Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)~~ Joint Quarterly Readiness**
25 **Review process.** The LSA builds upon assessments, which are formed in collaboration with
26 the Services, supporting commanders, and Defense Agencies. The LSA assesses the
27 combined support capabilities represented by the **six functional areas of logistics: supply,**
28 **maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other services.** The
29 LSA integrates the assessments of the individual functional areas of logistics by optimizing
30 and balancing their contributions as both enablers and constrainters of logistic support.
31 Preparation of this analysis is a two step process. It begins with the Services' and Defense
32 Agencies' assessment of their ability to support the combatant commander's plan, followed
33 by the combatant commander's assessment of the inputs along with supported commander's
34 analysis of theater requirements and capabilities.

35
36 m. **Unified Command Plan.** Although not formally part of the JSPS, the UCP
37 supports joint strategic planning by establishing the missions and responsibilities of the
38 combatant commanders, delineating ~~their~~ geographic AORs, and providing other strategic
39 guidance and direction. The UCP is prepared by the Secretary of Defense and approved by
40 the President with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

41 n. **"Forces For Unified Commands" Memorandum.** Although not formally part of
42 the JSPS, the "Forces For" memorandum supports joint strategic planning by directing the
43 assignment of Active and Reserve Component forces to the unified commands to perform
44 missions assigned to those commands. The memorandum is prepared by the Chairman of
45 the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense. A force assigned or
46 attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed

by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President.

6. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JOPES is a combination of the policies, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology systems to plan, execute, and monitor joint operations (see Figure II-4). JOPES is the principal system within DOD for translating policy decisions into operation plans and orders. JOPES provides for orderly and coordinated operation planning, problem solving, and decision-making. JOPES policy and procedures are defined in series of JOPES manuals. Within JOPES there are eight sub-processes: Mobilization, training, preparation, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization. JFCs must integrate and synchronize these activities to assure successful joint preparedness and operations. Successful completion of these activities requires the preparation, understanding, and integration of the basic situation awareness, planning, and execution activities described in Chapter III, "Joint Operation Planning." ~~The JPEC uses JOPES to plan, execute, and monitor joint operations. JOPES is the principal system within DOD for translating policy decisions into operation plans and orders. JOPES includes policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and computer systems. The JPEC uses JOPES to integrate the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. JFCs must integrate and synchronize these activities to assure successful joint preparedness and operations. Successful completion of these activities requires the preparation, understanding, and integration of the basic situation awareness, planning, and execution activities described in Chapter III, "Joint Operation Planning."~~




Figure II-4. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

SECTION B. SUPPORTING SYSTEMS

7. Introduction

The command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems that support JOPES include the GCCS, ~~National Military Command System (NMCS)~~, and Service planning systems. These systems and their relationship to joint planning are described below.

8. Global Command and Control System

a. The GCCS and its TOP SECRET variant provides the primary support to JOPES. The GCCS furnishes JFCs at all levels with needed connectivity for comprehensive, interoperable, global C2. GCCS encompasses the policies, procedures, trained personnel, and systems that support the ~~command and control (C2)~~ of joint forces. GCCS provides a comprehensive, secure, worldwide network of systems that provides the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, Defense Agencies, subordinate joint ~~commands and JTFs~~

1 forces, and others with information processing and dissemination capabilities necessary to
2 exercise C2 of joint forces. Information flow is enhanced by the joint reporting structure, a
3 set of formalized policies, procedures, reporting structures, planning formats, and guidance
4 defined in CJCSM 3150 series and supported by standard, compatible ~~command, control,~~
5 ~~communications, and computers (C4)~~ systems and applications connected in a global
6 network of reporting systems and databases. The ~~C4-system~~ GCCS supports four basic
7 functional areas:

- 8
- 9 (1) Resources.
- 10
- 11 (2) Sustainment and unit monitoring.
- 12
- 13 (3) Deliberate, crisis action, campaign, and nuclear planning.
- 14
- 15 (4) Execution, tactical warning, situation monitoring, and combat assessment.
- 16

17 ~~9. National Military Command System~~

18

19 b. The National Military Command System (NMCS) is the priority component of
20 GCCS that supports the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint
21 Chiefs of Staff in exercising their military command responsibilities, including planning and
22 executing joint operations. It includes the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the
23 Alternate National Military Command Center, the National Airborne Operations Center
24 ~~(NAOC)~~, and other command centers designated by the Secretary of Defense. It also
25 includes the communications connecting those command centers with the headquarters of
26 the combatant commanders, Services, and other commands and agencies that support joint
27 operation planning via GCCS. The NMCS also provides coordination with activities outside
28 the DOD (for example, the White House Situation Room and the Central Intelligence
29 Agency's ~~(CIA)~~ Operations Center) that have operation planning and execution functions.
30 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for
31 operating the NMCS.
32



The National Airborne Operations Center provides the President and Secretary of Defense with back-up capability to exercise their military command responsibilities.

9. Service Planning ~~Systems~~ Documents

a. **General.** Each ~~Service has~~ Service has its own unique planning system that supports its planning for the support and sustainment of joint operations. These systems incorporate strategic guidance from the respective Secretaries of Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and promulgate the guidance of the respective Service Chiefs to the major Service commanders for joint operation planning. The Service component commanders receive guidance through the administrative branch of the chain of command ~~and the administrative control channel~~. The Service component commanders are the common link between the Services and the combatant commanders. Descriptions of the Service planning ~~systems and plans documents~~ follow below.

b. **Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).** The AMOPES is an integrated planning and execution system used to ensure that Army capabilities are available to support the combatant commanders during military operations. It provides a single source document for issuing policies, procedures, guidance, and planning assumptions for all levels of mobilization, as well as for military operations without the involuntary callup of the Reserve Component forces. It provides policy and guidance for follow-on activities of military operations to include redeployment and demobilization. AMOPES provides US Army mobilization and operations planning guidance, including the availability, apportionment, and employment of US Army forces. The AMOPES also describes the US Army Crisis Action System and its relationships to joint CAP.

1 c. **Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan.** The Navy Capabilities and Mobilization
2 Plan (~~NCMP~~) is the basic US Navy document for transmitting mobilization and operations
3 planning guidance and for allocating forces. It provides direction and guidance to
4 second-echelon commands, including the US Coast Guard, responsible for developing
5 logistic support and mobilization plans.

6
7 d. **Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP) and Marine Corps Mobilization**
8 **Management Plan (MPLAN).** The MCP and MPLAN are the basic US Marine Corps
9 operations planning documents. The MCP presents Marine Corps capabilities to JFCs and
10 staffs; provides guidance and information to JFCs and staffs on the deployment and
11 employment of Marine Corps forces; identifies Marine Corps forces apportioned to the
12 combatant commanders in the JSCP; and fuses guidance, information, planning, and
13 capabilities from Services' planning and joint planning channels and imparts it to JFCs and
14 staffs. The MPLAN provides policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the expansion of
15 the Marine Corps to specific levels of mobilization. MPLAN Volume III contains a
16 prioritized list of Selected Marine Corps Reserve units needed to augment and reinforce the
17 Marine Expeditionary Forces for major regional contingencies. It also contains information
18 on base, station, and CONUS requirements to support mobilization and Fleet Marine Force
19 deployments. It is intended to provide information for deliberate planning and to provide a
20 predictable basis for refining requirements during crisis action.

21
22 e. **Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP).** The WMP provides major
23 commands and US Air Force staff agencies with consolidated guidance concerning the
24 support of combatant forces and mobilization planning. The WMP provides consolidated
25 lists of ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs, lists of combat and support forces available to support
26 ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs, planned positioning and use of aircraft forces in support of joint
27 ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs, basic planning factors, and base use.

28
29 f. **Coast Guard Capabilities Manual (CGCAPMAN) and Coast Guard Logistic**
30 **Support and Mobilization Plan (CGLMSMP).** The CGCAPMAN and CGLMSMP contain
31 operational guidance and force apportionment for contingencies and war.
32

KEY TERMS

unified action — A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of synergistic and integrated actions (including the synchronization of interagency and multinational activities) taking place for a common purpose within combatant commands, subordinate joint commands, and joint task forces under the overall direction of the joint force commander.

interagency — A broad generic term that describes the collective elements or activities of the Department of Defense and other US Government agencies, regional and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, ~~private voluntary organizations,~~ and commercial organizations engaged in a common effort.

SECTION C. INTERAGENCY PLANNING

10. General

a. Complex security challenges require the skills and resources of many organizations. These include United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional and international organizations, and the agencies of partner nations. The large number and diversity of the organizations that can become involved in plans and operations will likely have different goals, capabilities, and limitations, and operational philosophies. Despite these differences, the interagency process must bring together the interests of multiple organizations to be successful. Military and civilian planners need to understand what resources are relevant to the situation and how to leverage them. In the absence of a comprehensive, overarching, and authoritative document that illustrates how nonmilitary governmental, nongovernmental and commercial organizations must operate in an interagency environment to achieve unified action, success can only be achieved through close interagency coordination and cooperation.

See JP 3-08 Volume I, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, and CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance), for additional information.

b. **The purpose of interagency planning is to integrate a JFC's military plan with the other instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives.** ~~Engaging the economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, and informational elements of national power effectively is often vital to military operational success. JFCs and their staffs must consider how to leverage all elements of national power. Integrating the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law enforcement instruments of national power effectively is often vital to military success. JFCs and their staffs should consider how the other instruments of national power can be applied to assist in accomplishing their~~

missions. At the national level, the NSC with its interagency committees and working groups advises and assists the President on all aspects of national security policy:

(1) Both OSD and the Joint Staff, in consultation with the Services and combatant commands, participate in this national-level interagency planning.

(2) At the theater level, the geographic combatant commanders are the focal point for interagency cooperation in support of military planning and operations.

(3) At the operational level, subordinate JFCs also integrate interagency activities into their estimates, plans, and operations.

c. **Interagency planning is conducted at three levels.** At the national level, the NSC with its interagency committees and working groups advises and assists the President on all aspects of national security policy. Both OSD and the Joint Staff, in consultation with the Services and combatant commands, participate in this national-level interagency planning. At the theater level, the geographic combatant commanders are the focal point for interagency cooperation in support of military planning and operations. They integrate interagency activities into their commander's estimates, operation plans, and OPORDs. At the operational level, subordinate JFCs also integrate interagency activities into their estimates, plans, and operations. Because the nonmilitary organizations are not subject to the military or other formal chain of command, the interagency planning process and structures vary widely depending on the mission and the needs of the leadership. Management tools employed are generally in the form of committees, steering groups, or interagency working groups organized by functional needs. When formed, a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) can provide the combatant commander with an increased capability to collaborate with other USG civilian agencies and departments. Composed of USG civilian and military experts, the JIACG composition can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the supported command.

d. **Political-Military Plan.** The supported commander is responsible to develop a political-military plan annex for each ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN. Interagency planning is conducted for each phase of the operation. The ~~initial and post hostilities~~ deter/engage and transition phases will likely have the most interagency activity.

(1) The ~~initial~~ deter/engage phase will include a set of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) designed to avoid the use of military force by influencing achievement of a satisfactory strategic end state short of military conflict.

(2) The ~~post-hostility~~ transition phase generally requires a high level of interagency activity for stability and foreign humanitarian assistance to form a lasting peace. A successful campaign is arranged so that stability operations and foreign humanitarian assistance are planned for and implemented before the end of hostilities. The early implementation of interagency support, such as refugee relief in a protected zone, can accelerate mission success.

SECTION D. MULTINATIONAL PLANNING

11. Introduction

Collective security is a strategic goal of the United States, and joint operation planning will frequently be accomplished within the context of ~~treaty or alliance~~ multinational operation planning for multinational operations. There is no single doctrine for multinational action, and each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and ~~operation plans~~ OPLANS. US planning for joint operations must accommodate and complement such protocols and plans. JFCs must also anticipate and incorporate such nonmilitary planning factors as ~~international environmental regulations, international criminal law, domestic and international laws and regulations, including legal and policy~~ and restrictions on the use of various weapons and tactics.

JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, provides greater detail.

12. Multinational Operations

“Multinational operations” ~~are military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations~~ is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance, although other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization (such as the United Nations or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Nations usually form coalitions for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow area of common interest. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example of an alliance. These alliance operations are ~~technically combined operations, though in common usage “combined” is often used as a synonym (though not technically defined as such) for all multinational operations.~~

13. Multinational Planning

a. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in multinational and national channels. Multinational force commanders develop multinational strategies and plans in multinational channels. JFCs perform supporting joint operation planning for multinational operations in US national channels. Coordination of these separate planning channels occurs at the national level by established multinational bodies or coalition member nations and at the theater strategic and operational levels by JFCs, who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters. US doctrine and procedures for joint operation planning also are conceptually applicable to multinational problems. The fundamental issues are much the same for both situations.

b. **Strategic Integration.** In support of each coalition or alliance, a hierarchy of bilateral or multilateral bodies is established to define objectives, develop strategies, and to

coordinate strategic direction for planning and executing multinational operations. Through dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national leaders integrate national and theater strategic planning with that of the alliance or coalition. Within the multinational structure, US participants ensure that objectives and strategy complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure, US participants ensure that international commitments are reflected in national military strategy and are adequately addressed in strategic direction for joint operation planning. Planning with NGOs is often necessary, particularly for foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and other civil-military operations.

c. Theater Integration. The commander of US national forces dedicated to a multinational military organization is responsible for integrating joint operation planning with multinational planning at the theater or operational level. Normally, this will be the combatant commander or the subordinate JFC responsible for the geographic area within which multinational operations are to be planned and executed. These commanders function within both the US and multinational chains of command. Within the multinational organizations, they command or support the designated multinational force and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in accordance with strategic direction and guidance emanating from multinational leadership. Within the US chain of command, they command joint US forces and prepare joint ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs in response to taskings from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These taskings include developing joint ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs to support each multinational commitment within the operational area and planning for unilateral US contingencies within the same area. In this dual capacity, the US commander coordinates multinational planning with joint operation planning.

d. Bilateral Planning. When directed, designated US commanders participate directly with the armed forces of other nations in preparing bilateral ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs. Bilateral operation planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency. Bilateral planning may be accomplished within the framework of a treaty or alliance or in the absence of such arrangements. Bilateral planning is accomplished in accordance with specific guidance provided by the President, Secretary of Defense, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ~~Planning with NGOs is often necessary, particularly for humanitarian and peace operations and other civil-military operations.~~

14. Review of Multinational Plans

US joint strategic plans or ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs prepared in support of multinational plans are developed, reviewed, and approved exclusively within US operational channels. They are not shared in total with multinational partners. Selected portions and/or applicable planning and deployment data may be released in accordance with CJCSI 5714.01, *Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information*. USG representatives and commanders within each multinational organization participate in multinational planning and exchange information in mutually devised forums, documents,

1 and plans. The formal review and approval of multinational plans is accomplished in
2 accordance with unique procedures adopted by each multinational organization and may or
3 may not include separate US review or approval. Bilateral ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs
4 routinely require national level US approval.

5
6 *CJCSM 3122-01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies*
7 *and Procedures), describes review and approval procedures for multinational*~~operation~~
8 ~~plans~~ OPLANs.
9

WAR PLANNING BY THE WAR COLLEGE

Under Major General Leonard Wood's reorganization of the War Department General Staff in September of 1910, the War College Division was given responsibility for preparing plans for the national defense, operating the Army War College, and handling military intelligence.

At this time, war plans were developed through the interaction of two groups, the War Plans Committee in the War College Division and student planning committees at the Army War College. Student committees dealt with various geographical areas and were responsible for working out details within the existing general plans. In so doing, they assisted the War Plans Committee, which was charged with finalizing the contingency plans.

These plans considered various wars that might hypothetically occur. Sometimes, however, developments in the real world added particular urgency to such planning.

The situation in Mexico in early 1912, for example, prompted a review and revision of the existing war plan. This plan, in brief, called for a main effort to be made along the axis Vera Cruz-Mexico City. A secondary thrust was to be made from the north, from Laredo to Monterrey. Finally, static defense was to be organized along the entire 1600-mile common border. Several problem areas surfaced during the course of this review. For instance, the plan called for 435,000 American troops. There was much head scratching among the planners as to where these forces would come from since only 35,000 could be provided from the regular Mobile Army units in the continental United States. The planners were further discommoded when the Commissary General, Brigadier General Henry G. Sharpe, pointed out that there were no provisions in the plan for the establishment and operation of a logistical base and lines of communications.

Wood, as Chief of Staff of the Army, was not happy over how his own planning system actually worked in practice. Neither the proposed plan nor the commentary on it from the special staff sections pleased him. They showed the General Staff in a bad light and suggested that it was an inadequate planning agency. He, therefore, pointed out to the President of the Army War College, who also served as Chief of the War College Division, that the present plan needed work and that he would immediately give it his attention.

SOURCE: Hixson, John A., "War Planning by the War College," published in *Vignettes of Military History, Vol. II*, US Army Military History Research Collection. Office of Military History, Army War College, 1976

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CHAPTER III

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

"In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war. Its archives should contain the historical details of the past and all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future."

Baron Antoine de Jomini
Precis de l' Art de la Guerre, 1838

"War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."

Carl von Clausewitz
On War, 1832

~~*"Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end."*~~

Carl von Clausewitz
Principles of War, 1812

~~*"A good plan violently executed NOW is better than a perfect plan next week."*~~

George S. Patton, Jr.
War As I Knew It, 1947

1. General

a. The JOPES establishes a single, integrated ~~set of activities and procedures that define deliberate planning and CAP. Most of the joint operation planning process described activities described in this chapter are common to both deliberate planning and CAP, although certain decision authorities and planning products differ as shown in Figure III-4 methodology for conducting deliberate and crisis-action planning. While most of the activities described in this chapter are common to both deliberate and crisis-action planning. While most of the activities described in this chapter are common to both deliberate and crisis-action planning, the purpose, focus, and approach can be different.~~ The JPEC conducts joint operation planning by integrating concurrent actions required in three complementary interactive elements: Situation ~~Awareness Monitoring~~, Planning, and Execution. Situation ~~awareness monitoring~~ and planning apply to both deliberate planning and CAP while execution applies only to CAP. The elements are not mutually exclusive or discrete. They are iterative, continuous, and overlap throughout the joint operation planning process to respond to the continually changing nature of mission requirements.

b. ~~Four publications guide~~ The JOPES guidance process:

(1) CJCSM 3122.01 series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, ~~Vol 1~~ volumes (Planning Policies and Procedures). ~~This manual~~ provides general guidance for planning and executing joint operations. And They also provide specifics, ~~detail~~ eds, ~~and~~ standardized procedures, and checklists for deliberate planning and CAP. ~~It also contains specific formats and checklists used by commanders and staffs during CAP~~ JOPES volumes provide guidance for deployment and redeployment of forces including TPFDD development.

COMPARING DELIBERATE AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING		
	Deliberate Planning	Crisis Action Planning
Time Available to Plan	12 - 24 Months	Hours or Days
JPEC involvement	Full JPEC participation	JPEC participation may be very limited for security reasons
Elements	Situation Monitoring and Planning	Situation Monitoring, Planning, and Execution
Document assigning planning task	CJCS issues JSCP Supported commanders issue WARNORD or PLANORD	CJCS issues WARNORD Supported commanders issue WARNORD
Forces for planning	Apportioned in JSCP	Allocated in WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD
Planning guidance	CJCS issues JSCP Supported commanders issue PLANORD	CJCS issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD Supported commanders issue PLANORD
COA selection	Supported commander prepares commander's estimate with COA decision, CJCS may require review and the Secretary of Defense may require approval unless delegated.	Supported commander submits commander's estimate with COA recommendation to CJCS for decision by Secretary of Defense or President CJCS releases COA decision in ALERTORD
CONOPS approval	Supported commander submits CONOPS to CJCS and Secretary of Defense for review, approval, or modification	Supported commander submits CONOPS to CJCS and Secretary of Defense for review, approval, or modification
Final planning product	OPLAN, CONPLAN, or FUNCPLAN	OPORD
Final planning product approval	Supported commander submits final plan to CJCS and Secretary of Defense for review, approval, or modification	Supported commander submits final OPORD to CJCS and Secretary of Defense for review, approval, or modification
Execution document	Not applicable	CJCS issues EXORD Supported commander issues EXORD
ALERTORD alert order CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff COA course of action CONOPS concept of operations CONPLAN operation plan in concept format EXORD execute order FUNCPLAN functional plan JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order PLANORD planning order WARNORD warning order		

Figure III-1. Comparing Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning

- 1 (2) CJCSM 3122.02, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol III:*
2 *Crisis Action Time Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment*
3 *Execution.* This manual provides standardized procedures for the development of time-

~~phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) and for the deployment and redeployment of forces within the context of joint operation planning.~~

~~(3) CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance). This manual provides standardized procedures and formats for developing and writing joint operation plans OPLANs.~~

~~(4) CJCSM 3122.04, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (SECRET Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance). This manual provides guidelines for the review of operation plans OPLANs submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.~~

SECTION A. COMMON PLANNING ACTIVITIES

2. Situation Awareness Monitoring

~~a. Situation awareness monitoring encompasses two activities, situation development and situation assessment. During “Situation Development,” an event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and is reported through a variety of means to the NMCC. In “Situation Assessment,” the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic implications of the events are weighed. Implications to current strategy and operation plans are assessed. Situation awareness monitoring continues throughout the joint operation planning process as additional information is gathered and planning is accomplished. As COAs are developed and refined, situation awareness monitoring allows the update of critical information and forms a basis for COA analysis and comparison. Subsequently, changes in the planning and execution components may influence future data collection and assessment conducted as part of situation awareness monitoring.~~

3. Planning

a. The planning ~~component element~~ of the joint operation planning process includes all of the activities that the JPEC must accomplish to prepare for an anticipated operation. It includes those activities required to prepare for the mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces leading up to, but not including, the actual movement of those forces. When necessary or appropriate, joint operation planners also address disengagement, reconstitution, redeployment, and demobilization of forces, as preparation for these activities may have to occur early in the execution of the operation. Planning is initiated from a state of continuous monitoring of global events, recognizes the need for preparing military options that support national security objectives, and follows a collaborative, iterative planning process.

b. Planning phases, activities, and end states are shown in Figure III-2-1 and explained in the next few pages. These activities require the allocation of sufficient planning time. The quality-detail of the plan and follow-on execution is directly proportional to the amount of time allocated for planning the operation. To provide the most relevant plans to the President and the Secretary of Defense an iterative planning process is established between



Figure III-21. Planning Activities

the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and the Supported Commander. Clear strategic guidance followed by in-progress reviews (IPRs) between the Secretary of Defense and the supported combatant commander focus joint operational planning on the requirements of the civilian leadership.

c. Joint operation planning takes place in a knowledge-based collaborative environment and emphasizes sharing information iteratively and collaboratively throughout the process. Collaboration among JPEC members is essential throughout the process. Distributed and collaborative planning allows JPEC members worldwide to build a plan in components or sub-plans in parallel, and to integrate their products into the overall plan. Collaboration also provides JPEC members with a “view of the whole” while working on various sections of a plan and provides them with the means to identify and resolve planning conflicts early. Tools that enable collaboration include web-enabled applications and portals, audio-visual conferencing, electronic mail, newsgroups, record message traffic, shared databases, and webpages.

d. Joint operation planning must be flexible and responsive to dynamic conditions. Commands and organizations must be able to integrate data in order to provide actionable information to commanders and their staffs at the multiple echelons of command across multiple command echelons. While the JOPES process military planning activities remains fundamentally unchanged, conceptually, an environment that fosters with sequential and simple overlapped parallel activities is no longer adequate. Today's dynamic, fast-paced security environment demands that the JPEC be able to quickly gather, review, integrate, and act upon information collaboratively.

e. The use of automated and collaborative planning tools and shared applications enables plan development and refinement. Such collaboration facilitates concurrent COA development, force planning, support planning, ~~and~~ transportation planning with feasibility determination by the supported commander's staff and between multiple echelons of supporting commands and agencies.

54. Initiation

a. **The President, Secretary of Defense, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiates COA development by deciding to develop military options.** The military options are normally developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power.

b. Combatant commanders may also initiate planning COA development on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority.

c. For deliberate planning purposes, the CPG and JSCP serve as the primary tools/directives to initiate planning and COA development. However, in times of crisis, external forces drive the necessity to develop military options.

65. Mission Analysis

a. In response to the planning directive that initiated planning, the supported commander analyzes the assigned mission and issues it to the staff as well as to subordinate and supporting commands. During mission analysis, the supported ~~commander~~ JFC and staff:

(1) Determine the military objective(s) required to achieve the strategic objective(s) and or protect and advance national interests. Military objectives must include post-conflict considerations.

(2) Analyze the adversary, friendly, and ~~the~~ physical conditions that affect the mission. Interagency and multinational impacts must be considered.

(3) Review the guidance provided by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(4) Determine the mission's specified, implied, and essential tasks in order to develop a concise mission statement.

b. The primary product of mission analysis is the **mission statement**. The mission statement should be a clear and concise statement of the operation's objective ~~to be accomplished~~ and ~~the purpose of the operation~~. The mission statement forms the basis for planning and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the commander's estimate, the CONOPS, and the completed plan.

46. COA Course of Action Development

A COA consists of the following information: **what** type of military action; **who** will take the action; **when** the action begins; **where** the action takes place; **why** (purpose); and **how** (method of employment of forces). **In COA development the focus is on the supported commander, who develops and submits a commander's estimate with COA recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense, ~~and President~~ for review, approval, or modification. The approved COA is turned into a concept of operations that includes the full range (e.g. FDO to regime change) and menu (e.g. branches and sequels) of military operations. ~~In CAP, the commander's estimate is an abbreviated version of the commander's estimate prepared during deliberate planning.~~**

7. Planning Guidance Development

a. General. ~~During planning guidance development, the supported combatant command staff~~To ensure focused and effective planning the supported combatant commander and his staff develops and communicates the planning guidance that will accompany tentative COAs to subordinate and supporting commanders for their estimates of feasibility and supportability.

b. Initial Guidance. As a minimum, the initial planning guidance should include the mission statement, controlling factors, assumptions, operational limitations, desired end state, military success criteria, and termination criteria.

(1) **Controlling factors** that influence COA development may include diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in the countries involved, and host-nation issues.

(2) **Assumptions** provide suppositions about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof. Assumptions are necessary to enable the supported commander to complete an estimate of the situation and select the COA. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. ~~The commander considers assumptions handed down from higher echelons as facts. For planning purposes, subordinate commanders treat assumptions made by higher headquarters as if they are facts. However, they should challenge those assumptions if they~~

1 ~~appear unrealistic.~~ Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure ~~they remain~~
2 ~~valid validity.~~ ~~Planners-Commanders and their staff~~ should anticipate changes to the plan
3 that may become necessary should an assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their
4 influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in a plan. A valid
5 assumption has three characteristics: it is **logical, realistic,** and **essential** for the planning to
6 continue. Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations. ~~Commanders~~
7 ~~and Planners~~ should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume that unrealistic
8 friendly capabilities would be available. ~~Planners should consider the adversary's most~~
9 ~~likely COA, and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment.~~

10
11 (3) **Operational limitations** ~~include constraints and restraints~~ are actions that are
12 ~~required or prohibited by higher authority that limit the JFC's freedom of action when~~
13 ~~developing COAs.~~ A **constraint** is an action that ~~a commander the JFC~~ is required to take;
14 ~~for example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of bypassing it~~
15 ~~during the 1944 campaign in France.~~ A **restraint** is an action that ~~a commander the JFC~~ is
16 prohibited from taking; ~~for example, General MacArthur was prohibited from striking~~
17 ~~Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War.~~ Operational limitations
18 temporarily or permanently impact on a COA and may impede its implementation. JFCs
19 examine the operational limitations imposed on them by higher authority to understand their
20 impacts and develop options that minimize these impacts for successful execution of the
21 operation.

22
23 (4) The **desired-strategic end state** is the ~~thread of continuity that ties the strategic~~
24 ~~objectives to the operational and tactical levels.~~ A ~~strategic end state simply means the~~
25 ~~political and military conditions that must be established to achieve the strategic objectives.~~
26 ~~threat of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels. It is~~
27 ~~the set of political and military conditions that defines strategic success.~~ The President or
28 Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
29 Staff, should clearly describe the **desired-strategic** end state before committing the Armed
30 Forces of the United States to an operation. Although the Chairman or the supported
31 commander may recommend a **desired-strategic** end state, the President or Secretary of
32 Defense should formally approve it.

33
34 (5) **Mission success criteria** ~~define what military forces must accomplish to~~
35 ~~establish the necessary conditions to achieve the desired end state.~~ Defining these conditions
36 ~~defines military success in an operation and becomes the basis for establishing mission~~
37 ~~termination criteria~~ describe what military forces must accomplish operationally to establish
38 the military conditions necessary to achieve the strategic end state. They measure how well
39 the joint forces are performing their portion of the interagency effort to achieve the strategic
40 end state. Defining and measuring this set of military conditions define military success in
41 an operation and become the basis for establishing mission termination criteria.

42
43 (6) **Mission termination criteria** ~~describe conditions that could cause the~~
44 ~~President to terminate operations prematurely (i.e., before military success is achieved)~~
45 ~~describe conditions that could cause the President to terminate operations prematurely (i.e.,~~
46 ~~before military success is achieved).~~ Defining and measuring these conditions define

1 military or strategic failure in an operation and form the basis for assessing whether to
2 modify or terminate it before conditions worsen.

3
4 ~~c. **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare.** This is an especially sensitive area~~
5 ~~since adversary use of NBC weapons has the potential to affect US operations significantly.~~
6 ~~The adversary's NBC capability presents major defensive problems and requires in-depth~~
7 ~~study and detailed planning. **Employment of Chemical, Biological, Radiological,**~~
8 ~~**Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Weapons.** Adversary employment of~~
9 ~~CBRNE weapons is an especially sensitive planning consideration because their use has the~~
10 ~~potential to affect US operations significantly. Adversary CBRNE capabilities present major~~
11 ~~defensive challenges and require detailed planning.~~

12
13 *Guidance for nuclear, biological, and chemical ~~NBC~~ defense operations is found in*
14 *CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and*
15 *Execution Formats and Guidance), and in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear,*
16 *Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.*

17
18 ~~d. **Interagency Considerations.** Planners-JFCs and their staffs must consider ~~and~~~~
19 ~~integrate all the instruments of national power and consult with interagency counterparts on~~
20 ~~OPLAN development. The supported combatant commander discusses any interagency~~
21 ~~actions and coordination required at the initial Secretary of Defense IPR. JFCs and their~~
22 ~~staffs must coordinate their OPLANs with the plans of their interagency counterparts.~~
23 ~~Interagency planning must be conducted collaboratively in parallel with CONOPS and final~~
24 ~~plan or OPOD development. They should conduct interagency planning collaboratively~~
25 ~~throughout plan development. The supported commander's-JFC's political advisor is a~~
26 ~~valuable asset in advising the supported commander and staff on political issues crucial to~~
27 ~~the planning process, such as dissuasion and deterrence options, overflight, ~~and~~ transit rights~~
28 ~~for deploying forces, basing, and support agreements. The presence of ~~an interagency~~~~
29 ~~coordination group at the supported commander's-a JIACG at the JFC's headquarters further~~
30 ~~facilitates the integration of interagency considerations into the military planning effort.~~

31
32 ~~e. **Planning Schedule.** The supported commander usually issues a planning schedule~~
33 ~~with the initial guidance, although this practice varies between commands.~~

34
35 ~~f. **Initial Staff Briefings.** Initial briefings include such subjects as terrain, climate,~~
36 ~~demographics, adversary capabilities, the legal environment, and other relevant planning~~
37 ~~factors. These briefings assist the Plans Directorate (J-5)-JFC staff in formulating additional~~
38 ~~tentative COAs and focus the joint staff directorates as they analyze and compare tentative~~
39 ~~COAs and develop their staff estimates.~~

40
41 ~~g. **Initial Commander's Intent.** The supported commander's intent describes the~~
42 ~~situation or conditions that must be established to accomplish the military mission~~
43 ~~successfully. The commander's intent deals only with the military conditions that lead to the~~
44 ~~desired strategic end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and~~
45 ~~supporting commanders pursue the desired end state without further orders, even when~~

operations do not unfold as planned. It may include the supported commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent. It may also contain an assessment of where and how the supported commander will accept risk during the operation.

h. **Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** These are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the supported commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affects successful mission accomplishment. The information needed to verify or refute a planning assumption is an example of a CCIR.

i. **Tentative COA Development.** Based on the supported commander's intent, the staff develops tentative COAs for further evaluation during the staff estimate process. A valid COA must have the characteristics shown in Figure III-32.




Figure III-32. Characteristics of a Valid Course of Action

j. **Planning Directive.** The supported commander publishes a WARNORD or PLANORD to communicate initial planning guidance to the staff and supporting and subordinate commanders, and task them to evaluate the tentative COAs and submit their estimates. An early exchange of information facilitates concurrent planning and can prevent many potential conflicts.

8. Staff Estimates

a. Staff estimates provide the foundation for COA selection. The purpose of ~~the~~ staff estimates is to determine which COA best accomplishes the mission and which can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the supported commander the best possible information to select a COA. In their staff estimates, each staff element:

(1) Reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective.

(2) Examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff.

(3) Analyzes and refines each COA to determine its supportability from the perspective of their functional area.

(4) Concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA may best be supported.

b. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the tentative COAs, and potential deficiencies and risks that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the tentative COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands. Examples of functional areas requiring review during the staff estimate process are shown in Figure III-43.

c. Collaboration among staff elements during the staff estimate process facilitates the iterative refinement of COAs and provides the basis for concurrent and parallel planning among staffs. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs are most likely to succeed and can best be supported.

CJCSM 3122.01 ~~series~~ Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures) JOPES volumes, contains sample formats for staff estimates.

d. Not every situation will require or permit a lengthy and formal staff estimate process. For a simple or time-sensitive mission, the supported commander may review the assigned mission, receive oral staff briefings, develop and select a COA informally, and direct that plan development commence. However, deliberate planning ~~is more likely to will~~ demand a more formal and ~~through-thorough~~ process. Although written staff estimates are not

- 1 mandatory, they are useful because planners can extract information from them to prepare
- 2 the commander's estimate and subsequent plans and orders. Although documenting staff
- 3 estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the commander's estimate, they should
- 4 be sent to the shared collaboratively with subordinate and supporting commanders in time to
- 5 help them prepare their supporting estimates, plans, and orders. This will improve parallel

FUNCTIONAL STAFF ESTIMATES	
Mobilization	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and address actions that must occur to integrate and synchronize the use of Reserve Component forces in the tentative courses of action (COAs). 	
Personnel	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and address known or anticipated personnel factors that may influence the tentative COAs, including the anticipated need for individual and small unit replacements; the anticipated use of civilian, contract support, or indigenous personnel; and, if the operation is expected to be of long duration, the anticipated individual and unit rotation policy. 	
Intelligence	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify relevant information about the operational area and its populace and resources, the anticipated military situation at the time military operations begin, the adversary's centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, intentions, most likely COA, and COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment, and current and anticipated priority intelligence requirements. 	
Logistics/Sustainment	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and address known or anticipated logistics / sustainment factors that may influence the feasibility of providing the required logistic support to sustain the timing, intensity, and duration of the tentative COAs, including the required time phasing to position support personnel to receive and integrate required combat forces and to move sustainment stocks to sustain the tentative COAs. 	
Health Service Support	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and address known or anticipated medical threat factors that may influence or directly effect force health protection, including theater evacuation policy, medical treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization capabilities required, preventive medicine, veterinary, combat operational stress, dental support required, health service logistics, and the medical aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical defensive operations. 	
Engineering	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and address known or anticipated operational engineering factors that may influence or directly effect preparatory tasks, force deployment, antiterrorism/force protection, and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Identify construction requirements that may require Emergency or Contingency Construction Authority. 	
Transportation/Movement	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify available transportation capabilities and coordination requirements to meet required time phasing to support both the employment and sustainment of tentative COAs, including requirements for strategic and intratheater transportation assets and capabilities, and requirements to protect critical transportation nodes and lines of communications. 	
Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify available capabilities and coordination requirements for the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of arriving personnel and equipment, including potential external sources of support. 	
Religious Support	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and address known or anticipated religious support factors that may influence the tentative COAs, including the impact of indigenous religions on military operations and the anticipated religious support needs that may influence or directly effect morals, morale, and religious readiness. 	

Figure III-43. Functional Staff Estimates




Figure III-43. Functional Staff Estimates (cont'd)

planning efforts of subordinate and supporting elements to help reduce the planning times for the entire process.

e. Based on the supported commander's guidance, subordinate and supporting commanders review the tentative COAs for supportability and begin identifying the forces and resources required to support each tentative COA. Referencing existing TPFDD in the JOPE database can expedite this process. Time permitting, a TPFDD-force flow is generated and assessed for each COA. The subordinate and supporting commanders provide their commander's estimates to the supported commander with their COA recommendations.

f. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers review the tentative COAs for transportation feasibility and prepare deployment estimates for each tentative COA. USTRANSCOM integrates the deployment estimates from all transportation providers and

furnishes a consolidated deployment estimate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported commander, and other JPEC members as appropriate.

g. The Services monitor COA development, deployment planning, and force readiness; and begin planning for mobilization, deployment, and sustainment.

9. Commander's Estimate

a. ~~The final product of COA development is the commander's estimate.~~ The supported commander's estimate clearly states the intent and summarizes the rationale for that decision. It describes the tentative COAs considered, provides the commander's personal evaluation of the tentative COAs, and presents COA recommendations. **It provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and President with a summary of the essential information for their review, approval, or modification of the COA recommendation.** ~~In deliberate planning, the commander's estimate may be developed over a number of months. In CAP, it may have to be developed in a matter of hours.~~ The commander's estimate format is shown at Figure III-54.

CJCSM 3122.01 series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), JOPES volumes provides detailed guidance on the content and format for the commander's estimate.




Figure III-54. Commander's Estimate




Figure III-65. Wargaming Insights

b. **COA Analysis and Wargaming.** In COA analysis, the supported commander and staff analyze each tentative COA separately. An objective, comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Wargaming provides a means for the supported commander and participants to analyze a tentative COA and obtain insights that otherwise might not have occurred (see Figure III-65). Based upon time available, the supported commander should wargame each tentative COA against adversary COAs identified through the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process.

JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, provides a detailed discussion of the wargaming process.

c. **COA Comparison.** ~~During the wargaming process, COAs are not compared to each other.~~ After wargaming the COAs, the staff compares the advantages and disadvantages of each COA to determine which COA to recommend to the commander.

10. COA Course of Action Selection

The supported commander selects a COA based upon the staff recommendations and the commander's personal estimate. ~~During deliberate planning, the Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff may review and the or Secretary of Defense may review and approve the COAs. Under CAP, the supported combatant commander forwards the commander's estimate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense, and the President for review, approval, or modification.~~

11. Plan Development

a. During plan development, the supported combatant commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders, expands an approved or directed COA into a detailed joint ~~operation plan OPLAN~~ or OPORD necessary to execute the approved or

directed COA when so directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. If required by the situation, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already in development. The supported commander guides the plan development process by issuing a PLANORD to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. There are ~~twelve~~eleven activities associated with plan development as shown in Figure III-76. These activities may be accomplished sequentially or in overlapping timeframes. They may be repeated iteratively. The same flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as shortfalls are discovered and eliminated.

b. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the supported and supporting commanders and other members of the JCS, monitor planning activities, resolve shortfalls when required, and review the supported commander's ~~operation plan~~OPLAN for feasibility, adequacy, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine.

c. Plan development may continue after approval of a deliberate ~~operation plan~~OPLAN or after a decision by the President or Secretary of Defense to begin execution. If the President or Secretary of Defense decides to execute the plan, all three joint operation planning elements — situation ~~awareness~~monitoring, planning, and execution — continue in a complementary and iterative process.

d. ~~Military plans~~JFCs and staffs should consider and ~~incorporate~~integrate the other ~~elements—instruments~~of national power—economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, and informational into their military plans. The military option is frequently the least desirable option, and a decision to execute a military option is usually made only after other, less severe options have been judged unsuitable. In reaching a decision to develop a military option, the President and Secretary of Defense may consider the possible range of ~~flexible deterrent options~~(FDOs), including military FDOs. To assist the President and Secretary of Defense in their decision making, the Chairman of the Joint



Figure III-76. Plan Development Activities

1 Chiefs of Staff and supported commanders must explicitly relate military FDOs to
2 nonmilitary FDOs as they develop their operation plans and orders in close coordination
3 with interagency partners.

4
5 *Appendix B, “Flexible Deterrent Options,” provides a more detailed discussion of FDOs.*

6 7 **12. CONOPS-Concept of Operations Development**

8
9 a. Before the component commanders begin detailed force planning, the supported
10 ~~commander-JFC~~ and subordinate ~~operational-supporting~~ commanders expand the approved
11 COA into an executable CONOPS. The CONOPS is written in sufficient detail to impart a
12 clear understanding of the supported commander’s concept of how the assigned mission will
13 be accomplished (see Figure III-87).

14
15 b. During CONOPS development, the supported commander determines the best
16 arrangement of simultaneous and sequential activities and operations to accomplish the
17 assigned mission quickly and with the least cost in casualties and other resources. This
18 arrangement dictates the sequencing of forces into the OA; which provides the link between
19 the CONOPS and force planning. When the scope and duration of contemplated operations
20 require it, formal campaign planning begins during this stage and the details of the campaign
21 plan are incorporated into the final OPLAN or OPORD.




Figure III-87. Commander's Concept of Operations

c. Chapter IV, "Campaign Planning," and JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, contain more detailed discussions of the operational art and campaign design practiced during CONOPS development. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*, provides detailed guidance on CONOPS content and format.

13. CONOPS Concept of Operations Review and Approval

When the CONOPS is complete, the supported commander forwards it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman must review and approve the supported commander's recommended CONOPS. The JPEC reviews the recommended CONOPS and provides the results of the review to the Chairman. ~~The Secretary of Defense or President will review, approve, or modify the CONOPS following the Chairman's review. The Chairman forwards the results of these reviews to the supported commander by memorandum or message stating that the CONOPS is either approved or modified for further plan development or disapproved and requires significant changes before resubmission. The supported commander uses the approved CONOPS as the basis for further plan development. A new CONOPS is not required if a deliberate plan is being updated without major changes to it.~~ The Chairman reviews and recommends approval of the supported commander's recommended CONOPS to the Secretary of Defense.

14. Force Planning

The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported commander's concept of operations and phase the forces into the ~~theater of operations~~ OA. It consists of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution. Force planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service component commanders and begins during CONOPS development. They determine force requirements, develop force lists, identify and resolve shortfalls, and organize and time-phase their force lists into force modules to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the CONOPS. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned or allocated for planning and included in the supported commander's CONOPS. They then make tentative assessments of the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) required for the intended operation. As the actual forces are identified (sourced), the Services and ~~F~~force ~~P~~providers refine the CS and CSS force requirements. These CS and CSS units are identified to the supported commander and USTRANSCOM for movement in support of the operation.

15. Support Planning

The purpose of support planning is to determine the personnel, logistic, and other support required to receive, maintain, and sustain the forces identified during force planning, and sequence their movement into the OA to accomplish the mission. Support planning encompasses such essential factors as executive agent identification, assignment of responsibility for base operating support, force rotation policy, management of individual and small-unit replacements, ~~medical treatment and evacuation, health service support,~~ personnel management, handling of prisoners of war and detainees, theater civil engineering policy, support of noncombatant evacuation operations (~~NEO~~) and other retrograde operations, and nation assistance. Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service component commanders and begins during CONOPS development. They identify and update support requirements in coordination with the Services and the Defense Logistics

Agency (DLA). They initiate the procurement of critical and low-density inventory items. The Service component commanders continue to refine their sustainment requirements as the force providers identify and source force requirements.

16. Nuclear Planning

a. Nuclear planning considers the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used in combat. ~~Planners—Commanders~~ must assess the impact that this will have on their operations. Because the use of nuclear weapons in any military operation would be so influential, commanders and joint planners must realistically appreciate both the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the fact that the supported commander does not effectively control the decision to use them.

b. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the combatant command level is based on national-level political considerations but is influenced by the military mission. USSTRATCOM conducts nuclear planning in coordination with the supported combatant commanders and certain allied commanders.

c. JP 3-12.1, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations*, provides guidance for non-strategic nuclear force employment and discusses planning and employment of nuclear weapons.

17. Transportation Planning

During transportation planning, the supported combatant commander and USTRANSCOM resolve gross feasibility questions impacting ~~strategic—intertheater~~ and intratheater movement. The supported commander consolidates each component's force modules and supplies, and sequences their movement into the OA. Non-unit sustainment supplies and replacement personnel also become deployment movement requirements. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers use them along with force planning data to identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the approved CONOPS. These resources may include apportioned intertheater transportation, geographic combatant commander-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate commands. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers then develop transportation schedules for movement requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not necessarily mean that the supported commander's CONOPS is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules provide the most effective and realistic use of available transportation resources in relation to C-day and L-hour.

18. ~~TPFDD~~ Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development

a. **General. One of the most time-consuming and intensively managed aspects of plan development is constructing the supporting TPFDD.** A TPFDD is a comprehensive movement schedule that contains time-phased force data and associated movement data for in-place and deploying units, as well as estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces, and estimates of




Figure III-98. Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

transportation requirements (see Figure III-98). TPFDD development involves the iterative development and refinement of forces, logistics, and transportation data to support a feasible and adequate ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN. The Service component commanders and their parent Services are the primary sources for TPFDD data. As TPFDD development progresses, the supported commander adds an estimate of resupply and personnel requirements to sustain the force based on consumption factors, computer modeling, and past experience.

b. **TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI).** The supported commander publishes a TPFDD LOI that provides TPFDD development guidance and milestones for deployment, replacement, and redeployment of forces. The LOI gives instructions and direction to the components, supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC concerning lift allocation, reporting and validation requirements, and management of TPFDD data in general.

CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), and CJCSM 3122.02, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol III: Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution, contain details on preparing a TPFDD LOI.

c. **Refinement.** A TPFDD must be made transportation feasible. **USTRANSCOM plays a key supporting role in the TPFDD development process** by hosting and coordinating refinement conferences and providing **transportation feasibility analysis** of the ~~strategic-intertheater~~ portion of the deployment.

(1) **Forces refinement** is conducted to confirm that forces are sourced within strategic guidance and to assess the adequacy of the ~~combat, combat support CS,~~ and ~~combat service support CSS~~ sourced by the Services. USTRANSCOM provides ~~sealift and airlift capability~~ transportation feasibility estimates throughout the process.

(2) **Support refinement** is conducted to confirm the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with strategic guidance and to assess the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. USTRANSCOM coordinates logistic planning matters, hosts conferences dedicated to logistic planning and refinement, integrates sustainment requirements with other transportation requirements, and synchronizes the throughput of forces and sustainment resources required by the supported commander.

(3) **Transportation refinement** simulates the planned movement of resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. The supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements as necessary to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility.

d. **Integrated TPFDD Development.** Overlapping major combat operations may require an integrated TPFDD (ITPFDD) to ensure that resources are properly identified and allocated for two or more supported commanders. Developing an ITPFDD requires that additional steps be added to the process.

~~Annex~~ Appendix C, “*Integrated ~~TPFDD~~ Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development*,” provides greater detail on this process.

e. **TPFDD Modification During Execution.** Operational requirements may cause the supported commander and/or subordinate JTFs to alter their plans, potentially impacting the deployment priorities or requirements of validated TPFDDs. These plan changes and the resulting modifications to the TPFDDs must be handled during the planning cycles.

19. Shortfall Identification

Shortfall identification ~~along with hazards and threats analysis are is~~ is performed throughout the plan development process. The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities shortfalls and associated risks as plan development progresses. **Where possible, the supported commander resolves the shortfalls and required controls and countermeasures** through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting and subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls and necessary controls/countermeasures cannot be reconciled ~~and or~~ the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and his assessment of the associated risk to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. **However, the completion of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls.** If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the JSCP time frame, the completed plan will include a consolidated summary and impact assessment of unresolved shortfalls and associated risks.

20. Documentation

When the TPFDD is complete, the supported commander completes the documentation of the final, transportation-feasible ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN or OPORD and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate.

21. Plan Review and Approval

a. When the final plan or OPORD is complete, the supported commander then submits it with the associated TPFDD file to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense for review, approval, or modification. ~~The Chairman must review the supported commander's final plan or OPORD. The JPEC reviews the plan or OPORD and provides the results of the review to the Chairman. Although reserving the right to review all plans and OPORDs, normally the Secretary of Defense reviews only major OPLANs. The JPEC reviews the recommended CONOPS and provides the results of the review to the Chairman. The Chairman reviews and recommends approval of the supported commander's recommended CONOPS to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense or President will review, approve, or modify the plan following the Chairman's review.~~ The Secretary of Defense may delegate the approval of deliberate plans to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President is the final approval authority for OPORDs.

b. Plan review criteria are common to deliberate planning and CAP, as shown in Figure III-109.




Figure III-409. Plan Review Criteria

22. Supporting Plans

- a. **The supported commander directs the completion and submission of supporting ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs or OPORDs** by supporting and subordinate commanders and agencies. These supporting plans or OPORDs focus on the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces and resources in support of the operation described in the supported commander's approved plan or OPORD. Subordinate and supporting commands and agencies develop supporting plans concurrently

1 with the supported ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN, and normally direct their subordinate
2 commanders to prepare additional supporting plans.

3
4 b. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the subordinate ~~commander~~ JFC
5 who will direct the forces if the plan is executed. Detailed employment planning may be
6 delayed ~~until actual circumstances require it~~ when the politico-military situation cannot be
7 clearly forecast, or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned
8 and executed within a multinational framework.

9
10 c. The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans.
11 However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be asked to resolve critical issues
12 that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff may coordinate the
13 review of any supporting plans should circumstances so warrant.

14
15 d. ~~Although the deliberate planning process is complete when the supported~~
16 ~~commander approves the supporting plans, TPFDD refinement and maintenance continues~~
17 ~~until the plan is cancelled canceled or superseded superseded.~~ Deliberate planning does not
18 conclude when the supported commander approves the supporting plans. Planning
19 refinement and maintenance continues until the planning requirement is cancelled or
20 superseded.

21 22 **23. Global Planning Procedures**

23
24 a. When the scope of contemplated military operations exceeds the authority of a single
25 combatant commander to plan and execute, the President or Secretary of Defense directs the
26 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to implement **global planning procedures** and assist the
27 Secretary of Defense in the strategic direction and integration of the planning effort. The
28 President or Secretary of Defense normally makes the decision to implement global planning
29 procedures during the assessment of the situation. Specific situations that may trigger this
30 decision include major combat operations that extend across combatant command
31 boundaries and require the strategic integration of the campaigns and major operations of
32 two or more geographic combatant commanders.

33
34 b. When the President or Secretary of Defense decides to implement **global planning**
35 **procedures**, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the authority of the Secretary of
36 Defense, issues a planning directive to the JPEC and assumes the JOPES role of a supported
37 commander **for planning purposes only**. The Chairman performs a mission analysis; issues
38 initial planning guidance; develops COAs in coordination with the affected combatant
39 commands, Services, and combat support agencies; and prepares a Chairman's estimate to
40 provide the President and Secretary of Defense the information they require for COA
41 selection. In some cases, the Chairman issues a planning order to accelerate detailed
42 planning. With the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman may issue a PTDO
43 or DEPOD.

1 c. When the President or Secretary of Defense selects a COA under global planning
2 procedures and directs that detailed planning be initiated, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
3 Staff issues an ALERTORD announcing the decision. The Joint Staff expands the approved
4 or directed COA into a CONOPS and develops the ~~operation-plan-OPLAN~~ or OPORD and
5 supporting TPFDD in coordination with the affected combatant commands and other JPEC
6 members. If the contemplated scope and duration of the operation exceeds that of a single
7 major operation, the Joint Staff integrates campaign planning into its plan development.
8 When the ~~operation-plan-OPLAN~~ or ~~OPORD-OPORD~~ is complete, the Chairman of the
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff forwards it to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for review
10 before final approval by the President or Secretary of Defense. When the President or
11 Secretary of Defense approves the plan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs the
12 affected combatant commands, Services, and Defense Agencies to prepare and submit
13 supporting plans for approval by the Chairman.

14 SECTION B. DELIBERATE PLANNING ACTIVITIES

15 16 17 | 24. ~~Situation Awareness~~Monitoring

18
19 In deliberate planning, situation development is conducted using the JSPS. It
20 normally culminates in the issuance of the JSCP. However, the Chairman of the Joint
21 Chiefs of Staff maintains global situation ~~awareness-monitoring~~ throughout the deliberate
22 planning process. The JSR and the JMNA identify and assess conditions or trends that may
23 warrant a change in deliberate planning taskings. Strategic requirements or tasking for the
24 planning of major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for
25 the same requirement using different assumptions and different sets of forces and resources
26 in order to preserve flexibility. Combatant commanders also monitor the global situation
27 and may direct deliberate planning for contingencies not directly tasked in the JSCP.

28 29 | 25. ~~COA-Course of Action~~ Development

30
31 a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff uses the JSCP to initiate deliberate
32 planning. In the JSCP, the Chairman assigns planning tasks to supported commanders,
33 apportions forces and resources, and issues planning guidance. The JSCP links the JSPS to
34 joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type
35 of joint ~~operation-plan-OPLAN~~ required, and provides additional planning guidance as
36 necessary.

37
38 b. A combatant commander may also initiate deliberate planning by preparing plans not
39 specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities.

40 c. If a situation develops during a deliberate planning cycle that warrants deliberate
41 planning but was not anticipated in the JSCP, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasks
42 the appropriate supported commander out-of-cycle to begin deliberate planning in response
43 to the new situation.

26. ~~COA~~ Course of Action Selection

a. The supported commander prepares a commander's estimate and selects a COA. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Secretary of Defense may require submission, review, and approval of the COAs with the commander's estimate. The Joint Staff reviews the commander's estimate and provides the results of the review to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense or President may also decide to review, approve, or modify the COA following the Chairman's review. The Chairman forwards the results of the reviews to the supported commander for incorporation during CONOPS development.

b. ~~CJCSM-CJCSI~~ 3141.01, *Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Operation Plans*, provides detailed guidance on the CONOPS review process.

27. Plan Review and Approval

a. When an ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN is approved, it is ~~effective~~ continuously refined and maintained for potential conversion into an OPORD for execution when directed. Approval of the plan is the signal to subordinate and supporting commands to ~~finalize develop~~ their draft supporting plans and submit them to the supported commander for review, modification, or approval. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the JPEC, assesses and validates ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs using the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, ~~completeness~~, and compliance with joint doctrine to determine whether it satisfies the task assignment and demonstrates the effective use of resources within the constraints of JSCP apportionment guidance. The review also identifies unresolved shortfalls in force and resource capabilities.

b. Approved ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs remain so until superseded or canceled. Upon notification that a plan has been approved, the supported commander incorporates changes directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, or President.

c. CJCSM ~~3141.01~~ 3122 series; ~~Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans~~ JPES volumes, governs the formal plan review and approval process.

SECTION C. CRISIS ACTION PLANNING ACTIVITIES

28. Situation ~~Awareness~~ Monitoring

a. In CAP, situation ~~awareness~~ monitoring encompasses **five related activities** — monitoring the global situation, identifying that an event has occurred, recognizing that the event is a problem or a potential problem, reporting the event, and assessing the event. An event is an occurrence assessed as out of the ordinary and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

1 b. Situation monitoring is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring
2 | worldwide. ~~United States Government (USG)~~ organizations, including the JPEC,
3 continually monitor the global situation. When an event has immediate impact requiring
4 rapid response to an emerging or crisis situation, the President, Secretary of Defense, or
5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct CAP of military action to help resolve the
6 situation.

7 c. Regardless of the source, the initial report of the event should be as timely and
8 accurate as the unfolding situation permits. The military focal point for receiving and
9 providing information crucial to national security is the NMCC. The NMCC and the
10 combatant commanders share data collection activities and products through a collaborative
11 environment. The NMCC monitors the global situation, requests reports from the combatant
12 commanders, evaluates the supported commander's actions being taken under the ROE, and
13 coordinates additional intelligence gathering, if necessary. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
14 of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders,
15 advises the President and Secretary of Defense as the situation develops.

16
17 ~~d. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two~~
18 ~~most common means are the critical information message (CRITIC) and the operational~~
19 ~~report (OPREP-3) PINNACLE. If the geographic combatant commander does not make~~
20 ~~the initial report of an event, the NMCC will make every effort to establish~~
21 ~~communications with the combatant commander and request an OPREP-3~~
22 ~~PINNACLE or an assessment of the event.~~

23
24 d. The combatant commander's assessment provides the President, Secretary of
25 Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a personal assessment of actions
26 being considered or actions already taken. The assessment normally includes amplifying
27 information regarding the situation, actions being taken, forces available, expected time for
28 earliest commitment of forces, and major operational limitations on the employment of
29 forces. If the time sensitivity of the situation is such that normal CAP procedures cannot be
30 followed, the combatant commander's assessment may also include a COA
31 recommendation. The assessment then serves as the commander's estimate normally
32 prepared during COA development. For this reason, the supported commander's initial
33 assessment can have great influence. Lack of time may make the supported commander's
34 assessment the only alternative considered by the President, Secretary of Defense, and
35 Chairman when making the decision to develop military options to resolve a situation.

36
37 e. At the national level, assessment is an evaluation of the situation by the President,
38 Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the
39 other members of the ~~NCS-NSC~~ and JCS and the appropriate combatant commanders, to
40 determine whether a military option should be prepared. ~~Increased information gathering,~~
41 ~~national level review of available options, and preparatory action by the JPEC characterize~~
42 ~~the assessment. The assessment continues the combatant commander's initial assessment of~~
43 ~~the situation, and further develops actions being taken.~~

44
45 f. The detail and frequency of reporting increases in order to allow the Chairman of the
46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the appropriate

1 combatant commanders, to assesses the situation from a military perspective and provide
2 advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on possible military options. The President
3 and Secretary of Defense, in coordination with other NSC members, identify national
4 interests and objectives and consider possible combinations of diplomatic, informational,
5 economic, ~~financial~~, law enforcement, and military and nonmilitary actions options to
6 protect or advance those national interests and achieve national objectives. The President
7 may decide that a crisis exists and direct that the supported commander develop military
8 COAs for resolving the crisis.

~~g. During the national assessment, the President identifies the national interests at stake;
the national objectives related to those interests; and possible diplomatic, political, economic,
and military options to achieve the objectives. The President may decide that a crisis exists
and direct that the supported commander develop military COAs for resolving the crisis.~~

15 g. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews and evaluates reports from the
16 supported commander, assesses the situation from the military point of view, and reviews
17 current strategy and existing ~~operation plans OPLANs~~ for applicability. When appropriate,
18 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends to the President and Secretary of
19 Defense that orders be issued to prepare to mobilize or deploy forces, or to mobilize or
20 deploy forces.

22 h. Commanders at all levels assemble special teams to monitor the situation and
23 develop military options for its resolution. These teams vary in size and composition, as
24 well as in name. They may be called crisis action teams, crisis response cells, battle staffs,
25 emergency response teams, operations action groups, or operation planning groups. The
26 generic term is “joint planning group” (JPG). A JPG normally includes representatives from
27 all command staff divisions and may include representatives from a wide range of involved
28 organizations. Responsibilities of the JPG may include CAP, coordination of OPORD
29 development, and planning for future operations.

31 i. At any time during CAP, the President or Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the
32 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the supported commander, may decide to prepare
33 selected units for possible military action. They increase unit readiness by designating alert
34 conditions or ordering a specified deployability posture to reduce the response time of
35 selected forces. Increasing the readiness or changing the deployability posture of forces are
36 strong statements of the seriousness with which the United States views the situation and the
37 nation’s intent to take military action, if necessary, to resolve it.

39 j. **The President and Secretary of Defense can** either continue monitoring the
40 situation, return to the pre-crisis situation without further planning action, or initiate more
41 detailed planning. Their decision to develop military options for their consideration and
42 possible use provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include
43 specific guidance on COAs to be developed. **Regardless of which decision the President**
44 **or Secretary of Defense makes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expeditiously**

1 transmits it in an appropriate order to the supported commander and other JPEC
2 members.

3
4 | **29. ~~COA~~ Course of Action Development**

5
6 a. When the President, Secretary of Defense, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
7 decides to develop military options, the Chairman issues a planning directive to the JPEC
8 initiating the development of COAs and requesting that the supported commander submit a
9 commander's estimate of the situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation.
10 Normally, the directive will be a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or ALERTORD may be
11 used if the nature and timing of the crisis warrant accelerated planning. In a quickly
12 evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated vocally with a follow-on
13 record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept informed. If the directive contains force
14 deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required.

15
16 b. The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command relationships, and
17 identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces and strategic
18 mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It
19 may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment or
20 employment; or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding
21 these dates and times. If the President, Secretary of Defense, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
22 of Staff directs development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and
23 request the supported commander's assessment. A WARNORD sample can be in CJCSM
24 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and*
25 *Procedures)*.

26
27 c. In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with
28 subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint
29 | ~~operation plans-OPLANs~~ for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares COAs.
30 Based on the supported commander's guidance, supporting commanders begin their
31 planning activities.

32
33 d. Existing joint ~~operation plans-OPLANs~~ can be used to facilitate rapid COA
34 development. An existing OPLAN ~~may have been developed that~~ can be modified to fit the
35 situation. An existing CONPLAN ~~may be available that~~ can be fully developed beyond the
36 | stage of an approved CONOPS. The TPFDDs related to specific ~~operation plans-OPLANs~~
37 are stored in the JOPES database and available to the JPEC for review.

38
39 | **30. ~~COA~~ Course of Action Selection**

40
41 a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with other members of the
42 JCS and combatant commanders, reviews and evaluates the supported commander's
43 estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and Secretary of
44 Defense for COA selection. The supported commander's COAs may be refined or revised,
45 or new COAs may have to be developed in light of a changing situation. The President or
46 Secretary of Defense selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated.

1 b. On receiving the decision of the President or Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
2 issues an ALERTORD to the JPEC to announce the decision. The Secretary of Defense
3 approves the ALERTORD. **The order is a record communication that the President or**
4 **Secretary of Defense has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help**
5 **resolve ~~to~~ the crisis.** The contents of an alert order may vary, and sections may be deleted if
6 the information has already been published, but it should always describe the selected COA
7 in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with other members
8 of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy, employ, and sustain forces.

9
10 c. In some cases, the Chairman will issue a PLANORD to initiate detailed planning
11 before the President or Secretary of Defense formally select a COA. Used in this manner, a
12 PLANORD expedites plan development and provides flexibility in responding to fast-
13 breaking events as the crisis develops. It may be issued orally, by GCCS message, or by
14 formal message traffic to the supported commander with copies to members of the JPEC.
15 **The PLANORD may be the first record communication between the Chairman and**
16 **the JPEC on the crisis.** In this situation, vital planning information would be exchanged
17 now. However, it is desirable to use this message merely to update strategic guidance that
18 has been given earlier. The contents of the PLANORD will vary depending on the situation.
19 CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies,*
20 *and Procedures)*, outlines an example of a PLANORD that illustrates a standardized format
21 patterned after the operational report-1 message. **If the PLANORD directs the**
22 **deployment of forces or increases force readiness, Secretary of Defense approval is**
23 **required. Issuance of either the PLANORD or the ALERTORD marks the beginning**
24 **of plan development.**

25
26 d. While waiting for a decision, the supported commander and the other members of the
27 JPEC continue deployment and employment planning based on the facts and actual
28 conditions as they know them.

30 **31. Operation Plan Development**

31
32 The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD ~~by modifying~~
33 ~~an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or developing an OPORD from~~
34 ~~scratch when no deliberate plan exists using an approved COA.~~ Understandably, the speed
35 of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning and the planning time
36 available. **The supported commander and subordinate and supporting commanders**
37 **identify actual forces, sustainment, and ~~strategic~~ mobility resources and describe the**
38 **CONOPS in OPORD format.** They update and adjust planning accomplished during COA
39 development for any new force and sustainment requirements and source forces and lift
40 resources. All members of the JPEC identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations. **The**
41 **supported commander should bring any shortfalls or operational limitations to the**
42 **attention of the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of**
43 **Staff before execution.**

32. Force Planning

In CAP, force planning focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The supported commander identifies force requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate ~~force allocation~~ (“sourcing”) by the Services and other force providers. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported commander requires to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported commander describes required force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions (not unit type codes). The supported commander submits the required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing. The force providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which units to allocate to the supported commander’s force requirements. The Services and their Service component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of non-unit sustainment.

~~33. Transportation Planning~~

~~—In CAP, practical considerations require that transportation planning concentrate on the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of surface movement. Major changes to deployment plans with effective dates more than about 7 days or so in the future will have very little impact on the scheduling process; however, changes with effective dates of 7 days or less may adversely affect the timely development of the airlift flow schedule. Adding requirements within those management windows may cause delays in other scheduled movements. USTRANSCOM recommends transportation feasibility aligned to the JFC requirements. The supported commander makes the final decision, balancing mission needs with risks.~~

33. Plan Review and Approval

a. The supported combatant commander submits the completed OPORD for approval to the Secretary of Defense or President via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After an OPORD is approved, the President or Secretary of Defense may makes the decision to begin deployment in anticipation of executing the operation or as a show of resolve, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other means. Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with continuous situation ~~awareness—monitoring,~~ (which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or updates.

b. In CAP, plan development continues after a decision by the President or Secretary of Defense to execute the OPORD or return to the pre-crisis situation. When the crisis does not lead to execution, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or deliberate planning procedures. If the President or Secretary of Defense decides to execute the OPORD, execution begins.

34. Abbreviated Procedures

The procedures in the preceding discussion have been described sequentially. During a crisis they may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. In some situations, no formal WARNORD is issued, and the first record communication that the JPEC receives is the PLANORD or ALERTORD containing the COA to be used for plan development. It is also possible that the President or Secretary of Defense may make the decision to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities. No definitive length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity. Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces.

35. Execution

a. Execution begins when the President or Secretary of Defense decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis. Only the President or Secretary of Defense can authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue an EXORD ~~that directs the supported commander to initiate military action and conduct military operations.~~ The Chairman's EXORD directs the supported commander to initiate military operations, defines the time to initiate operations, deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. ~~The supported commander, in turn, issues an EXORD to subordinate and supporting commanders that directs the execution of their OPORDs. Subordinate and supporting commanders execute their OPORDs and conduct operations to accomplish assigned missions. The supported commander monitors movements, assesses and reports the achievement of objectives, directs action needed to ensure successful completion of military operations, and continues planning as necessary.~~ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful completion of military operations. USTRANSCOM manages common-user global air, land, and sea transportation, reporting the progress of deployments to the Chairman ~~of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ and the supported commander. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished or revised. ~~If the crisis is prolonged, the The CAP process may be repeated continuously as circumstances and missions change. If the crisis expands into major combat operations, CAP will evolve into, and be absorbed by, the larger scale planning for the conduct of the military operation.~~

b. During execution, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and non-unit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required. The JOPES deployment database contains the following information, at a minimum, at the time of OPORD execution:

1 (1) Sourced combat, CS, and CSS requirements for assigned and augmentation
2 forces.

3
4 (2) Integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, port of
5 debarkation (POD), and latest arrival date (LAD) at POD.

6 (3) Integrated non-unit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and
7 day.

8
9 c. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes the EXORD that defines D-day
10 and H-hour and directs execution of the OPORD. **The Chairman's EXORD** is a record
11 communication that authorizes execution of the COA approved by the President and
12 Secretary of Defense and detailed in the supported commander's OPORD. It may include
13 further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. In a fast-developing crisis the EXORD
14 may be the first record communication generated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
15 Staff. The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. **The issuance**
16 **of the EXORD is time-sensitive.** The format may differ depending on the amount of
17 previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint*
18 *Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*,
19 contains the format for the EXORD. Information already communicated in previous orders
20 should not be repeated. The EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the
21 operation and any additional essential guidance, such as C-day and H-hour.

22
23 d. Throughout execution, the Joint Staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of
24 tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary. The Chairman should monitor the situation for
25 potential changes in the applicability of current termination criteria and communicate them
26 to all concerned parties.

27
28 e. The supported commander issues an EXORD to subordinate and supporting
29 commanders upon receipt of the Chairman's EXORD. It may give the detailed planning
30 guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the
31 Chairman's EXORD does not cover. The supported commander also monitors, assesses, and
32 reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and
33 re-plans, re-deploys, or terminates operations as necessary, in compliance with termination
34 criteria directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

35
36 f. The subordinate and supporting commanders execute their supported commander-
37 directed OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of
38 organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database. These commanders
39 conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service
40 forces in the ~~combat theater~~ OA.

41 g. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first
42 increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop
43 transportation schedules for subsequent increments. Both statuses of movements and future
44 movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database.

1 h. **Campaign Planning during Execution.** If required by the situation, the supported
2 commander will have initiated campaign planning or refinement of an existing campaign
3 plan during plan development. Campaign planning continues throughout execution until the
4 scope or duration of the operation no longer exceeds that of a single major operation. The
5 supported commander uses the joint operation planning process as required to accomplish
6 campaign planning and prepare the ~~operation plans~~ OPLANs necessary to execute the
7 campaigns and major operations and accomplish the assigned mission.

8
9 ~~i. **Continued Planning.** Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the~~
10 ~~mission is accomplished. If the operation is prolonged, the joint operation planning process~~
11 ~~will continue as circumstances and missions change. If the crisis expands into major combat~~
12 ~~operations, planning will evolve into, and be absorbed by, the larger scale planning required~~
13 ~~for the conduct of the military operation.~~

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CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

“A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources doing neither too much nor too little. But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole. What we should admire is the accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only becomes evident in final success.”

Carl von Clausewitz
On War, 1832

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country”.

Napoleon
Maxims of War, 1831

1. Introduction

a. **General.** Supported ~~commanders~~-JFCs translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the supported ~~commander~~ JFC’s strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of major combat operations, but it can be used across the range of operations.

KEY TERMS

campaign — A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

campaign planning — The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

campaign plan — A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

b. **Purpose.** JFCs plan, prepare, and execute campaigns to achieve strategic military objectives. Campaign planning ~~encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through CAP. The campaign plan provides the CONOPS needed to~~ synchronizes and integrates the actions necessary to accomplish a strategic objective by accomplishing a series of intermediate objectives within a given time and space. Supported ~~commanders~~ JFCs normally prepare campaign plans in ~~operation plan~~ OPLAN format. Figure IV-1 provides key aspects of campaign planning.




Figure IV-1. Purpose of Campaign Planning

SECTION A. PLANNING FUNDAMENTALS

2. Campaign Plans

a. ~~General. A campaign plan describes how a series of related joint major operations are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic or operational objective with available resources.~~ A campaign plan: Fundamentals. Campaign planning is a primary means by which supported JFCs arrange for unified action and guide their subordinate and supporting commander's planning. It communicates the supported JFC's purpose, requirements, objectives, and CONOPS to subordinate and supporting commanders. Campaign planning binds military operations together at the operational level. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a supported JFC's strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by describing how the supported JFC intends to arrange a series of related operations in time, space, and purpose to accomplish strategic and operational objectives with available resources. A supported JFC's campaign plan provides the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination. Fundamentals of campaign plans are shown at Figure IV-2.




Figure IV-2. Fundamentals of Campaign Planning

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, provides additional guidance.

~~(1) Orients on an adversary's centers of gravity.~~

~~(2) Protects friendly centers of gravity.~~

~~(3) Is designed to achieve simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces.~~

~~(4) Clearly defines an end state, mission success, and mission termination criteria.~~

~~(5) Serves as the basis for subordinate planning.~~

~~b. **Fundamentals.** Two of the most important aspects of a campaign plan are the CONOPS and the concept for their sustainment.~~ Campaign plans are the operational extension of a supported commander's strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how the supported commander intends to conduct operations in a given time and space to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. Through theater campaign plans, supported commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; arrange operations in time, space, and purpose; organize forces; establish command relationships; assign tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations, often in coordination with interagency and multinational operations. ~~Campaign planning is a primary means by which supported commanders arrange for strategic unified action and through which they guide the planning of joint operations by their subordinate and supporting commanders.~~ It communicates the commander's purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to supporting commands and Services, so that they may make necessary preparations. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, supported commanders give the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level. Campaign planning is the glue that binds component, supporting, and interagency operations together at the operational level. The coordinated functioning of component and supporting elements can be achieved through the interactive process of building plans and communicating the intent of those plans to the higher headquarters, Service and/or functional component commanders, supporting commanders, other government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Fundamentals of campaign plans are shown at Figure IV-2. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, provides additional guidance.

b. **Considerations.** The considerations for ~~developing a~~ campaign plan~~ning~~ include the following.

(1) What ~~political~~-military conditions (objectives) must be achieved to accomplish the strategic objective? (Ends)

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce those conditions? (Ways)

(3) ~~How~~What resources are necessary to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

(4) What is the likely cost and operational risk to the joint force of performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)

3. Strategic Guidance

a. Guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a campaign plan. Campaigns are ~~not isolated from a part of~~ other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military power is used in conjunction with other instruments of national power ~~—diplomatic, economic, and informational—~~ to achieve

1 strategic objectives. Depending on the nature of the operation, a military campaign may be
2 the main effort, or it may be used to support ~~diplomatic or economic nonmilitary~~ efforts. A
3 campaign must be coordinated with nonmilitary efforts to ensure that all actions work in
4 harmony to achieve the ends of policy. An understanding of the national strategic ~~and~~
5 ~~operational~~ objectives is essential for campaign planning.

6
7 ~~b. Campaign plans are used by national authorities as well as by subordinates.~~
8 ~~Submission of a well-conceived campaign plan to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~
9 ~~gives the supported commander's estimated time-phased force requirements for~~
10 ~~consolidation with other combatant command forecasts at the national level. The campaign~~
11 ~~plan may be used to influence the joint strategic planning process.~~ For example, during
12 Operation DESERT SHIELD, Commander in Chief, US Central Command's campaign plan
13 briefing to the President for the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait identified the
14 requirement for, and resulted in, the deployment of a second Army corps to Southwest Asia.
15 Campaign planning may influence the joint strategic planning process. It is useful to
16 national authorities as well as subordinate and supporting commanders. Campaign plans
17 provide the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff with
18 the supported combatant commander's estimated time-phased force requirements for
19 consolidation and reconciliation with other combatant command, Service, and Defense
20 Agency estimates. For example, during Operation DESERT SHIELD, the US Central
21 Command's (USCENTCOM's) campaign plan briefing to the President for the expulsion of
22 Iraqi forces from Kuwait identified the requirement for, and resulted in the deployment of, a
23 second Army corps and a significant number of additional combat aircraft to Southwest
24 Asia.

25 26 4. Types of Campaign Plans

27
28 a. **Global Campaign Plan.** A global campaign plan describes how the Chairman of
29 the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a supported functional combatant commander intends to
30 ~~accomplish~~ coordinate the accomplishment of strategic objectives within multiple theaters ~~of~~
31 ~~operations~~ that extend beyond the AOR of a single geographic combatant commander.

32
33 b. **Theater Campaign Plan.** A theater campaign plan describes how a supported
34 geographic combatant commander intends to accomplish strategic or operational objectives
35 within a theater of war or theater of operations primarily within the supported ~~commander~~
36 ~~JFC's~~ AOR. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM has shown that Adjacent geographic
37 combatant commanders may must conduct supporting operations within the AOR of the
38 supported ~~commander JFC~~, or within their own AORs, under the overall direction of the
39 supported ~~commander JFC~~. ~~Several US combatant commanders have developed campaign~~
40 ~~plans in varying degrees and under a variety of names. The geographic combatant~~
41 ~~commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) establishes a campaign plan both in~~
42 ~~warfighting strategy and in war plans developed in response to tasking in the JSCP. The~~
43 ~~supported commander's planning tasks are not limited to those specified by higher authority.~~
44 ~~The commander of the Combined Forces Command in Korea also sets forth a campaign for~~
45 ~~the defense of the peninsula in an operation war plan approved by the Chairman of the Joint~~
46 ~~Chiefs of Staff. The geographic combatant commander of US Central Command~~

~~(USCENTCOM) has established a series of plans that fulfill the requirements of a campaign plan.~~

c. **Subordinate Campaign Plan.** A subordinate campaign plan describes how a subordinate JFC intends to accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) strategic or operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction developed by the supported ~~commander~~ JFC.

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, provides additional guidance.

~~d. **Major Operation Plan.** Service and functional component commanders prepare major operation plans that implement the CONOPS of the supported campaign plan as it affects their respective component forces.~~

5. Campaign Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

a. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of major combat operations. However, campaign planning is an effective methodology for situations other than war. Combatant commanders and ~~other subordinate~~ JFCs may develop campaign plans for the full range of military operations when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, campaign plans ~~must integrate consider~~ all instruments of national power ~~—political, economic, informational, and military—~~ and how their coordinated efforts work to attain national strategic objectives. The interagency and multinational aspects of campaign planning ~~is are~~ particularly relevant for campaigns involving MOOTW. MOOTW campaign planning considerations include the following:

(1) Statement of the national problem.

(2) Relevant national interests.

(3) Stated or perceived military mission.

(4) Nature of physical environment in the OA (for example, geography, climate, infrastructure).

(5) Nature of society in the OA (for example, population and demographics, history, general culture, religion, economy, politics, infrastructure, military and security forces, potential destabilizing factors, insurgencies, etc.).

1 (6) Nature of external forces, including other nations, international, and
2 transnational forces.

3
4 (7) Nature of the crisis, to include identification of critical events, economic
5 problems, natural disaster, government reaction, recent military defeat, religious influences,
6 or ethnic conflict.

7
8 (8) Impact of time as it affects the environment and key players. Any critical
9 upcoming events that can be influenced.

10
11 (9) Host-nation support (HNS) agreements exist that can support this operation;
12 how local, regional, national or international laws affect the operations in the OA. (Laws of
13 war apply to this operation and the impact on support in the OA.)

14
15 (10) Significant logistic support considerations (for example, geography, supply,
16 facilities, transportation, maintenance, labor resources, health service support, personnel
17 service support, religious support, field services, and field sanitation).

18
19 (11) General types of US support actions that should be contemplated, the
20 resources that they will require and how the actions of other than US forces and their support
21 resources may be coordinated for the operation.

22
23 (12) Legal status of US personnel in the OA (for example, combatant vs. ~~expert on~~
24 mission noncombatant, prisoner of war vs. illegal detainee, ~~status of~~ forces agreements with
25 friendly nations).

26
27 ~~b. Subordinate Plans. Subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans to~~
28 ~~accomplish tasks required to execute MOOTW. These may include transition operations~~
29 ~~between MOOTW and war. For example, a FDO such as a show of force, coupled with~~
30 ~~public statements of concern, to demonstrate US national resolve could be designed as the~~
31 ~~first phase of a campaign. The second phase could be a well-publicized selected~~
32 ~~mobilization of Reserve forces. If these actions do not deter an adversary, then the~~
33 ~~remaining phases of the campaign could be initiated and likely carried out to conclusion.~~

34
35 b. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, ~~and~~ JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military*
36 *Operations Other Than War*, and JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint*
37 *Operations*, provides additional guidance.

38 39 ~~6. Relationship of Campaign Planning to Joint Operation Planning~~

40
41 ~~a. Campaign plans are joint plans. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting~~
42 ~~operation plans and orders. Campaign planning facilitates national level coordination of~~
43 ~~strategic priorities and resource allocation. Campaign planning provides a common purpose~~
44 ~~and common objectives to a series of operation plans. Existing operation plans may also~~
45 ~~provide the basis for development of campaign plans. The use of campaign planning is~~
46 ~~refocused as the scale of contemplated operations and the imminence of hostilities decreases.~~

~~b. During deliberate planning, supported commanders prepare joint operation plans in direct response to taskings in the JSCP. When the scope and duration of contemplated operations warrant, they may also develop campaign plans or prepare their operation plans in campaign plan format. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the COA during CAP. The campaign planning elements of deliberate plans will have to be updated as in any deliberate plan used at execution.~~

~~c. When a crisis situation develops and CAP is directed, the supported commander has the essential elements necessary for finalizing a campaign plan using the approved CONOPS as the centerpiece of the plan.~~

~~d. See Appendix D, Theater Campaign Plan Format.~~

SECTION B. CAMPAIGN PLAN OPERATIONAL DESIGN PROCESS

6. General

a. Theater-level campaign planning is inextricably linked with operational art, most notably in the design of the operational concept for the campaign. While facilitated by such procedures as JOPES and commonly accepted military decision-making models, the **operational design process is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience and judgment.** The result of this process should provide the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means for the campaign.

b. The **elements of operational design** are ~~a tools~~ to help supported ~~commanders JFCs~~ and their ~~planners-staffs~~ **visualize what the campaign should look like and to shape the commander's intent.** The emphasis ~~on the specific applied to an operational design's~~ elements ~~of an operational design may vary-varies depending on-with~~ the ~~theater's~~ strategic objectives ~~in a particular theater~~. Not only does the strategic environment affect operational design, other factors such as the **availability of HNS**, the **allocation of strategic mobility assets**, the **state of the theater infrastructure**, and forces **and resources** **made available for planning all have an impact on the operational design.** In the final analysis, the goal of a sound operational design is to ensure a clear focus on the ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic COGs, and provide for sound sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all available military and nonmilitary ~~sources-instruments~~ of power to that end. The **key elements of operational design** are:

(1) Understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objectives(s)).

(2) Identifying both friendly and adversary sources of strength and key points of vulnerability (“critical factors”). ~~the critical factors (principal adversary strengths, including the strategic centers of gravity, and weaknesses).~~

(3) Developing an operational concept or scheme that will achieve the strategic objective(s).

7. Strategic Guidance

a. **General.** The President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory,” or success (**ends**); ~~describe the method of employing military force~~ (**ways**); and allocate adequate forces and ~~assets-resources~~ (**means**) to achieve strategic objectives. The method of employing military force (ways) to achieve the ends is for the supported JFC to develop and propose. As such, strategic guidance normally contains the following:

(1) Strategic end state (definition of victory or success).

(2) Resources (forces, to include multinational, time, space).

(3) ~~Restraints (prohibitions and restrictions, e.g., geographical, weapons, methods, ROE).~~ Operational limitations (constraints and restraints).

~~(4) Constraints (obligatory or must do, logistics, ROE).~~

(4) Strategic assumptions.

~~Note: When conditions imposed by strategic guidance are so prescriptive as to prevent the attainment of the established objectives, the supported commander must request relaxation of either the limitations or the strategic objectives themselves.~~

b. ~~Military-Strategic~~ **Military Objectives.** ~~Campaign-plan-Operation~~ design process begins with strategic guidance in the form of ~~military~~-strategic military objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. This focus on the ~~military~~-strategic military objective is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the stakes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the adversary to arrive at reasonably attainable national-strategic military objectives. **The strategic guidance must establish whether the supported commander JFC is to pursue a limited or unlimited strategic (political) objective.** This distinction is absolutely essential to ensure the right match between political and military objectives. Campaign planners should never lose sight of the fact that strategic objectives must dominate the campaign planning process at every juncture.

c. **Multinational Strategic Guidance.** In multinational settings, military committee directives provide the strategic guidance and direction for campaign planning. In multinational situations, the combatant commander and planners must clearly understand the conditions that the national or multinational political leadership wants the multinational military force to establish in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional security, geopolitics, and so forth. When multinational strategic objectives are unclear or ambiguous, the senior US military commander must seek clarification and convey the impact, positive or negative, of continued ambiguity to the President and Secretary of Defense.

8. Desired Strategic End State

a. The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is the desired “end state.” A strategic end state simply means the political and military conditions that must exist at the end of the military operation to accomplish the strategic objectives. Normally this includes crisis resolution, transition to a civil authority, and either the resumption of normal military operations in, or the disengagement of military forces from, the OA. The President or Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the supported ~~commander~~ JFC, should clearly describe the desired end state before committing the Armed Forces of the United States to an operation. The Chairman or the supported ~~commander~~ JFC may recommend a desired end state, but the President or Secretary of Defense should formally approve it.

b. Defining the strategic end state — which may change as the operation progresses — and ensuring that it supports the achievement of national strategic objectives are critical early steps in the operational design process. Aside from its obvious role in accomplishing the strategic objectives, **clearly defining the end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign.** When the ~~desired~~ strategic end state is ill-defined or even absent, or when it appears that the desired strategic end state has changed in response to changes in the strategic environment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supported ~~commander~~ JFC should solicit additional guidance and direction from the Secretary of Defense and through the interagency process to ensure that the strategic end state is clearly defined. To enhance clarity and promote unity of effort, the supported JFC should reiterate the strategic end state with his commander’s intent in the campaign plan.

~~e. Although they are related, the term “end state” should not be confused with “commander’s intent.” Commanders at all echelons issue a commander’s intent, but their intent does not specify the political conditions that must exist after military objectives have been accomplished. To enhance clarity and promote unity of effort, the supported commanders and planners should reiterate the end state in conjunction with the commander’s intent in the campaign plan.~~

c. A clearly defined end state is just as necessary in MOOTW situations. While there may not be an armed adversary to confront in a MOOTW situation, the supported

1 | ~~commander-JFC~~ still has to think in terms of causes and effects that will lead to success.
2 | Examples of a military condition that would have to be achieved to support the strategic end
3 | state might be something like “restoration of basic services;” “formation of a professional
4 | anti-drug force;” or “mitigation of the consequences of a nuclear accident.” While these
5 | examples are probably more typical of a major operation with joint forces in a supporting
6 | role, they serve to illustrate the link between military and strategic objectives.

8 | 9. ~~Conflict~~ Termination

10 | a. Every campaign and every strategic effort is directed toward a goal, and at some
11 | point military action eventually ends. The supported ~~commander-JFC~~ must clearly
12 | understand the termination criteria for the campaign. If the President or Secretary of
13 | Defense ~~does~~ not adequately articulate the termination criteria, the Chairman of the Joint
14 | Chiefs of Staff or the supported ~~commander-JFC~~ should request further guidance or
15 | clarification, as appropriate. The decision as to when and under what circumstances to
16 | suspend or terminate combat operations is a political decision. Even so, it is essential that
17 | the Chairman and the supported ~~commander-JFC~~ advise the President and Secretary of
18 | Defense during the decision-making process. The supported ~~commander-JFC~~ should ensure
19 | that political leaders understand the current political-military situation and the implications,
20 | both immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict.

22 | b. ~~Campaign planners-Commanders and their staffs~~ must plan for conflict termination
23 | from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves. To
24 | maintain the proper perspective, they must know what constitutes an acceptable political-
25 | military end state; (i.e., what ~~political~~-military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of
26 | combat operations). In examining the proposed national strategic end state, the supported
27 | ~~commander-JFC~~ and the staff must ~~consider whether it has reasonable assurance of ending~~
28 | ~~the fundamental problem or underlying conditions that instigated the conflict in the first~~
29 | ~~place determine if military operations will break the adversary’s will and lead him to accept~~
30 | ~~the strategic end state.~~

32 | c. When addressing conflict termination, ~~campaign planners-commanders and their~~
33 | ~~staffs~~ must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force
34 | protection, transition to post-conflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment.
35 | ~~Planners-They~~ must also anticipate the nature of post-conflict operations, ~~where the focus~~
36 | ~~will likely shift to MOOTW; for example, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance,~~
37 | ~~or enforcement of exclusion zones.~~

39 | d. In formulating the campaign plan, the supported ~~commander-JFC~~ and staff should
40 | ensure the following:

42 | (1) Conflict termination is a key aspect of the campaign planning process.

44 | (2) Emphasizing backward planning; ~~decision-makers should not take the first step~~
45 | ~~toward hostilities or war without considering planning should start from~~ the last step ~~in the~~
46 | ~~campaign.~~

(3) Defining the conditions of the termination phase. The military objectives must support the political aims — the campaign’s conflict termination process is a part of a larger implicit bargaining process, even while hostilities continue. The military contribution can significantly affect the political leverage available to influence that process.

(4) Considering how efforts to eliminate or degrade an adversary’s C2 may affect, positively or negatively, efforts to achieve the termination objectives. For instance, ~~Will~~ adversaries be able to affect a cease-fire or otherwise control the actions of their forces?

(5) Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. The supported ~~commander-JFC~~ and staff should view conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new post-hostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems.

10. Military Conditions

a. Strategic (political) objectives describe in broad terms the political conditions that the President wants produced through military action, in combination with the other instruments of national power. Military objectives describe the conditions that military forces must produce in order to accomplish the strategic objectives. The supported ~~commander-JFC~~ must determine what sequence of actions is most likely to produce those military conditions; and how military resources will be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions.

b. Determining military conditions and how to produce them requires a clear understanding of when military force is the main effort and when it is acting in support of another instrument of national power. This relationship is not as obvious as it may seem. In major combat operations, the other instruments of national power support military forces and the campaign can be relatively unrestrained. In MOOTW, however, military operations often support other ~~U.S. Government-USG~~ activities and must be closely integrated with those nonmilitary activities as an integral part of the campaign. The complex strategic environment that characterizes many MOOTW scenarios only serves to underscore the importance of JFCs clearly focusing on their strategic objectives and the military conditions they must produce to accomplish them.

11. Centers of Gravity and Other Critical Factors

KEY TERM

centers of gravity — Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.

“One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all of our energies should be directed.”

Carl von Clausewitz
On War, 1832

“The first task . . . in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, and if possible, trace them back to a single one.”

Carl von Clausewitz
On War, 1832

1
2 a. Once the supported ~~commander JFC and the planners have~~ has determined **what** set
3 of military conditions must exist for the adversary to submit to US will (the strategic
4 objective), the focus now shifts to **how** they will accomplish that objective. The most
5 important task confronting ~~campaign planners the JFC’s staff~~ in this process is being able to
6 identify friendly and adversary **strategic COGs**, (i.e., the sources of strength, power, and
7 resistance). ~~Campaign planners JFCs and their staffs~~ must first understand both friendly and
8 adversary sources of strength and key points of vulnerability; these are referred to as **critical**
9 **factors**.

10
11 ~~b. The center of gravity concept is useful as an analytical tool for designing campaigns~~
12 ~~and major operations, and to assist supported commanders and their staffs in analyzing~~
13 ~~friendly and adversary strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Analysis of centers of~~
14 ~~gravity, both friendly and adversary, is a continuous process throughout a major operation or~~
15 ~~campaign. This process cannot be taken lightly. A faulty analysis of friendly or adversary~~
16 ~~centers of gravity can have very serious consequences; specifically, the inability to~~
17 ~~accomplish the military objectives at an acceptable cost and the unconscionable expenditure~~
18 ~~of lives, time, and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational~~
19 ~~results. Accordingly, a great deal of thought and analysis must take place before the~~
20 ~~supported commander and staff can determine centers of gravity with any confidence.~~

21
22 ~~c. Before attempting to identify friendly and adversary centers of gravity, planners must~~
23 ~~first understand the complementary relationship of centers of gravity to the other critical~~
24 ~~factors. These are important distinctions, because understanding the relationship among the~~
25 ~~critical factors (and centers of gravity in particular) not only permits but also compels greater~~
26 ~~precision in thought and expression in designing the campaign.~~

27
28 ~~d. Critical capabilities are those capabilities that are considered crucial enablers for a~~
29 ~~center of gravity to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the strategic~~
30 ~~objective(s). Critical requirements are those essential conditions, resources, and means for a~~
31 ~~critical capability to be fully operational. Critical vulnerabilities, on the other hand, are those~~
32 ~~aspects or components of critical capabilities that are deficient, or vulnerable to~~
33 ~~neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results,~~
34 ~~disproportionate to the military resources applied. In general, a supported commander must~~

possess sufficient operational reach and combat power to take advantage of an adversary's critical vulnerabilities; otherwise, these weaknesses cannot be targeted as physical objectives that are key to mission accomplishment (see Figure IV-3). Similarly, a supported commander must protect friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an adversary.

e. In general, the higher the level of war is, the fewer potential centers of gravity there will be (ideally, planners can identify the center of gravity) and they will tend to be more intangible in nature. At the strategic level, a center of gravity might include an alliance or coalition, national will or public support, or the national leadership's will to fight. Identifying strategic centers of gravity is usually a difficult and challenging task because of the large number of intangible elements involved. An operational center of gravity, on the other hand, is normally more tangible—for example, a powerful element of the armed forces. It is frequently that concentration of an adversary's military power that is most dangerous to friendly forces or the one that stands between those forces and the accomplishment of their strategic objective.

f. The importance of identifying the proper centers of gravity cannot be overstated. Determining friendly and adversary strategic centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities is absolutely essential to establishing clarity of purpose, focusing friendly efforts and, ultimately, generating synergistic results in the employment of one's forces. In fact, detailed operational planning should not begin until the adversary's centers of gravity have been identified. Identifying centers of gravity is an analytical process that involves both art and science. A proper analysis must be based on a detailed knowledge of how adversaries organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. The key to this process is intelligence that anticipates the commander's intelligence needs and is timely, objective, usable, available, complete, accurate, and relevant.

g. From a procedural perspective, the analysis of adversary centers of gravity is a key step in the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process. In the third of four steps in the JIPB process, joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary centers of gravity. The analysis is conducted after an understanding of the broad operational environment has been obtained and before a detailed study of the adversary's forces occurs. The analysis addresses the adversary leadership, fielded forces, resources, infrastructure, population, transportation systems, and internal and external relationships of the adversary. The goal is to determine from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), or the will to fight. A determination is then made to see if the tentative or candidate centers of gravity are truly critical to the adversary's strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the campaign planning effort, since **the essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the adversary's critical vulnerabilities in order to destroy or neutralize them, employing both kinetic and non-kinetic means of attack.** JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, provides detailed information on the JIPB process as it relates to campaign planning.

h. ~~The most effective method for planners to conduct an analysis of friendly and adversary centers of gravity and their critical vulnerabilities is to visualize the centers of gravity in terms of a system i.e., what are its functional components (critical requirements) and how do they relate to one another? What elements within this “system” protect, sustain, or integrate its various elements or components? Once a detailed systemic analysis is completed, the planners should then try to identify the critical vulnerabilities within that system. For example, assume that the supported commander’s staff has determined that an adversary’s integrated air defense system (IADS) is a critical requirement for the adversary operational center of gravity. Upon conducting their systemic analysis, the staff determines that the IADS primary weakness is its radar network. Since active radar sites are especially vulnerable to high speed anti-radiation missiles, the planners deduce that the radar network constitutes a critical vulnerability. The planners can then devise a method of attack to destroy this critical vulnerability, which will ultimately neutralize the adversary’s operational center of gravity.~~

i. ~~Within the context of pitting friendly strengths against adversary weaknesses, the supported commander will understandably want to focus efforts against those critical vulnerabilities identified within the critical requirements (enabling objects or functions) that will do the most decisive damage to an adversary’s centers of gravity. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners must also compare their degree of criticality with their degree of accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, and redundancy, and then balance those factors against friendly capabilities. The supported commander’s goal is to seek opportunities aggressively to apply asymmetrical force against an adversary in as vulnerable an aspect as possible, and in as many dimensions as possible. In other words, the supported commander uses force strength to undermine the adversary’s strength by exploiting adversary weaknesses.~~

j. ~~Another major element of properly identifying the adversary’s centers of gravity and underlying critical vulnerabilities is having a thorough understanding of the adversary and how it thinks. This is not as simple as it sounds; not only must intelligence analysts and planners develop an understanding of the adversary’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, they must take into account the way that friendly forces and actions appear from the adversary’s viewpoint. Otherwise, planners may fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values, and reactions that “mirror image” US actions in the same situation, or by assuming that the adversary will respond or act in a particular manner. Likewise, what might be a critical requirement for friendly forces might be less so, or not even important to the adversary. This means that those factors that might influence the adversary to abandon or change its strategic objectives must be fully understood by campaign planners. Not only is this analysis key to determining how to attack the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, it would be very difficult to derive realistic adversary COAs or develop effective deception plans or ruses without it.~~

k. **Validity Testing.** ~~Before solidifying centers of gravity into the campaign plan, planners should analyze and test their validity. The destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of a valid center of gravity will result in changing an adversary COA or denying its strategic objectives. If a center of gravity does not meet these criteria, then planners must~~

review the previously identified critical factors, look for other critical vulnerabilities, or reassess how to attack the previously identified critical vulnerabilities with additional resources. The conclusions, while critically important to the campaign planning process itself, must be tempered with continuous evaluations and reassessments, because derived centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities are subject to change at any time during the campaign or major operation. Accordingly, supported commanders and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances during execution of the campaign that may cause derived centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities to change and adjust friendly plans and operations accordingly.

1. Protection of Own Center(s) of Gravity. Supported commanders must also analyze friendly centers of gravity and identify friendly critical vulnerabilities. Long sea and air LOCs from CONUS or supporting theaters could be a critical vulnerability for a friendly center of gravity. A friendly center of gravity could also be something more intangible in nature. During the Gulf War, for example, USCENTCOM identified the coalition itself as a friendly strategic center of gravity and took appropriate measures to protect it. In conducting the analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the supported commander must decide how, when, where, and why friendly military forces are (or might become) vulnerable to hostile actions, and then plan accordingly. This planning goes well beyond force protection. The supported commander must achieve a balance between prosecuting the main effort and providing operational protection. In providing operational protection, the supported commander should focus attention on and assign adequate forces and assets to the most capabilities in the operational area to protect friendly centers of gravity.

b. The COG concept assists JFCs and their staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Analysis of COGs, both friendly and adversary, is a continuous process throughout a major operation or campaign. The importance of properly identifying the COGs and the relationships among them cannot be overstated. Determining friendly and adversary COGs is essential to establishing clarity of purpose, focusing friendly efforts and generating synergistic results in the employment of joint forces. A faulty analysis can have very serious consequences and lead to the inability to accomplish the military objectives at an acceptable cost, and the unconscionable expenditure of lives, time, and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational results. Accordingly, a great deal of thought and analysis must take place before the JFC and staff can determine COGs with any confidence.

c. In general, the higher the level of war is, the fewer potential COGs there will be and they will tend to be more intangible in nature. Intangible COGs reflect the will, influence, and courage of people and their leaders. At the strategic level, a center of gravity might include an alliance or coalition, national will or public support, or the national leadership's will to fight. Identifying strategic COGs is usually a difficult and challenging task because of the large number of intangible elements involved. An operational COG, on the other hand, is normally more tangible — for example, a powerful element of the armed forces. It is frequently that concentration of an adversary's military power that is most dangerous to friendly forces or the one that stands between those forces and the accomplishment of their strategic objective.

d. From a procedural perspective, the analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step in the JIPB process. In the third of four steps in the JIPB process, joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs. The analysis is conducted after an understanding of the broad operational environment has been obtained and before a detailed study of the adversary's forces occurs. The analysis addresses the adversary leadership, fielded forces, resources, infrastructure, population, transportation systems, and internal and external relationships of the adversary. The goal is to determine from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), or the will to fight. A determination is then made to see if the tentative or candidate COGs are truly critical to the adversary's strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the campaign planning effort.

JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, provides detailed information on the JIPB process as it relates to campaign planning.

e. After identifying friendly and adversary COGs, JFCs and their staffs must determine how to protect or attack them, respectively. An analysis of the identified COGs in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities is vital to this process.

KEY TERMS

Critical capabilities — those capabilities that are considered crucial enablers for a center of gravity to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the strategic objective(s).

Critical requirements — those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.

Critical vulnerabilities — those aspects or components of critical capabilities that are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportionate to the military resources applied.

f. Understanding the relationship among the COGs and the other critical factors not only permits but also compels greater precision in thought and expression in designing the campaign. In general, a JFC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power to take advantage of an adversary's critical vulnerabilities; otherwise, these weaknesses cannot be targeted as physical objectives that are key to mission accomplishment (see Figure IV-3). Similarly, a supported commander must protect friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an adversary.




Figure IV-3. Characteristics of Centers of Gravity

g. The most effective method for JFCs and their staffs to conduct an analysis of friendly and adversary COGs and their critical vulnerabilities is to visualize the COGs in terms of a system i.e., what are its functional components (critical requirements) and how do they relate to one another? What elements within this system protect, sustain, or integrate its various elements or components? Once a detailed systemic analysis is completed, the planners should then try to identify the critical vulnerabilities within that system. For example, assume that the supported commander's staff has determined that an adversary's integrated air defense system (IADS) is a critical requirement for the adversary operational COG. Upon conducting their systemic analysis, the staff determines that the IADS primary weakness is its radar network. Since active radar sites are especially vulnerable to high-speed anti-radiation missiles, the planners deduce that the radar network constitutes a critical vulnerability. The planners can then devise a method of attack to destroy this critical vulnerability, which will ultimately neutralize the adversary's operational COG.

h. When identifying friendly and adversary critical vulnerabilities, the JFC and staff will understandably want to focus their efforts against the critical vulnerabilities that will do the most decisive damage to an adversary's COG. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners must also compare their criticality with their accessibility.

1 recuperability, vulnerability, redundancy, and effect on the civilian populace, then balance
2 those factors against friendly capabilities to effect those vulnerabilities. The JFC's goal is to
3 seek opportunities aggressively to apply asymmetrical force against an adversary in as
4 vulnerable an aspect as possible, and in as many dimensions as possible. In other words, the
5 JFC seeks to undermine the adversary's strength by exploiting adversary vulnerabilities,
6 while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from adversaries attempting to do the same.

7
8 i. A proper analysis of adversary critical factors must be based on a detailed knowledge
9 of how adversaries organize, fight, think, make decisions, and their physical and
10 psychological strengths and weaknesses. This is not as simple as it sounds. JFCs and their
11 staffs must develop an understanding of their adversaries' capabilities and vulnerabilities,
12 and the critical factors that might influence an adversary to abandon or change strategic
13 objectives. They must also envision how friendly forces and actions appear from the
14 adversaries' viewpoints. Otherwise, they may fall into the trap of ascribing to an adversary
15 particular attitudes, values, and reactions that "mirror image" their own.

16
17 j. Before solidifying COGs into the campaign plan, planners should analyze and test
18 their validity. The destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of a valid COG will
19 result in changing an adversary COA or denying its strategic objectives. If a COG does not
20 meet these criteria, then planners must review the previously identified critical factors, look
21 for other critical vulnerabilities, or reassess how to attack the previously identified critical
22 vulnerabilities with additional resources. The conclusions, while critically important to the
23 campaign planning process itself, must be tempered with continuous evaluations and
24 reassessments, because derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities are subject to change at any
25 time during the campaign or major operation. Accordingly, JFCs and their subordinates

TITLE???

"The strategic and tactical air forces under General Eisenhower's command or direction for Operation OVERLORD were an Allied CENTER OF GRAVITY. These forces provided the critical capabilities to gain and maintain air supremacy over northern France (dominate the Luftwaffe), and simultaneously destroy and disrupt enemy ground forces to support Allied ground forces. The critical requirements included: superior air-to-air, long-range fighter planes, and capable air-to-ground attack aircraft. Allied possession of a superior air-to-air long-range fighter plane in the P-51 Mustang was an effective force multiplier that made all other aircraft in the Allied strategic and tactical air forces supporting Operation OVERLORD far more effective. The P-51, and the P-47 Thunderbolt, possessed performance characteristics that met a critical requirement in support of a critical capability necessary for Allied air forces to function as a CENTER OF GRAVITY in relation to OVERLORD. Other critical requirements include: on-the-ground forward air controllers, a ground-to-air communication system, a targeting and sortie allocation system, etc."

SOURCE: *Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities,*
by Dr. Joe Strange

1 should be alert to circumstances during execution of the campaign that may cause derived
2 COGs and critical vulnerabilities to change and adjust friendly plans and operations
3 accordingly.

4
5 k. JFCs must also analyze friendly COGs and identify friendly critical vulnerabilities.
6 Long sea and air lines of communications (LOCs) from CONUS or supporting theaters
7 could be a critical vulnerability for a friendly COG. A friendly COG could also be
8 something more intangible in nature. During the Gulf War, for example, USCENTCOM
9 identified the coalition itself as a friendly strategic COG and took appropriate measures to
10 protect it. In conducting the analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the supported commander
11 must decide how, when, where, and why friendly military forces are (or might become)
12 vulnerable to hostile actions, and then plan accordingly. This planning goes well beyond
13 force protection. The supported commander must achieve a balance between prosecuting the
14 main effort and providing operational protection. In providing operational protection, the
15 supported commander should focus attention on and assign adequate forces and assets to the
16 most capabilities in the OA to protect friendly COGs.

17 18 **12. CONOPS-Concept of Operations Development**

19
20 a. During CONOPS development, the ~~At this stage of the operational design~~
21 ~~development process, campaign planning is still very much an intellectual exercise. The~~
22 ~~supported commander JFC has to must~~ assimilate many variables under conditions of
23 uncertainty to ~~form a vision for the requisite~~ determine the essential military conditions,
24 sequence of actions, and application of forces and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives.
25 **Campaign planners-JFCs and their staffs should never lose sight of the fact that**
26 **strategic objectives must dominate the campaign planning process at every juncture.** If
27 operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or “nesting”
28 is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at
29 cross-purposes.

30
31 b. The thought process that ultimately leads to the development of a CONOPS should
32 capture the essence of operational art and provide the foundation for the campaign plan. A
33 CONOPS expresses in clear, concise, conceptual language a broad vision of what the
34 supported commander plans to accomplish and how it will be done using available
35 resources. The commander’s intent, clearly and explicitly stated, is an integral component of
36 the CONOPS. Normally, a campaign plan consists of an overall operational scheme for the
37 entire campaign, while subordinate component commanders will draw operational schemes
38 for their respective components. The CONOPS is the foundation for the campaign plan. It
39 clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC plans to accomplish and how it will be done
40 using available resources. The CONOPS:

41
42 (1) States the commander’s intent.

43
44 (2) Describes the defeat mechanism.

1 (3) Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of
2 forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose.

3
4 (4) Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander
5 intends to give or refuse battle, if required.

6
7 (5) Focuses on friendly and adversary COGs and their associated critical
8 vulnerabilities.

9
10 (6) Avoids discernible patterns and makes full use of ambiguity and deception.

11
12 (7) Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation.

13
14 (8) Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved.

15
16 (9) Links the strategic end state to the tasks assigned to subordinate and supporting
17 commanders.

18
19 c. ~~The CONOPS should also contain in general terms a scheme of when, where, and~~
20 ~~under what conditions the supported commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required.~~
21 ~~Above all, the CONOPS must make explicitly clear that the focus is on the destruction or~~
22 ~~neutralization of the adversary's centers of gravity. The CONOPS should exhibit creativity~~
23 ~~and avoid discernible conventions and patterns, should make full use of ambiguity and~~
24 ~~deception, and should provide for speed of execution. The CONOPS should also be~~
25 ~~grounded in the elements of operational art to help visualize the campaign in terms of the~~
26 ~~forces and functions involved.~~ How the supported commander JFC applies operational art
27 will vary with the:

28
29 (1) Nature of the operational environment, ~~conditions, the~~

30
31 (2) #Nature of the strategic objectives.

32
33 (3) Time and space available in the ~~theater~~ OA.

34
35 (4) Number and types of forces involved.

36
37 ~~d. Because each campaign plan is context specific, there is no commonly agreed upon~~
38 ~~checklist of prescriptive elements for a CONOPS. However, at a minimum, the CONOPS~~
39 ~~(scheme) should address the method of defeating the adversary (defeat mechanism);~~
40 ~~application of forces and capabilities; sequencing, synchronization and integration of forces~~
41 ~~and capabilities; and operational functions.~~

42 d. Chapter III, "Planning Joint Operations," in JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*,
43 contains a detailed discussion on all the facets of operational art and should be used in
44 conjunction with this publication.

13. Defeat Mechanism

KEY TERM

defeat mechanism — The approach by which a commander seeks to attack the critical capabilities that enable the adversary's centers of gravity to function as such.

a. At the theater-strategic level, the supported ~~commander~~ JFC has to determine **what set of political-military conditions will achieve the required strategic aims.** ~~In most situations, all the complementary instruments of national power will come into play, but military action may end up being the main effort at the strategic level. In that case, the theater design should focus on the adversary's critical vulnerabilities that lead to the destruction or neutralization of the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity as previously described.~~

b. The essence of operational art lies in ~~concentrating (in some way) US military resources determining how to allocate available friendly resources~~ against ~~the an~~ adversary's COGs to achieve ~~US-friendly~~ strategic and operational objectives. There are two approaches to accomplish this, so ~~campaign planners~~ JFCs and their staffs will have to decide between the two methods, given the specific circumstances. The decision facing the ~~planners~~ commander is whether to attack the COG **directly** or **indirectly**. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, states, **"To the extent possible, JFCs attack adversary centers of gravity directly."** In theory, direct attacks against adversary COGs resulting in their destruction or neutralization are the most direct path to victory. However, where direct attack means attacking into an adversary's strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach (see Figure IV-4).




Figure IV- 4. Direct vs. Indirect Approaches

c. In some situations, the direct approach may entail an attack focused on the bulk of the adversary's forces with the explicit aim of destroying or annihilating those forces in the shortest possible time. When one's own combat power is overwhelming, or the adversary force is deemed particularly vulnerable, a direct approach can sometimes be the most practical and effective way to decisively attack the adversary's COGs. However, this approach is often situationally dependent.

d. An adversary's COGs may not be open to direct attack because of their inherent strength. Their key elements may be too strong, too well protected or concealed or too abstract or intangible in nature. They may be beyond the operational reach of the joint force, or limiting factors, political or otherwise (e.g., ROE for the employment of US forces) may preclude a direct attack on an adversary's COGs.

e. In these cases, the JFC should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. An analysis of an adversary's critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect approaches to

1 attacking ~~its-an~~ adversary's COGs. ~~Adversary vulnerabilities are not worth attacking unless~~
 2 ~~they contribute to the defeat of the adversary's centers of gravity.~~ The approach selected by
 3 the supported JFC becomes the defeat mechanism for the campaign.

5 (1) At the strategic level of war, indirect methods of defeating the adversary's
 6 COG could include depriving the adversary of allies or friends, weakening the national will
 7 to fight by undermining the public support for war, and breaking up cohesion of adversary
 8 alliances or coalitions.

10 (2) At the operational ~~and tactical~~ levels of war, the most common indirect method
 11 of defeating an adversary's COGs is to conduct a series of attacks against selected aspects of
 12 the adversary's combat power. For example, the supported ~~commander-JFC~~ may sequence
 13 combat actions to force an adversary to divide its forces in theater, destroy the adversary's
 14 reserves or elements of the adversary's base of operations, or prevent or hinder the
 15 deployment of the adversary's major forces or reinforcements into the OA. Indirect methods
 16 of attacking the adversary's COGs (through critical vulnerabilities) could entail reducing the
 17 adversary's operational reach, isolating the force from its C2, and destroying or suppressing
 18 key protection functions such as air defense.

14. Decisive Point

KEY TERMS

decisive point — A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, ~~of-or~~ function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an ~~adversary-enemy~~ and greatly influence the outcome of an ~~attack operation, battle, or engagement~~.

leverage — The advantage achieved by the application of combat power against one point of an adversary's system in order to affect another, more decisive point indirectly.

21 There may often be cases where the supported ~~commander-JFC~~ will have insufficient
 22 combat power to achieve leverage against an adversary's COGs with a single blow. In this
 23 situation, the supported ~~commander-JFC~~ must selectively focus a series of blows against the
 24 adversary's critical vulnerabilities until the cumulative effects of these blows lead to mission
 25 success. The indirect approach may offer the most effective method to exploit adversary
 26 critical vulnerabilities through the identification of decisive points. Decisive points may be a
 27 geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a
 28 marked advantage over an ~~adversary-enemy~~ and greatly influence the outcome of an
 29 operation. Decisive points are not COGs; they are the keys to attacking or protecting them.
 30 Although ~~theaters-of-operation-OAs~~ may have numerous decisive points, only a few will
 31 truly have operational or even strategic significance relative to an adversary's COGs. The
 32 art of identifying decisive points is a critical part of campaign planning. Normally, there are
 33 far more decisive points in a given OA than can be attacked, seized, retained, or controlled
 34 with the forces and capabilities available. Accordingly, campaign planners should study and
 35

1 analyze potential decisive points and determine which of them offer the best opportunity to
2 attack the adversary's COGs indirectly, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the
3 application of friendly forces and capabilities. Afterward, the supported ~~commander-JFC~~
4 should assign sufficient forces and assets for attacking, seizing, retaining, or controlling
5 these decisive points.
6

"Every point of the theater . . . is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication or from presence of military establishments or fortifications. Others [decisive points] have a value from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against them. . . The decisive point of a battlefield can be determined by:

- 1. Features on the ground.**
- 2. Relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.**
- 3. Positions occupied by the respective forces."**

Lieutenant General Antoine-Baron de Jomini
Summary of the Art of War, 1838

15. Application of Forces and Capabilities

7
8
9
10 a. When ~~applying forces-planning the application of forces~~ and capabilities, ~~campaign~~
11 ~~planners-the JFC~~ **should not be completely constrained by the strategic plan's force**
12 **allocation or apportionment.** Campaign planning is inherently an iterative process, with
13 forces being requested and approved for certain early phases, while other forces may be
14 needed or withdrawn for the later phases. The ~~supported-commander-JFC~~ should request
15 additional forces and capabilities when the need for them becomes apparent during
16 campaign planning. When making this determination, ~~campaign planners-the JFC~~ should
17 also consider withholding some capability as an **operational reserve.**

18
19 b. ~~In designing a campaign, the supported commander should designate the main~~
20 ~~effort and secondary efforts as early as possible. This action is necessary for the sound~~
21 ~~application of economy of effort and allocating disparate forces, to include multinational~~
22 ~~forces. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or~~
23 ~~functional terms. In developing the CONOPS, campaign planners determine those tasks~~
24 ~~essential to the accomplishment of the military objectives and assign them to subordinate~~
25 ~~commanders either as area (geographic) responsibilities or as functional responsibilities.~~
26 ~~Area tasks and responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations.~~
27 ~~Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that~~
28 ~~involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same dimension or~~
29 ~~domain—air, land, sea, space, or information—or where there is a need to accomplish a~~
30 ~~distinct aspect of the assigned mission. In either case, designating the main effort will~~
31 ~~establish where or how a major portion of available friendly forces and assets are~~
32 ~~employed to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign. . . In~~
33 ~~designating a campaign plan, the supported JFC should designate the main effort and~~

secondary efforts as soon as possible. This action is necessary for the sound application of economy of effort and allocating disparate forces, to include multinational forces. The main effort is based on the supported JFC's prioritized campaign objectives. It identifies where the supported JFC will concentrate his combat power to achieve the campaign's primary objective. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same dimension or domain — air, land, sea, space, or information — or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or how a major portion of available friendly forces and assets are employed to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign.

c. ~~The designation of the main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of all combat elements while leaving the greatest possible scope for the initiative of subordinate commanders. The operational commander must provide adequate support to ensure the quickest possible accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the forces operating in the sector of main effort. As such, the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.~~ Designating a main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of the joint force while preserving subordinate commanders initiative. After the main effort is identified, campaign planners determine those tasks essential to accomplishing campaign objectives. The supported JFC assigns these tasks to subordinate commanders along with the combat power and support necessary to achieve them. As such, the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.

d. ~~During a major operation, forces deployed or employed as the main effort are sustained with supporting forces and assets. If conditions change and success of the overall mission can be obtained at less cost or more quickly through another approach, the operational commander should shift the main effort to the new approach. When this occurs, priorities of support must be changed to ensure the success of actions in the newly designated main effort.~~ Secondary efforts, as the term implies, are subsidiary or ancillary to the main effort. They are characterized by a lack of operational depth, assignment of fewer forces and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives. The main effort can change during the campaign based on how the adversary reacts to friendly operations. When the main effort changes, priorities of support must be changed to ensure success. Horizontal, as well as vertical, coordination within the joint force is essential when shifting the main effort.

e. Secondary efforts are subsidiary or ancillary to the main effort. They lack operational depth, have fewer forces and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives.

16. Sequencing of Operations

~~a. Sequencing is the chronological arrangement of events within a major operation or campaign in the order most likely to achieve the overall objectives. Proper sequencing helps the supported commander determine which operational objectives have to be achieved and by when in order to establish the conditions for subsequent operations. Sequencing includes the determination of phases within operations, as well as plans for branches, sequels, and operational pauses.~~

~~b. Even though sequencing adds chronological structure to the concept, the sequence of events necessary to achieve the desired operational conditions cannot be rigidly established. In fact, during execution, the supported commander should be prepared to change or adjust the sequence for accomplishing principal tasks to exploit vulnerabilities (branches), adjust tempo, or adapt to outcomes (sequels).~~

Sequencing is the chronological arrangement of events within a major operation or campaign in the order most likely to achieve the overall objectives. Proper sequencing helps the supported JFC determine which operational objectives have to be achieved and by when in order to establish the conditions for subsequent operations. Sequencing includes the determination of phases within operations, as well as plans for branches, sequels, and operational pauses. Sequencing cannot be rigid. During execution, the supported JFC should be prepared to change or adjust the sequencing to exploit vulnerabilities (branches), adjust tempo, or adapt to outcomes (sequels).

17. Phasing

KEY TERM

phase — A definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.

"These phases of a plan do not comprise rigid instructions, they are merely guideposts. . . . Rigidity inevitably defeats itself, and the analysts who point to a changed detail as evidence of a plan's weakness are completely unaware of the characteristics of the battlefield."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

a. Phasing is a basic tenet of ~~campaign plan operational design process~~. ~~Phasing assists commanders and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Since a campaign is required whenever pursuit of a strategic objective is not attainable through a single major operation, the theater operational design includes provision for related~~

~~phases that may or may not be executed and can, in some cases, overlap with activities occurring either simultaneously or in sequence. Phases are a logical way of chronologically organizing the diverse, extended, and dispersed activities involved in the campaign. A campaign plan design may have several aspects, each to be executed by different forces or different kinds of forces. The campaign planner's task is to devise a combination of actions over time that achieves the strategic objective most effectively and quickly. While each phase may be distinguishable from the others as an identifiable episode, each is necessarily linked to the others and gains significance only in the larger context of the campaign. The manner of distinction may be separation in time, space, or a difference in aim or of forces assigned. Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign's objectives, as shown in Figure IV-5. As such, it is imperative that the campaign not be broken down into numerous arbitrary chunks that may inhibit tempo and lead to a plodding, incremental approach. A campaign is normally divided into phases to logically organize a campaign's diverse, extended, and dispersed activities. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from each another, but should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign, as shown in Figure IV-5. Phases are necessarily linked and gain significance only in the larger context of the campaign. As such, it is imperative that the campaign not be broken down into numerous arbitrary chunks that may inhibit tempo and lead to a plodding, incremental approach. Since a campaign is required whenever pursuit of a strategic objective is not attainable through a single major operation, the theater operational design includes provision for related phases that may or may not be executed. Phases will normally occur in sequence but can, in some cases, overlap with activities occurring simultaneously. An operational design process may have several aspects, each to be executed by different forces or different kinds of forces. The campaign planner's task is to devise a combination of actions over time that achieves the strategic objective most effectively and quickly.~~

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, contains a detailed discussion of the phasing model.

b. In conceptualizing the campaign, each phase should be viewed as an essential component in a string of events that are related in cause and effect. Like a chess player, the ~~campaign planner-JFC~~ must learn to think beyond the next move, to look ahead several moves, and consider the long-term results of those moves and how to exploit them. Likewise, every move by the joint force must take into consideration the adversary's reactions or anticipations.

~~c. The actual process of developing the sequence of phases in a campaign operates in two directions simultaneously, i.e., backward and forward. Campaign planning begins with both the current situation and the desired end state in mind—recognizing, of course, that the end state may change as the situation unfolds. Backward or reverse planning envisions a reasonable set of phases backward in time (and event) from the desired end state toward the present. In contrast, forward planning proceeds from the current conditions at the outset of the campaign, focusing on near-term objectives while envisioning subsequent phases. The cumulative results of earlier phases set the stage for the eventual decisive action that accomplishes the campaign's objectives. For the plan to~~

succeed, the two sets of opposed but sequenced phases have to mesh. Forward planning provides campaign planners with a better idea of what is feasible in the near term, while backward planning provides better focus over the long term. Phasing is accomplished using forward and backward planning methods, simultaneously. Backward planning develops phases from the desired end state to the present; it provides better long-term focus. Forward planning develops phases from the present to the desired end state, focusing on near term objectives; it gives planners a better idea of near term feasibility. A successful plan will mesh backward and forward planned phases.

d. As a general rule, the **phasing of the campaign should be conceived in event-driven terms rather than time-driven**. However, resource availability depends in large part on a time schedule — such as sustainment or deployment rates — rather than the events of war. The challenge for planners, then, is to **reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and sustainment with the event-driven phasing of operations**.




Figure IV-5. Phases of a Campaign

18. Culminating Point

KEY TERM

culminating point — The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. For the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. For the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible.

The supported ~~commander JFC and campaign planners~~ must ensure that forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the campaign and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later stages of the campaign. This is a key point, because sustainment is a significant aspect of the campaign. Specifically, effective phasing must address how the joint force will avoid reaching a culminating point. If resources are insufficient to sustain the force until the accomplishment of the strategic objective, campaign planners should consider phasing the campaign to account for necessary operational pauses between phases. Such phasing enables the reconstitution of the joint force during the campaign. In some cases, sustainment requirements and political factors may even dictate the purpose of certain phases as well as the sequence of those phases. For example, phases may shift the main effort among Service and functional components to maintain momentum while one component is being reconstituted.

19. Branches and Sequels

KEY TERMS

branch — A contingency option built into an operation plan for changing the orientation, disposition, or direction of movement of a force based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by adversary actions and reactions.

sequel — A contingency option built into an operation plan for an operation that may follow the current operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (major success, success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation.

“To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way to operate is along a line which offers alternative objectives.”

B.H. Liddell Hart

1 a. ~~Since no plan can be accurately projected with confidence much beyond the initial~~
2 ~~stages of the operation, flexibility must be built into not just the campaign plan itself, but the~~
3 ~~execution of it as well. Accordingly, **branches and sequels are fundamental**~~
4 ~~**considerations for each phase.** They are primarily used for changing deployments or~~
5 ~~direction of movement and accepting or declining combat. Branches are often decisive for~~
6 ~~the outcome of a major operation or campaign, because **they allow the operational**~~
7 ~~**commander to act faster than the adversary to exploit emerging operational situations.**~~
8 ~~A branch is essentially a different path to the same end state of the ongoing operation.~~
9 ~~Sequels, on the other hand, **anticipate subsequent actions or major operations contingent**~~
10 ~~**upon the outcome of ongoing operations.** For every action or major operation that does~~
11 ~~not accomplish a strategic objective, there has to be a sequel for each possible outcome, i.e.,~~
12 ~~“win, lose, draw, or win big.”~~

13
14 b. ~~Once the planners have thought through as far as practicable the possible~~
15 ~~branches and sequels within each phase, they must now determine what or where the~~
16 ~~decision points (not to be confused with decisive points) should be. Such decision points~~
17 ~~are often represented by battles or engagements that, despite everything being done to~~
18 ~~anticipate their outcome, can be either lost or won. **Each branch from a decision point will**~~
19 ~~**require different actions and each action demands various follow-up actions, i.e.,**~~
20 ~~**sequels or potential sequels.**~~

21
22 a. Since no plan can be accurately projected with confidence much beyond the initial
23 stages of the operation, flexibility must be built into not just the campaign plan itself, but the
24 execution of it as well. Accordingly, **branches and sequels are fundamental**
25 **considerations for each phase.** They are primarily used for changing deployments or
26 direction of movement and accepting or declining combat. Branches and sequels are often
27 decisive for the outcome of a major operation or campaign, because **they allow the JFC to**
28 **act faster than the adversary to exploit emerging operational situations.**

29
30 b. Branches provide different ways or sets of means to accomplish the existing
31 objective of an ongoing operation. Sequels anticipate subsequent actions or major
32 operations contingent upon the outcome of ongoing operations. For every action or major
33 operation that does not accomplish a strategic objective, there has to be a sequel for each
34 possible outcome, i.e., “win, lose, draw, or win big.”

35
36 c. Once the JFC’s and their staffs have thought through as far as practicable the
37 possible branches and sequels within each phase, they must now determine what or
38 where the decision points (not to be confused with decisive points) should be. Such
39 decision points are often represented by battles or engagements that, despite everything
40 being done to anticipate their outcome, can be either lost or won. **Each branch from a**
41 **decision point will require different actions and each action demands various follow-up**
42 **actions, i.e., sequels or potential sequels.**

20. Operational Pauses

KEY TERM

operational pause — A temporary halt in offensive operations caused by logistic constraints, or force shortfalls, or political considerations, normally for the purpose of regenerating combat power or augmenting forces or sustainment for the next phase of the campaign or major operation.

a. The supported ~~commander~~ JFC should aggressively conduct operations to obtain and maintain the initiative. However, there may be certain circumstances when this is not feasible because of logistic constraints, force shortfalls, or political considerations. Therefore, operational pauses may be required when a major operation may be reaching the end of its sustainability. As such, operational pauses can provide a safety valve to avoid potential culmination, while the JFC retains the initiative in other ways. However, if an operational pause is properly executed in relation to one's own culminating point, the adversary will not have sufficient combat power to threaten the joint force or regain the initiative during the pause.

b. Operational pauses are also useful tools for obtaining the proper synchronization of sustainment and operations. Normally, operational pauses are planned to regenerate combat power or augment sustainment and forces for the next phase, although this will result in extending the duration of a major operation or campaign. Moreover, operational pauses properly planned and sequenced will ensure that the JFC has sufficient forces and assets to accomplish the strategic or operational objectives of the major operation or campaign. However, planners must guard against cutting the margin of sustainment and combat effectiveness too thin. Executing a pause before it is necessary provides for flexibility in the timing of the pause and allows for its early termination under urgent conditions without unduly endangering the future effectiveness of the force.

c. The primary drawback to operational pauses is that they risk forfeiture of strategic or operational initiative. It is therefore incumbent upon the JFC to plan on as few operational pauses as possible if any and, consistent with the CONOPS, to alternate pauses and tempo between components of the force. In this manner, a major portion of the joint force can maintain pressure on the adversary through offensive actions while other components pause.

21. Synchronization

Synchronization is another key aspect for designing a major operation or campaign. In contrast to sequencing, synchronization is defined as “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.” Clarity of operational intent is critical to ensure synchronization of effort

by all forces, especially so in multinational operations. **Synchronization of joint forces and assets-resources should, among other things, focus on defeating the adversary's COGs by maximizing relative combat power at the decisive time and place.** All the key functions and elements of the joint force should be fully integrated to that end. **Campaign plans synchronize and integrate operations** by establishing proper command relationships among subordinate commands, by clearly describing the CONOPS, by assigning realistic tasks and objectives, and by effectively task-organizing assigned forces. Ideally, **synchronization should be event- rather than time-driven.** Finally synchronization, although distinct from sequencing, must still allow for flexibility by providing decision points and a series of branches and sequels (discussed above).

22. Lines of Operations

KEY TERM

lines of operation — Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. Lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead ultimately to control of the objective or defeat of an adversary force.

~~a. Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the joint force in time and space in relation to the adversary. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. In geographic terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead ultimately to control of the objective or defeat of an adversary force.~~

a. **A campaign or major operation may have single or multiple lines of operations.** A single line of operations has the advantage of concentrating forces and simplifying planning. Multiple lines of operations, on the other hand, increase flexibility and create opportunities for success. Multiple lines of operations also make it difficult for an adversary to determine the objectives of the campaign or major operation, forcing the adversary to disperse resources to defend against multiple threats. The decision to operate on multiple lines will depend to a great extent on the availability of resources.

b. ~~Lines of operations may be either interior or exterior.~~ In campaign planning, the relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. Although an adversary force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force, that advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher operational tempo. Conversely, if a smaller force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile adversary forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.

23. Operational Reach

KEY TERM

operational reach—~~The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities.~~

The concept of operational reach is ~~inexorably inextricably~~ tied to the concept of lines of operation. The geography surrounding and separating the adversaries influences operational reach. Locating forces, reserves, bases, pre-positioned equipment sets, and logistics forward extends operational reach. Operational reach is also affected by increasing the range of weapons, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of LOCs and throughput capability. Some combat capabilities, such as space and information operations, are not necessarily limited by operational reach. Nevertheless, **for any given campaign or major operation, there is a finite range beyond which predominant elements of the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations.**

24. Basing

a. Basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable part of operational art, since it is tied to the concept of lines of operations and directly affects operational reach. It also directly influences the combat power ~~that~~ the joint force is capable of generating because of its impact on such critical factors as sortie or resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and ~~succcessive~~ positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the ~~progressive~~ ability of the joint force to shield its components from adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows ~~with ever increasing power and ferocity.~~

b. Basing is often directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and, as such, can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently based forces to temporary sea basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the adversary. To that end, **theater assessments must determine whether sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces**, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from adversary attacks. Determining where to locate bases poses certain challenges for campaign planners. Recognizing the critical role basing plays during force projection, **potential adversaries may try to develop strategies designed to prevent the build up and sustainment of forces in theater, a so-called “anti-access strategy.”** The campaign planner must determine how to mitigate the efforts of the adversary to deny access to the theater and its infrastructure.

DESERT STORM CAMPAIGN PLAN

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his autobiography, “It Doesn’t Take a Hero,” recounts the events of November 14, 1990, the day he briefed his senior commanders on his campaign plan to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Desert Storm. After asserting that this would be the most important meeting of the war, General Schwarzkopf acknowledges the twenty-two generals who were in attendance, commenting “that no other theater commander in history had ever been blessed with such an array of talent,” and describes his battle plan...

“The first thing that we’re going to have to do is, I don’t like to use the word ‘decapitate,’ so I think I’ll use the word ‘attack,’ leadership, and go after his command and control. Number two, we’ve got to gain and maintain air superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally, all you tankers, listen to this. We need to destroy—not attack, not damage, not surround—I want you to destroy the Republican Guard. When you’re done with them, I don’t want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don’t want them to exist as a military organization.’ For the benefit of the Vietnam vets—practically the whole room—I emphasized that ‘we’re not going into this with one arm tied behind our backs. We’re not gonna say we want to be as nice as we possibly can, and if they draw back across the border that’s fine with us. That’s bullshit! We are going to destroy the Republican Guard.’ If we were ordered to go on the offensive, we would be free to use our full military strength and attack across the border into Iraq.

‘I’m now going to tell you all some stuff that not very many people know about, in Washington particularly,’ I said, and described the four phases of attack we’d mapped out for Desert Storm: strategic bombing first; then gaining control of the Kuwaiti skies; then bombing Iraqi artillery positions, trench lines, and troops. At last I turned to the plan for the ground offensive—a fully realized version of the envelopment I’d proposed to [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General] Powell three weeks before. Using the map, I showed the commanders where I wanted them to maneuver their units. The plan covered a huge area: in order to make sure we fought the campaign on our own terms, we had extended the boundary of the battlefield westward so that it encompassed a rectangle roughly the size of Pennsylvania. Saddam’s forces were concentrated at the eastern end, in and around Kuwait. Desert Shield forces would keep them from moving south; to their east was the natural barrier of the gulf; to their north was the Euphrates, which would become a natural barrier once [Joint Force Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General] Chuck Horner’s air force dropped the bridges that crossed it; and to the west were hundreds of miles of desert that would become our main avenue of attack.

‘I anticipated,’ I said, ‘a four-pronged ground assault.’ Along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border near the gulf, I wanted two divisions of U.S. Marines and a

Saudi task force to thrust straight into Kuwait, with the objective of tying up Saddam's forces and eventually encircling Kuwait City. Nodding in [U.S. Marine Commander in DESERT STORM, Lieutenant General, Walter E.] Boomer's direction, I said, 'I'll leave it to Walt Boomer to figure out how he wants to do that, but it also gives him the capability to come in from the sea with his amphibious forces.' I'd reserved a second corridor, in the western part of Kuwait, for a parallel attack by the pan-Arab forces led by two armored divisions from Egypt and another Saudi task force. Their objective would be the road junction northwest of Kuwait City that controlled Iraqi supply lines. Eventually they would enter Kuwait City and have the dirty job of fighting the Iraqis house to house if necessary.

Meanwhile from the west would come the U.S. Army's power punch. Looking at [Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General] Gary Luck, I indicated a section of Saudi-Iraqi border more than three hundred and fifty miles inland. 'I am probably going to send the XVIII Airborne Corps very deep,' I said, showing how I wanted Luck's divisions to race north from that area to the Euphrates, blocking the Republican Guard's last route of retreat. Once that sector was secured I told him, he would hook his forces east, ready to join the attack on the main body of the Iraqi army. Finally I turned to [Commander, VII Corps, Lieutenant General] Fred Franks. 'I think it's pretty obvious what your mission is going to be', I said, moving my hand along the desert corridor just to the west of Kuwait, 'attack through here and destroy the Republican Guard.' I wanted to pin them with their backs against the sea, and then go in and wipe them out. I couldn't resist adding, 'Once they're gone, be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad. Because there isn't going to be anything else out there.' I allowed that taking Baghdad would probably be unnecessary, because by then the war would have ended.

After a question-and-answer session I tried to set a tone for the coming months. 'Let me leave you with one thought, guys. In order for this to succeed—because the enemy is still going to outnumber us—it is going to take, for lack of a better word, killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there.' I pointed again at the map. 'What I'm saying is when the Marines hit the wire right here and when the Army forces hit the wire over here ...we need commanders in the lead who absolutely, dearly understand that they *will get through*. And that once they're through they're not going to stop and discuss it. They are going to go up there and destroy the Republican Guard. I cannot afford to have commanders who do not understand that it is attack, attack, attack, attack, and destroy every step of the way. If you have somebody who doesn't understand it, I would strongly recommend that you consider removing him from command and putting in somebody that can do the job.

'Because, let's face it, the prestige of the United States military is on our shoulders. But more importantly, the prestige of the entire United States of

America rests on our shoulders. There isn't going to be anybody else in this thing except us. There are no more forces coming. What we got is what's going to do the job. And for our country we dare not fail. We cannot fail, and we will not fail. Anybody in here who doesn't understand that, get out of the way. Any questions? Okay, good luck to you. You know what needs to be done.'

SOURCE: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Pert
It Doesn't Take a Hero, ~~1999~~1993

APPENDIX A ASSESSMENT

1. General

The objective of joint operation planning and execution is the attainment of military objectives in support of national security ~~policy strategy~~. The resultant plans are a measurement of the Nation's ability to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities. Chapters in this publication described the principles, concepts, and processes that govern the preparation and implementation of joint operation plans and orders and campaign plans in support of that objective. This appendix focuses on the secondary, but vital, role that joint operation planning plays in assessing national warfighting capabilities and programming improvement. Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national military strategy. ~~The resultant plans are a measurement of the Nation's ability to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities.~~ This appendix summarizes the requirements for assessments and the concepts and processes through which joint operation planning supports these requirements.

2. Responsibilities

As the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for recommending national military strategy to attain national security objectives and for assessing the national military capability and readiness to perform the missions identified in the strategy. The Chairman's specific responsibilities for assessment of capabilities and readiness are defined in Title 10, US Code, and include the following:

a. **Advising the Secretary of Defense on critical strengths and deficiencies in force capabilities** (including manpower, logistics, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of joint operation plans-OPLANs and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

b. Establishing and maintaining a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

c. **Reviewing the plans and programs** of the combatant commanders to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.

1 d. **Ascertaining the logistic support available** to execute the joint ~~operation plans~~
2 ~~OPLANs~~ of the combatant commanders, and **reviewing and recommending to the**
3 **Secretary of Defense logistic guidance for the Military Services** that, if implemented, will
4 result in logistic readiness consistent with the approved plans.

5
6 e. Periodically, not less often than every two years, **reporting to the Secretary of**
7 **Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat support agencies.**
8 Those include the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,
9 DLA, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Security Agency, and any other
10 Defense Agency designated as a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense.

11
12 f. **Developing a uniform readiness reporting system for reporting the readiness of**
13 **combat support agencies.**

14
15 g. **Advising the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program**
16 **recommendations and budget proposals** of the Military Departments and other DOD
17 components **conform to the priorities established** in strategic plans and with the priorities
18 established for the requirements of the combatant commanders.

19
20 h. **Advising the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of requirements**, especially
21 operational requirements, identified by the combatant commanders.

22
23 i. **Submitting to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations**
24 **and budget proposals** within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the
25 Secretary of Defense and with the priorities for the requirements of the combatant
26 commanders.

27 28 **3. Integration**

29
30 **Assessments derived through joint operation planning provide insight into the**
31 **strengths and deficiencies of the Nation's existing military capabilities.** Consequently,
32 they can be **an invaluable source of information for force development planning and the**
33 **development of national military strategy.** The greatest use of joint operation planning as
34 a vehicle for assessing capabilities and influencing other defense planning is realized when
35 **deliberate planning is accomplished within a disciplined planning cycle that**
36 **complements the PPBS and the JSPS.** These three DOD planning systems must be
37 integrated within a mutually supporting, complementary process. Joint operation planning
38 conducted in response to the strategic direction provided by the JSPS must produce approved
39 plans within a time frame that permits consideration of the results of that planning in the next
40 succeeding strategy development evolution. Conversely, the JSPS, in conjunction with the
41 PPBS, must provide timely strategic direction that allows the necessary time for the detailed
42 development of adequate and feasible ~~operation plans~~ ~~OPLANs~~. A disciplined deliberate
43 planning process, coordinated with PPBS and JSPS and supported by an effective JOPES, is
44 essential to exploiting the full potential of joint operation planning as a way to assess
45 capabilities and program improvement.

4. Preparedness and Capability

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to monitor and assess the readiness of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. The Chairman's readiness system (CRS) supports the Chairman in meeting this responsibility. **Joint campaign and operation plans provide the foundation for the CRS—they are the standards against which readiness is measured ~~in the JMRR~~ by the CRS.** This senior forum is designed to assess both unit readiness, as reported by the Services, and joint readiness, as reported by the combatant commanders. **The end product of the CRS is senior level consensus on the readiness of the force to execute JSCP tasks successfully.** Significant shortfalls or deficiencies are assessed in terms of risk and may be remedied through operational or programmatic actions. Joint campaign and operation plans have a major role in the process to address remedies to shortfalls and deficiencies.

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APPENDIX B

SCOPE OF JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

1. Introduction

As shown in Figure B-1, joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment and demobilization of forces.

2. Mobilization Planning

a. **Mobilization is the process by which** all or selected parts of the Armed Forces of the United States are brought to the necessary state of readiness **for military operations or other national emergencies**. Depending on the mission, mobilization may range from the activation of all or part of the Reserve Components to augment the active force to widespread assembly and organization of the nation's resources to support national objectives in time of war and for ~~military operations other than war (MOOTW)~~. Mobilization planning and execution activities are accomplished primarily by the Military Departments and Services. However, major combat operations rely heavily on timely mobilization of the necessary forces and capabilities. This mandates that ~~joint operation planning and~~ mobilization planning be closely integrated with other joint operation planning activities.

b. The foundation of joint mobilization concepts and procedures is established by statute. The National Security Act, as amended, delineates broad responsibilities for mobilization.

(1) **Military Departments and Services.** Each Military Department plans for the **expansion of its components** to prepare for military operations or other emergencies and submits coordinated mobilization information to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each Service plans for the expansion of its components in accordance with integrated



Figure B-1. Scope of Joint Operation Planning

1 joint mobilization plans.

2
3 (2) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
4 Staff performs specific mobilization responsibilities. With the assistance of the Joint Staff
5 and in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **the Chairman**
6 **prepares integrated plans** for military mobilization; **provides guidance** for use by the
7 Military Departments, the Services, and the Defense Agencies in the preparation of their
8 respective detailed plans; and **submits general strategic recommendations** to the Secretary
9 of Defense for the development of industrial mobilization programs.

10
11 c. The DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG) governs coordinated planning for
12 mobilization within the DOD. The MMG provides the guidance of the Secretary of Defense
13 relative to mobilization planning to support joint operations. The MMG identifies
14 mobilization responsibilities and describes tasks to be performed during normal operations
15 and at the time of mobilization. It also delineates functional relationships among DOD
16 components for mobilization planning and execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
17 Staff amplifies the Secretary's guidance by issuing guidance in the JSCP for use by the
18 Services and developing integrated plans for joint mobilization. Based on the guidance of
19 the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and the Services develop coordinated
20 mobilization plans for assembling, preparing, moving, and supporting mobilized forces and
21 capabilities. The process for integrating mobilization planning with the other joint operation
22 planning activities is outlined below:

23
24 (1) The **JSCP** tasks the combatant commander to develop deliberate plans and
25 apportion forces and resources for planning. It **contains Service-provided availability**
26 **times for major combat forces** designated to augment combatant commands.

27
28 (2) The **mobilization annex of the JSCP** provides guidance to the Services for
29 developing supporting mobilization plans for those contingencies that require mobilization.

30
31 (3) The **combatant commanders**, either directly or through their component
32 commands, **identify requirements** not listed in the JSCP but required to support joint
33 operations. Identified forces are provided by the Services.

34
35 (4) The **combatant commanders develop** OPLANs ~~operation plans and orders~~
36 that specify the level of mobilization and the Reserve Component forces necessary to
37 support the plan.

38
39 (5) The **Services develop detailed mobilization plans** to support the operation
40 plans-OPLANs of the combatant commanders.

41
42 (6) The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews the OPLANs** of the
43 combatant commanders to ascertain the effect of mobilization capabilities on their adequacy
44 and feasibility.

45

1 (7) The **JPEC** identifies the major mobilization decisions and activities in each of
2 the 12 major resource areas (manpower, material and equipment, transportation, facilities,
3 industrial base, training base, health service support, communications, HNS, environment,
4 legal authorities, and funding) and describe how they are interrelated. Thorough
5 coordination and effective communications are necessary to ensure that mobilized resources
6 in one area can be supported by the eleven other resource areas. The process unifies
7 industrial mobilization planning and analytical efforts by focusing on warfighting
8 requirements and capabilities.

9
10 *JP 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, discusses joint mobilization planning in*
11 *greater detail.*

12 **3. Deployment Planning**

13
14
15 a. Deployment planning is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders
16 and their Service component commanders, in close coordination with ~~the joint force~~
17 ~~providers and the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and other~~
18 ~~supporting combatant commanders, especially those providing joint forces to the operation.~~
19 Deployment planning **encompasses planning for the movement of forces and their**
20 **sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific destination** to conduct
21 joint operations outlined in a given plan. It specifically includes planning for movement
22 within ~~the continental United States (CONUS)~~ and the intertheater and intratheater
23 movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them. Deployment includes
24 movement to and activities at the port of embarkation (POE), movement from the POE to the
25 ~~port of debarkation (POD)~~, and joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration
26 (JRSOI) activities. ~~Executing commands are responsible for coordinating and monitoring all~~
27 ~~forms of transportation to ensure in-transit visibility and the command and control of the~~
28 ~~deploying force while enroute. During deployment operations, supported combatant~~
29 ~~commanders are responsible for building and validating requirements, determining~~
30 ~~predeployment standards, and balancing, regulating, and effectively managing the~~
31 ~~transportation flow. Supporting combatant commands and agencies source requirements not~~
32 ~~available to the supported combatant commander and are responsible for: verifying~~
33 ~~supporting unit movement data; regulating the support deployment flow; and coordinating~~
34 ~~effectively during deployment operations. Deployment operations involve four phases:~~
35 ~~predeployment activities; movement to and activities at POE; movement to POD; and JRSOI~~
36 ~~activities. These phases describe the major activities of a joint force from point of origin to a~~
37 ~~prescribed destination in theater and are dependent on the JFC's concept for employment.~~
38 ~~Planning for and execution of the four phases of deployment is based primarily on mission~~
39 ~~requirements and the time available to accomplish the mission.~~



The lift capability required to move units from one area to another, or to another location within the area, is of primary importance in the development of deployment plans.

1
2 b. The JSCP provides planning guidance to the combatant commanders and other
3 members of the JPEC for the conduct of deliberate deployment planning. The JSCP
4 apportions major military formations and other assets for planning. The Services determine
5 support forces ~~based~~ based upon the combatant commanders' requirements. The JPEC and
6 USTRANSCOM staffs work in close coordination with the supported combatant
7 commanders to provide the force movement including detailed deployment planning for all
8 the phases of the operation. ~~When~~ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will approve
9 the ~~supported~~ combatant commander's estimate with COA recommendation selection.

10
11 c. Upon approval of the supported combatant commander's COA, the supported
12 combatant commander develops a CONOPS directed toward accomplishing the assigned
13 mission. From this CONOPS, the supported combatant commander's staff develops the
14 phased force requirements arrayed by time and place. The JPEC and supporting combatant
15 commander(s) support the CONOPS to the fullest extent possible, including the times and
16 places of the deploying forces and material. Any resource shortfalls are addressed in risk
17 assessments that are reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

18
19 d. The JPEC develops these requirements into a detailed listing of actual forces to
20 deploy delineated in JOPES and produced as the TPFDD. The TPFDD provides the
21 automated, detailed deployment data containing all the non-unit cargo and personnel data,
22 and movement data for the plan. Detailed deployment data includes in-place units,
23 deploying units with a priority of desired sequence at ~~port of debarkation~~ POD, and any
24 theater routing LOC.
25

JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, discusses joint deployment planning in greater detail.

4. Employment Planning

a. Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use of military forces and capabilities within an OA. Employment encompasses all activities required to accomplish the assigned mission from unit arrival at destination in the OA until redeployment. Employment planning prescribes **how to apply forces and capabilities to attain specified military objectives**. The combatant commanders, in close coordination with their component commands, develop employment planning concepts. Employment planning provides the foundation for, and determines the scope of, mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning. Mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning support the concepts and requirements developed during employment planning. Detailed planning for the actual use of forces and resources within the OA is normally accomplished as part of joint operation planning by subordinate commanders, such as component commanders and subordinate JFCs. However, in the broader context of joint operation planning, each level of command plans for the employment of its available forces and resources to achieve specified objectives.

b. At the **national level**, strategic plans provide for the global and theater employment of national capabilities to achieve national security and military objectives. This planning considers global requirements, national capabilities, and the theater strategies of the combatant commanders. The JSCP describes strategic concepts, defines supporting regional objectives, and apportions forces and resources among the combatant commanders to attain prioritized national objectives. National strategic planning for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment is based on the planned employment of forces in the individual theaters.

c. Employment planning at the **theater level** focuses on organizing and positioning assigned and augmenting forces for the conduct of theater campaigns or major operations to attain national or theater strategic objectives. The combatant commander's strategic employment concept defines objectives, organizes forces, arranges and prioritizes operations, assigns tasks, and prioritizes the movement of forces and support to and within the theater. It **provides strategic direction to the employment planning of subordinate commands** and, when appropriate, **supports multinational plans** for the employment of multinational forces. Theater strategic employment planning **provides the foundation for the CONOPS for joint operation plans-OPLANs** prepared by the combatant commander and the framework for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization planning.

d. Subordinate commands normally accomplish the detailed employment planning for the conduct of joint operations to perform missions tasked by the combatant commander. When part of a multinational organization, detailed employment planning is performed within the multinational chain of command in support of multinational strategies, campaigns,

1 and missions. Under these circumstances, **multinational employment plans become the**
2 **basis for joint ~~operation plans OPLANs~~** prepared within the US chain of command for
3 moving, preparing, and sustaining US forces dedicated to multinational operations.

4
5 *JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, discusses joint employment planning in greater detail.*

6 7 **5. Sustainment Planning**

8
9 a. Sustainment planning is directed toward **providing and maintaining levels of**
10 **personnel, materiel, and consumables** required to sustain the planned levels of combat
11 activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment planning
12 is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders and their component
13 commands in close coordination with the Services, combat support agencies, and supporting
14 combatant commanders, including USSOCOM.

15
16 b. The JPEC is critical in integrating the requisite level of national and multinational
17 resources necessary to sustain an operation. The JPEC completes a **logistics support analysis**
18 **(LSA)** of an **~~operation plan OPLAN~~** to provide a broad assessment of key logistic
19 capabilities in the six functional areas of logistics: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil
20 engineering, health services, and other services. The LSA is an iterative process performed
21 **~~in during~~** both the development and maintenance of the **~~operation plan OPLAN~~**.

22
23 c. Following completion of the LSA, the supported combatant commander's assesses
24 the LSA input and compares it to an analysis of theater requirements and capabilities. The
25 supported combatant commander identifies shortfalls to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
26 Staff for resolution.

27
28 ~~See~~ *JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, which discusses joint*
29 *sustainment planning in greater detail.*

30 31 **6. Redeployment Planning**

32
33 a. Redeployment planning is directed toward **the transfer of units, individuals, or**
34 **supplies** deployed in one OA to another OA, or to another location within an OA, or to
35 CONUS for the purpose of further employment. Redeployment planning also encompasses
36 planning for the return of forces and resources to their original location and status. In most
37 cases, units cannot **be** and are not redeployed in the reverse order of their deployment.

38
39 b. Command relationships change during redeployment depending on the geographic
40 location **of the unit during** movement. In the case of an intertheater transfer (movement
41 between CONUS and an AOR, or between two AORs), the Secretary of Defense establishes
42 the guidance, priority and timing of the change in command. With intratheater redeployment
43 (movement within an AOR) the combatant commander establishes guidance, priority and
44 timing of change of command between subordinate JFCs. CONUS redeployment normally
45 will be at the conclusion of a campaign or completion of a phase within a campaign. **With**
46 **~~the exception of USSTRATCOM as the supported combatant commander for redeployment~~**

of strategic forces to support the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the supported combatant commander is responsible for the redeployment TPFDD.

c. Redeployment planning requires the same consideration to detail and planning as deployment planning, including an LSA and, for movement between two AORs, transportation assessment by USTRANSCOM. Plans need to factor in whether the redeployments are conducted under hostile conditions. Redeployment planning requires the same rigor in detail and analysis as deployment planning, but the uncertainty is greater in terms of requirements, priority, location, and timing. Redeployments need to be synchronized with the combatant commander's post-mission requirements for forces and material. For example, the combatant commander may require occupation or rotation forces for peace operations or nation assistance. Furthermore, planners must ~~integrate~~ consider interagency planning factors into the redeployment plan. Therefore, redeployment planning is conducted with full JPEC participation.

JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, discusses joint redeployment planning in greater detail.

7. Demobilization Planning

a. Demobilization planning is directed toward the transition of a mobilized military establishment and civilian economy to a normal configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Demobilization planning determines which forces and material are no longer required to meet current and future military operations. It includes planning for the return of Reserve Component units, individuals, and material stocks to their former status. The Military Departments and Services are primarily responsible for demobilization planning. They base their plans on the plans of supported combatant commanders and the determination by the President and the Secretary of Defense of the national military posture required for future operations. The combatant commander considers the demobilization of Reserve Component forces in redeployment planning. Excess forces are redeployed to CONUS and material that is excess, obsolete or no longer required for theater operations is segregated for redeployment or demobilized in theater if not required nationally. Demobilization policies consider readiness, national economy, Service members and their families, Defense civilian employees and their families, and materiel disposition.

b. The combatant commander's responsibility for the units or individuals ends when they depart the AOR. USJFCOM conducts joint demobilization planning with the Services. The plans assure an orderly separation from active service and return of the units and individuals to their home station in reserve status.

c. Materiel demobilization for theater stocks is the joint responsibility of the Service or designated Defense Agency in coordination with the JPEC. The combatant commander determines the future requirements for in-theater operational stocks. The operational stocks that are no longer required in theater are assessed against future national military requirements. A determination is made to either retain national inventories for future use or

1 have them declared excess and demobilized. If the responsible agency determines that
2 selected material is excess property, proper steps are taken to demobilize the stocks. A
3 political, economic and environmental assessment about the stocks will lead to a decision on
4 location of demilitarization. If the stocks are demobilized in theater, the combatant
5 commander supports the Service or agency in their demobilization. If the assessment
6 determines that the stocks should not be demobilized in theater, then the appropriate Service
7 | or ~~the~~ agency plans for the best political, economic, and environmental demobilization.
8
9 | *JP 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, discusses demobilization planning in*
10 | *greater detail.*
11

APPENDIX C

FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

"Efforts to deter an adversary—be it an aggressor nation, terrorist group or criminal organization—can become the leading edge of crisis response Deterrence in crisis generally involves demonstrating the United States' commitment to a particular country or interest by enhancing our warfighting capability in the theater."

A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000

"In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a general status quo, risk adverse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people and the wealth of their nations...We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."

The National Security Strategy, September 2002

1. General

Flexible deterrent options (FDOs) are intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal during a crisis. These options should include limited military forces and preplanned requests for economic, political, and informational actions gauged to particular military actions. FDOs use all instruments of national power to influence another nations' actions. FDOs are pre-planned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence another nations' actions. The basic purpose of FDOs is to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – but they are most effective when used to combine the influence across instruments of national power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision-making, rapid de-escalation and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths. Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in Figures C-1 through C-5. Key goals of FDOs are:

- a. Deter aggression through communicating the strength of US commitments to treaty obligations and peaceful development.
- b. Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs for its possible aggression.
- c. Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.
- d. Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA.

2. ~~Description of Deterrent Actions~~FDO Implementation

~~Deterrence can be described as the prevention of action by fear of the consequences. As such, FDOs are deterrent-oriented response options that are requested and may be initiated based on evaluation of indicators of heightened regional tensions. FDOs serve two basic purposes. First, they assist in bringing an issue to early resolution before armed conflict by sending an appropriate message to belligerent parties. Second, they position US forces in a manner that facilitates implementation of campaign plans in the event that hostilities are unavoidable. They also facilitate an early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that are carefully tailored to avoid the classic response of too much, too soon, or too little, too late. They are initiated before and after unambiguous warning. Although they are intended to not place US forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails, it goes without saying that risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDO to use, and how and when that FDO should be used. FDOs have the advantage of rapid de-escalation if the situation precipitating the FDO changes. Implementation of a particular FDO is directed by the NCA and there are no hard and fast rules regarding implementation indicators. The use of FDOs is consistent with US national security strategy (i.e., the instruments of national power are normally used in combination with one another). They can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or concurrently. FDOs are primarily designed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results from all the political, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power. It is imperative that extensive, continuous coordination occurs with interagency and multinational partners in order to maximize the impact of FDOs.~~The President or Secretary of Defense direct FDO implementation. While there are no hard and fast rules regarding implementation indicators, FDOs are primarily designed to be used in groups to maximize integrated results from all instruments of national power. They can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or concurrently – continuous flexibility is paramount to defusing fluent crises. The use of FDOs must be consistent with US national security strategy (i.e., the instruments of national power are normally used in combination with one another), therefore, continuous coordination with interagency partners is imperative. All operation plans have FDOs, and combatant commanders are tasked by the JSCP to plan requests for appropriate options using all instruments of national power.

3. ~~Value of FDOs and Their Objectives~~Military FDOs

~~a. The value of an FDO is subjectively measured by its ability to influence events, especially adversary decision making, and to prepare for future operations should adversaries remain undeterred. Key objectives are as follows:~~

~~(1) **Deter aggression** through communication of strength of US commitment to treaty obligations and peaceful development.~~

~~(2) **Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs** of their possible aggression.~~

~~(3) **Isolate the adversary** from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.~~

(4) ~~Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA~~, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, PSYOP, and force protection assets without precipitating armed response from the adversary.

b. FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. Military FDOs should be used in concert with economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, and informational options to provide the President a wide array of deterrent options integrating all instruments of national power. ~~All OPLANs have FDOs, and combatant commanders are tasked by the JSCP to plan requests for appropriate political, economic, and informational options.~~ Examples of FDOs from all six instruments of national power are listed at the end of this appendix in Figures C-1 through C-6. Military FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, generally requires military FDO force packages to be light; however, military FDOs are not intended to place US forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails (risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDOs to use, and how and when to use them). Military FDOs are carefully tailored to avoid the classic "too much, too soon" or "too little, too late" responses. They rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, psychological operations, and force protection assets, without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Military FDOs are most effective when used in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic options. They can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning.

EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED ECONOMIC FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

- Freeze or seize real property and financial assets in the United States and internationally where possible
- Embargo goods and services
- Enact trade sanctions, including restrictions on technology transfers
- Encourage or require corporations to restrict or terminate commercial transactions
- Cancel US funded programs
- Encourage or require financial institutions to restrict or terminate financial transactions

Figure C-1. Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options




Figure C-2. Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options

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EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED MILITARY FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

- Increase readiness of in-place forces
- Increase alert status and deployability posture of augmenting forces
- Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations
- Initiate or increase shows of force
- Increase exercise activities
- Deploy forces into or near the potential operational area

Figure C-3. Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options

1

EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED LAW ENFORCEMENT FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

- Investigate, arrest, and prosecute US citizens aiding adversaries
- Investigate, arrest, detain, and prosecute hostile foreign nationals in the United States or internationally where possible
- Investigate and prosecute nongovernmental and commercial organizations aiding adversaries

Figure C-4. Examples of Requested Law Enforcement Flexible Deterrent Options

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


Figure C-5. Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options

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APPENDIX D

INTEGRATED TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA DEVELOPMENT

1. General

The JPEC created an ~~integrated TPFDD~~ (ITPFDD) development process to manage the complexity of the parallel planning processes for overlapping major combat operations. Overlapping major combat operations require an ITPFDD to ensure that resources are properly identified and allocated. Deliberate planning for overlapping major combat operations requires extra steps to produce an ITPFDD.

2. Process

The following 10-step process expands the normal TPFDD development process. Figure D-1 illustrates the process.

a. Step 1 (COA Development) coincides with normal COA development. The supported ~~combat~~ commanders develop their COAs and submit them to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. Step 1 includes the deliberate planning conference, publishing the supported combatant commanders' planning directives, and completing the staff and commanders' estimates.

b. In Step 2 (Force Requirements Determination), the supported Service component commanders determine the ~~combat support CS~~ and ~~combat service support CSS~~ structure required to support the supported combatant commanders' strategic concepts. Step 2 concludes with the supported combatant commanders' review and informal acceptance of the ~~combat support CS~~ and ~~combat service support CSS~~ structure.

c. In Step 3 (Force Requirements Validation), the Services sponsor a series of conferences to validate the supported Service components' force requirements and identify shortfalls in available forces. The force shortfalls identified during these conferences become issues requiring JPEC resolution before deliberate planning can proceed.

d. In Step 4 (Issues Review), the JPEC conducts in process review (IPR) #1 to address combatant command and Service issues. The JPEC reviews all the issues and establishes milestones and timelines to guide ITPFDD development. The completion of IPR#1 initiates the supported combatant commanders' submission of their first TPFDD to USTRANSCOM for a transportation analysis at least 30 days before the JOPES forces conference.

e. In Step 5 (JOPES Forces Conference), USTRANSCOM sponsors the JOPES forces conference to produce an error free TPFDD, forces phased to support the CONOPS, and a gross transportation assessment for the first operation.




Figure D-1. Integrated Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development Process

f. In Step 6 (Risk Assessment), the supported combatant commander for the first operation identifies critical shortfalls, conducts a mid-term risk assessment, performs a feasibility analysis of moving swing forces from the first operation to the second to address critical shortfalls, and submits ammunition requirements.

g. In Step 7 (Logistics and Sustainment Review), the JPEC conducts IPR #2 to review logistic and sustainment issues and provide guidance for plan development. This step includes the Joint Staff review of all classes of supply, Service confirmation of the forces

1 provided, and the combatant commanders' submission of their refined TPFDD to
2 USTRANSCOM not later than 30 days before the TPFDD Logistics Conference.

3
4 h. In Step 8 (TPFDD Logistics Conference), USTRANSCOM sponsors the TPFDD
5 logistics conference to provide the cargo identification numbers and passenger identification
6 numbers detail and complete a gross transportation feasibility assessment.

7
8 i. In Step 9 (JOPES Transportation Analysis), the JPEC conducts IPR#3 to develop the
9 ITPFDD. The JPEC reviews the remaining issues, provides guidance, and establishes
10 milestones and timelines for the final transportation conference.

11
12 j. In Step 10 (Final Transportation Conference), USTRANSCOM sponsors the final
13 transportation conference. At this conference, the JPEC finalizes the plans with a full review
14 of the ITPFDD and transportation feasibility assessment accompanying the plans.

15
16 k. Upon completion of Step 10, the JPEC can proceed with the rest of the normal plan
17 development activities. The supported combatant commanders develop and submit their
18 integrated plans with full resources applied for review and approval by the Chairman of the
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supported combatant commanders conduct their final risk
20 assessment. USTRANSCOM conducts a transportation feasibility assessment with
21 interagency integration.

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APPENDIX E

THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT

1. Introduction

Below is a theater campaign plan format. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*, describes the process including models of planning messages and estimates. CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)*, provides the formats for OPLANs and CONPLANs.

a. Copy No. _____

b. Issuing Headquarters

c. Place of Issue

d. Effective Date/Time Group

e. THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .

g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan).

2. Situation

(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses (see national intelligence estimate, any ~~allied~~-multinational sources, and strategic and commanders' estimates)).

a. General. (This section describes the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the campaign plan. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State US policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations to attain US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) Environment of Conflict. (Provides a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context (JSCP, UCP).)

(2) Policy Goals. (This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, and termination objectives to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions, interests, intentions/criteria for termination.)

1
2 | (a) US/Multinational Policy Goals. (~~Identifies-Identify~~ the national security,
3 multinational or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the
4 combatant command.)

5
6 (b) Desired End State. (Describe the desired strategic end state and relate the
7 military end state to the strategic end state.)

8
9 (3) Non-US National Political Decisions.

10
11 (4) Constraints/Restraints/Limitations. (List actions that are prohibited or required
12 by higher or multinational authority (ROE, law of armed conflict, termination criteria, etc.))

13
14 b. Area of Concern.

15
16 | (1) Operational Area-of-Responsibility. (Describe the combatant commander's
17 operational area-of-responsibility for the campaign. A map may be used as an attachment to
18 graphically depict the area.)

19
20 (2) Area of Interest. (Describe the general area of interest covered by the
21 combatant commander's Strategic Concept and/or Basic Plan. This description should
22 address all air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the campaign.)

23
24 (3) Operational Area. (Describe the specific areas covered in each option
25 contained in the combatant commander's strategic or basic plan. Maps or overlays may be
26 included as an attachment.)

27
28 c. Deterrent Options. (Delineate FDOs desired to include those categories specified in
29 the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of LAD relative
30 to C-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options
31 accomplished by non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment. See
32 | Appendix D, "Integrated Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development," for
33 examples of FDOs.)

34
35 d. Risk.

36
37 e. Adversary Forces. (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and
38 appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to Annex B (Intelligence) for details.
39 However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of
40 the magnitude of the hostile threat. In a campaign plan, it is imperative to identify the
41 adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities as depicted
42 below.)

43 (1) Adversary Centers of Gravity.

44
45 (a) Strategic.

1 (b) Operational.

2
3 (2) Adversary Critical Vulnerabilities.

4
5 (a) Strategic.

6
7 (b) Operational.

8
9 (3) Adversary Courses of Action (most likely and most dangerous to friendly
10 mission accomplishment).

11
12 (a) General.

13
14 (b) Adversary's Desired End State.

15
16 (c) Adversary's Strategic Objectives.

17
18 (d) Adversary's Operational Objectives.

19
20 (e) Adversary Concept of Operations.

21
22 (4) Adversary Logistics and Sustainment.

23
24 (5) Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities.

25
26 (6) Adversary Reserve Mobilization.

27
28 f. Friendly Forces.

29
30 (1) Friendly Centers of Gravity. (This section should identify friendly centers of
31 gravity, both strategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.)

32
33 (a) Strategic.

34
35 (b) Operational.

36
37 (2) Friendly Critical Vulnerabilities.

38
39 (a) Strategic.

40
41 (b) Operational.

42
43 (3) Multinational Forces.

(4) Supporting Commands and Agencies. (Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those tasked to support this campaign plan, that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in the campaign plan. Also list the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or government agencies that would directly support execution of the campaign plan. For example, USTRANSCOM, ~~USSPACECOM~~, ~~USSTRATCOM~~, Defense Intelligence Agency, and so forth.)

g. Assumptions. (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in the JSCP or other tasking on which the campaign plan is based. State expected conditions over which the combatant commander has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of the plan and supporting plans, and assumptions to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, would invalidate the plan or its concept of operations. Specify the mobility (air and sea lift), the degree of mobilization assumed, i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none.)

(1) Threat Warning/Timeline.

(2) Pre-positioning and Regional Access.

(a) International Support and Assistance.

(3) In-Place Forces.

(4) Strategic Assumptions.

(a) Nuclear Weapons Employment.

(5) Legal Considerations. (List those significant legal considerations on which the campaign plan is based.)

(a) International Law.

(b) US Domestic Law.

(c) Law of Armed Conflict.

3. Mission

(State concisely the key strategic task(s) the combatant commander has to accomplish. This statement should address: who, what, when, where, and why).

4. Execution

Annex C (Operations)

1 a. Concept of Operations. (The appropriate strategic concept(s) can be taken from the
2 theater strategy and developed into a strategic concept of operation for the theater campaign
3 plan. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how. It
4 also contains the combatant commander's strategic vision, intent and design in the strategic
5 concept of operation for force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment,
6 employment, sustainment and redeployment of all participating forces, activities and
7 agencies.)
8

9 (1) Commander's Intent. (This should describe the combatant commander's
10 ~~overall~~ intent (purpose and end state), overall and ~~intent~~ by phase. It may also include how
11 the posture of forces at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also
12 include the combatant commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an
13 assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. The
14 commander's intent, though, is not a summary of the concept of the operations.)
15

16 (a) End State. (See Chapter II, "Strategic Direction," for details on
17 determining the end state.)
18

19 (b) Campaign Objectives.
20

21 (2) General. (Base the concept of operations on the commander's estimate of the
22 situation. The estimate states how the commander plans to accomplish the mission,
23 including the forces involved; the phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of
24 operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service support. The commander's
25 estimate should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve force
26 mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve force size requirements.
27 The concept of operations should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the
28 level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for
29 preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the campaign plan concept
30 should incorporate the following operational concepts:
31

32 (a) Combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.
33

34 (b) Orientation on the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity.
35

36 (c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.
37

38 (d) Phasing of operations, to include the commander's intent for each phase.)
39

40 1. Phase I:
41

42 a. Combatant Commander's Intent.
43

44 b. Timing.
45

1 c. Objectives.

2
3 d. Risk.

4
5 e. Execution.

6
7 f. Employment.

8
9 (1) Land Forces.

10
11 (2) Air Forces.

12
13 (3) ~~Naval~~ Maritime Forces.

14
15 ~~d. () Marine Corps Forces.~~

16
17 (4) Space Forces.

18
19 (5) Special Operations Forces.

20
21 ~~g. () Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF).~~

22
23 (6) Joint CMO Task Force (JCMOTF).

24
25 g. Operational Fires. List those significant fires considerations on
26 which the campaign plan is based. The fires discussion should reflect the JFC's concept for
27 application of available fires assets. Guidance for joint fires may address the following:

28
29 (1) Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles.

30
31 (2) Joint fire support assets for planning purposes.

32
33 (3) Priorities for employing target acquisition assets.

34
35 (4) Areas that require joint fires to support operational
36 maneuver.

37
38 (5) Anticipated joint fire support requirements.

39
40 (6) Fire support coordinating measures (if required).

41
42 See JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, for a detailed discussion.

43
44 2. Phases II through XX. (Cite information as stated in subparagraph ~~3b~~
45 4a(2)(a) above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new
46 opportunities.)

b. Tasks. (List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the operation order. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform to fulfill the concept of operations, including operational and tactical deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published separately to receive special handling.)

(1) COMUSARXXXX.

(2) COMUSNAVXXXX.

(3) COMUSMARXXXX.

(4) COMUSXXXAF.

(5) ~~COMSPACE~~COMSTRATXXXX.

(6) COMSOCXXXX.

(7) Commander, ~~JPOTF~~Joint Psychological Operations Task Force.

(8) ~~Commander~~, Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force.

c. Coordinating Instructions. (List instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are required for proper coordination of the campaign's phases. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments.)

5. Administration and Logistics

a. Concept of Support. (This should provide broad guidance for the theater strategic sustainment concept for the campaign with information and instructions applicable to the campaign broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, personnel policies, and administration.)

b. Logistics. (This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; base development and other civil engineering requirement; host-nation support; ~~contracted support~~; and inter-Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. Note: Logistic phases must complement the campaign's operational phases. Identify strategic and theater ports for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance, and procedures for all options and phases.)

c. General Guidance.

d. Personnel. (Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements.)

e. Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.

f. ~~Civil Affairs~~Civil-Military Operations. Refer to Annex G.

g. Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Refer to Annex H.

h. Geospatial Information and Services. Refer to Annex M.

i. ~~Medical Services~~Health Service Support. Refer to Annex Q. (Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings for ~~hospitalization and evacuation~~ health service support functional areas. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in a subparagraph.)

6. Command and Control

a. Command.

(1) Command Relationships. (State the organizational structure expected to exist during campaign plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.)

(2) Command Posts. (List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution of the campaign. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.)

(3) Succession to Command. (Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.)

b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems. (Provide a general statement concerning the scope of C4 systems and procedures required to support the campaign. Highlight any C4 systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.) Refer to Annex K.

(1) s/

(2) t/

(3) Rank/Service

(4) Commander

c. Annexes:

(1) A — **Task Organization**

(2) B — **Intelligence**

(3) C — **Operations**

(4) D — **Logistics**

(5) E — **Personnel**

(6) F — **Public Affairs**

(7) G — ~~Civil Affairs~~Civil-Military Operations

(8) H — Meteorological and Oceanographic~~Operations~~Services

(9) J — **Command Relationships**

(10) K — **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems**

(11) L — **Environmental Considerations**

(12) M — **Geospatial Information and Services**

(13) N — **Space Operations**

(14) P — **Host-Nation Support**

(15) Q — **Medical Services**

(16) R — **Reports**

(17) S — **Special Technical Operations**

(18) T — **Consequence Management**

(19) U — **Notional Campaign Plan Decision Guide**

(20) V — **Interagency Coordination**

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(21) X — Execution Checklist

(22) Z — Distribution

(23) AA— Religious Support

Note: Annexes A-D and K are required annexes for a crisis action planning operation order. All others may either be required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or deemed necessary by the combatant commander.

APPENDIX F REFERENCES

The development of JP 5-0 is based on the following primary references:

1. Federal Statutory Laws

- a. Title 10, US Code, as amended.

2. Presidential Guidance

- a. *Unified Command Plan*.
- b. *Contingency Planning Guidance*.

3. Secretary of Defense Guidance

- a. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *Forces for Unified Commands*.
- b. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *Assignment of Forces*, 6 September 1996.

4. Department of Defense

- a. DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*.
- b. DOD Directive 5100.3, *Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Joint Commands*.
- c. DOD Instruction 3027.21, Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Issuances

- a. CJCSI 3020.01, *Managing, Integrating, and Using Joint Deployment Information Systems*.
- b. CJCSI 3100.01 A, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.
- c. CJCSI 3110.01, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.
- d. CJCSI 3113.01, *Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans*.
- e. CJCSI 3141.01 A, *Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Operation Plans*.

- 1 f. CJCSI 3401.01, *Chairman's Readiness System*.
- 2
- 3 | g. CJCSI 5714.01 A, *Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and*
- 4 *Information*.
- 5
- 6 h. CJCSI 8501.01, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the*
- 7 *Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and*
- 8 *Budgeting System*.
- 9
- 10 | i. CJCSM 3113.01 A, *Theater ~~Engagement Planning~~ Security Cooperation Planning,*
- 11 *(currently under revision)*.
- 12
- 13 j. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning*
- 14 *Policies and Procedures)*.
- 15
- 16 k. CJCSM 3122.02, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume III:*
- 17 *Manual for Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), Development and*
- 18 *Deployment Execution*.
- 19
- 20 l. CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planning*
- 21 *Formats and Guidelines)*.
- 22
- 23 | m. CJCSM 3141.01 A, *Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans*.
- 24
- 25 n. CJCSM 3150.01, *Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions*.
- 26

27 6. Joint Publications

- 28
- 29 a. JP 0-2, *Unified Actions Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
- 30
- 31 b. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- 32
- 33 c. JP 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.
- 34
- 35 d. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- 36
- 37 e. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operation*.
- 38
- 39 f. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence*
- 40 *Preparation of the Battlespace*.
- 41
- 42 g. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
- 43
- 44 h. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
- 45
- 46 i. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.

-
- j. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*.
- k. JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*.
- l. JP 3-12.1, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations*.
- m. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.
- n. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.
- o. JP 3-30, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*.
- p. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.
- q. JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense ~~of~~ Transportation System*.
- r. JP 4-01.8, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*.
- s. JP 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning*.
- t. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*s.
- u. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*.
- 7. Service Publications**
- a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Forces*.
- b. AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*.
- c. AFDD 2-1.2, *Strategic Attack*.
- d. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-1, *Campaigning*.
- e. Field Manual (FM)-~~100-5~~ 3-0, *Operations*.
- f. FM 100-7, *Decisive-Force: The Army in Theater Operations*.
- g. FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.
- h. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1, *Strategy*.
- i. MCDP 5, *Planning*.
-

- 1 j. Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*.
- 2
- 3 k. *Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES)*.
- 4
- 5 l. *Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)*.
- 6
- 7 m. *Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)* and *Marine Corps Mobilization*
- 8 *Management Plan (MPLAN)*.
- 9
- 10 n. *Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)*.
- 11
- 12 o. *Coast Guard Capabilities Manual (CGCAPMAN)* and *Coast Guard Logistic Support*
- 13 *and Mobilization Plan (CGLSMP)*.
- 14
- 15

APPENDIX G

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 5-0, 13 April 1995, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, and JP 5-00.1, 25 January 2002, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*.

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-CWPD/J-7-JDD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDET//
CDR USJFCOM JWFC SUFFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDET, 7000 Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes:

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3 publication is not available from the Service.

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6 combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication
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11 c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned
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13 *of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

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43 d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is
44 unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint
45 publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security*
46 *Program*.

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1	ADCON	administrative control
2	ADP	automated data processing
3	<u>AFDD</u>	<u>Air Force Doctrine Document</u>
4	ALERTORD	alert order
5	AMOPES	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
6	AOR	area of responsibility
7		
8	C2	command and control
9	C4	command, control, communications, and computers
10	CAP	crisis action planning
11	<u>CBRNE</u>	<u>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive</u>
12	CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
13	C day	unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins
14	CGCAPMAN	Coast Guard Capabilities Manual
15	CGLSMP	Coast Guard Logistics Support and Mobilization Plan
16	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
17	CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
18	CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
19	CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
20	COA	course of action
21	COCOM	combatant commander er <u>(command authority)</u>
22	COG	center of gravity
23	CONOPS	concept of operations
24	CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
25	CONUS	continental United States
26	CPA	Chairman's program assessment
27	CPG	contingency planning guidance
28	CPR	chairman's program recommendation
29	CRITIC	critical intelligence communication
30	CRS	Chairman's readiness system
31	CS	combat support
32	CSS	combat service support
33		
34	D day	unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled
35		to commence
36	DEPORD	deployment order
37	DEPRO	deployment preparation order
38	DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
39	DMS	Defense Message System
40	DOD	Department of Defense
41	DOS	Department of State
42	DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
43	DRB	Defense Resources Board

Glossary

1		
2	EXORD	execute order
3		
4	FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
5	FDO	flexible deterrent option
6	FM	Field Manual
7	FUNCPLAN	functional plan
8	FYDP	future years defense plan
9		
10	GCCS	Global Command and Control System
11		
12	HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
13	HD/LD	high demand/low density
14	HNS	host-nation support
15		
16	IADS	integrated air defense system
17	IPL	integrated priority list
18	<u>IPR</u>	<u>in process review</u>
19	ITPFDD	integrated time-phased force and deployment data
20		
21	J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff
22	J-5	Plans Directorate of a joint staff
23	J-7	Directorate of Operational Plans and Joint Force Development,
24		Joint Staff
25	JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
26	JFC	joint force commander
27	JFSOCC	joint force special operations command
28	JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
29	JIPB	joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
30	JLRSE	Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate
31	JMNA	joint military net assessment
32	JMRR	Joint Monthly Readiness Review
33	JMRWP	Joint Mid-Range War Plan
34	JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
35	JP	joint publication
36	JPD	Joint Planning Document
37	JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
38	JPG	joint planning group
39	<u>JPOTF</u>	<u>joint psychological operations task force</u>
40	JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
41	JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
42	JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
43	JSOTF	joint special operations task force
44	JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
45	JSR	joint strategy review
46	JTF	joint task force

1		
2	LAD	latest arrival date
3	L hour	the specific hour on C day when deployment is to commence
4	LOC	line of communications
5	LOI	letter of instruction
6	LSA	logistics support analysis
7		
8	MCDP	Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
9	MCP	Marine Corps Capabilities Plan
10	MMG	Master Mobilization Guide
11	MOOTW	military operations other than war
12	MOP	memorandum of policy
13	MPLAN	Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan
14	MTW	major theater war
15		
16	NAOC	National Airborne Operations Center
17	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
18	NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
19	NCMP	Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan
20	NGO	nongovernmental organization
21	NMCC	National Military Command Center
22	NMCS	National Military Command System
23	NMS	National Military Strategy
24	NSC	National Security Council
25	NSS	National Security Strategy
26		
27	OA	operational area
28	OMB	Office of Management and Budget
29	OPCON	operational control
30	OPLAN	operation plan
31	OPORD	operation order
32	OPREP	operational report
33	OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
34		
35	PBD	program budget decision
36	PDM	program decision memorandum
37	PID	plan identification number
38	PLANORD	planning order
39	POD	port of debarkation
40	POE	port of embarkation
41	POM	program objective memorandum
42	PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
43	PSYOP	psychological operations
44	PTDO	prepare to deploy order
45		

Glossary

1	ROE	rules of engagement
2	ROMO	range of military operations
3		
4	SATCOM	satellite communications
5	SO	special operations
6	SOF	special operations forces
7		
8	TACON	tactical control
9	TEP	task execution plan
10	TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
11	TSC	theater security cooperation
12	TSOC	theater special operations command
13		
14	UCP	Unified Command Plan
15	UHF	ultra high frequency
16	UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
17	USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
18	USG	United States Government
19	USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
20	USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
21	USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
22	USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
23	USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
24	USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
25		
26	WARNORD	warning order
27	WMP	War and Mobilization Plan

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1 **acceptability.** Operation plan review criterion. The determination as to whether the
2 contemplated course of action is proportional and worth the cost in manpower, materiel,
3 and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and is militarily and politically
4 supportable. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the
5 existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

6
7 **adaptive planning.** A new planning construct for rapid, networked, and iterative planning
8 to produce flexible, focused, comprehensive, and feasible operation plans. Adaptive
9 planning is the systematic, on-demand creation and revision of executable plans, with
10 up-to-date options.

11
12 **adequacy.** Operation plan review criterion. The review assesses the validity of the
13 assumptions and compliance with strategic guidance. Planning assumptions adequacy
14 predicts whether the scope and concept of planned operations can accomplish the
15 assigned mission and comply with the planning guidance provided. (Upon approval of
16 this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition
17 and will be included in JP 1-02.)

18
19 **administrative control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other
20 organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service
21 forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics,
22 individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and
23 other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other
24 organizations. Also called ADCON. ~~See also combatant command; combatant~~
25 ~~command (command authority); operational control; tactical control. (This term and its~~
26 ~~definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in~~
27 ~~the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)~~JP 1-02)

28
29 **alert order.** A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the
30 initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course
31 of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action.
32 See also execution planning. Also called ALERTORD. ~~(This term and its definition~~
33 ~~modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next~~
34 ~~edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)~~Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will
35 modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

36
37 **alliance.** An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more
38 nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the
39 members. See also coalition; multinational. (JP 1-02)

40
41 **allocation.** In a general sense, distribution for employment of limited forces and resources
42 among competing requirements. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons,
43 forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons,
44 etc. See also allocation (air); allocation (nuclear); allocation (transportation);

1 apportionment. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition~~
2 ~~and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.~~Upon approval of
3 this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition
4 and will be included in JP 1-02.)

5
6 **apportionment.** In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited forces and
7 resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and
8 forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for
9 planning, etc. See also allocation; apportionment (air). ~~(This term and its definition~~
10 ~~modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next~~
11 ~~edition of Joint Pub 1-02.~~Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will
12 modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

13
14 **assign.** 1. In joint operations, to place forces and resources under the combatant command
15 ~~(command authority)~~ of a combatant commander or under the operational control of a
16 subordinate joint force commander when such placement is relatively permanent. 2. To
17 place units or personnel in an organization when such placement is relatively permanent
18 and or when the gaining organization controls and administers the units or personnel for
19 the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the units or personnel. 3.
20 To detail individuals to specific duties or functions when such duties or functions are
21 primary and or relatively permanent. See also attach. ~~(This term and its definition~~
22 ~~modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next~~
23 ~~edition of Joint Pub 1-02.~~Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will
24 modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

25
26 **attach.** 1. In joint operations, to place forces and resources under the operational control of
27 a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander when such placement is
28 relatively temporary. ~~The administration and support of forces attached to a joint force~~
29 ~~remain the responsibility of the parent Service.~~—2. To place units or personnel in an
30 organization when such placement is relatively temporary. 3. To detail individuals to
31 specific duties or functions when such functions are secondary or relatively temporary,
32 e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. See also assign. ~~(This~~
33 ~~term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for~~
34 ~~inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.~~Upon approval of this revision, this term
35 and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in
36 JP 1-02.)

37
38 **augmentation forces.** Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the
39 combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported
40 commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the President and
41 Secretary of Defense. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will
42 modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

43
44 **branch.** ~~4. A contingency option built into an operation plan for changing the orientation,~~
45 ~~disposition, or direction of movement of a force based on anticipated events,~~
46 ~~opportunities, or disruptions caused by adversary actions and reactions. See also sequel.~~

~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)~~ 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. Unlike an annex, a branch is not merely an overflow addition. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the basic plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. See also sequel. (JP 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign; campaign plan. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by ~~†~~Title 10 ("Armed Forces"), ~~United States-US~~ Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command

(command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. ~~Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.~~ Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. See also combatant command. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.JP 1-02)~~

combatant commander's strategic concept. Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The combatant commander's strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the combatant commander's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called "the CINC's Strategic Concept." (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term "CINC's strategic concept" and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

combat support agency. A Defense Agency so designated by Congress or the Secretary of Defense that supports military combat operations. ~~(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more ~~allies~~ nations. (When all ~~allies~~ nations or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) See also joint. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in

1 planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
2 accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

3
4 **commander's estimate of the situation.** A logical process of reasoning by which a
5 commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at
6 a decision as to a course of action to be taken in order to accomplish the mission. A
7 commander's estimate that considers a military situation so far in the future as to require
8 major assumptions is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-
9 02)

10
11 **commander's intent.** A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired
12 end state that serves as the initial impetus for the planning process. It may also include
13 the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of
14 where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (~~This term and its~~
15 ~~definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.~~JP 1-02)

16
17 **completeness.** Operation plan review criteria. Ensures that operations plans incorporate
18 major operations and tasks to be accomplished and include forces required, deployment
19 concept, employment concept, sustainment concept, time estimates for achieving
20 objectives, and desired end state, mission success criteria, and mission termination
21 criteria. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in
22 JP 1-02.)

23
24 **concept plan.** An operation plan in an abbreviated format that ~~would~~may require
25 considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or
26 operation order. Also called CONPLAN. (~~This term and its definition modify the~~
27 ~~existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint~~
28 ~~Pub 1-02.~~Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the
29 existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

30
31 **contingency.** An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists,
32 subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation,
33 contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety
34 and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. ~~See also contingency~~
35 ~~contracting.~~ (JP 1-02)

36
37 **contingency operation.** A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of
38 Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of
39 law (10 United States Code (USC) 101[a][13]). It is a military operation that: a. is
40 designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the Armed
41 Forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against
42 an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force; or b. is created by definition
43 of law. Under 10 USC 101 (a)(13)(B), a contingency operation exists if a military
44 operation results in the (1) callup to (or retention on) active duty of members of the
45 uniformed Services under certain enumerated statutes (10 USC Sections 688, 12301(a),

12302, 12304, 12305, 12406, or 331-335); and (2) the callup to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under other (non-enumerated) statutes during war or national emergency declared by the President or Congress. See also contingency; operation. (JP 1-02)

contingency plan. A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated. ~~See also joint operation planning.~~ See also contingency; contingency operation; joint operation planning. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. ~~5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase.~~ Also called COA. ~~(JP 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

course of action development. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the deliberate and crisis action planning processes that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. See also course of action; crisis action planning. ~~(JP 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning activities associated with the time-sensitive development of ~~joint operation campaign~~ plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. See also deliberate planning, joint operation planning, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for~~

~~inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

culminating point. The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (JP 1-02)

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (JP 1-02)

~~**defeat mechanism.** The approach by which a commander seeks to attack the critical capabilities that enable the adversary's centers of gravity to function as such. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning activities associated with the development of joint operation plans and campaign plans for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of apportioned forces and resources in response to a hypothetical situation identified in a joint strategic planning document. Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions that will exist when the plan is executed. See also crisis action planning, joint operation planning, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

~~**demobilization planning.** Planning that returns mobilized Reserve Component units and personnel to their former status. The transactions restore force readiness and regulate the rate of industrial sector conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

~~**deployment order.** A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the authority that the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the transferred forces. (JP 1-02)~~

~~**deployment planning.** Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental~~

1 United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding
2 areas. (JP 1-02)
3

4 **deterrent options.** A course of action, developed on the best ~~economic~~, diplomatic,
5 informational, political, and military, economic, and law enforcement judgment,
6 designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated
7 operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a range of options should be presented to
8 effect deterrence. Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate
9 force module.) (JP 1-02 Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will
10 modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)
11

12 **effect.** A result or consequence (physical or behavioral) brought about by an agent or cause.
13 (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)
14

15 **employment.** The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (JP 1-02)
16

17 **employment planning.** Planning that prescribes how to apply force and/or forces to attain
18 specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by
19 combatant commanders and/or subordinate joint force commanders through their
20 component commanders. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition
21 will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)
22

23 **end state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's
24 objectives. (JP 1-02)
25

26 **estimate.** 1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its
27 major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the
28 prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. 2. An appraisal of the
29 capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or
30 combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or
31 contemplated course of action. 3. An analysis of an actual or contemplated clandestine
32 operation in relation to the situation in which it is or would be conducted in order to
33 identify and appraise such factors as available and needed assets and potential obstacles,
34 accomplishments, and consequences. (JP 1-02)
35

36 **execute order.** A directive to implement an approved military course of action. ~~Only the~~
37 ~~President and the Secretary of Defense have the authority to approve and direct the~~
38 ~~initiation of military operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the~~
39 ~~authority of and at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, issues an alert~~
40 ~~order to initiate military operations. Upon receipt of such an alert order, combatant~~
41 ~~commanders and subordinate joint force commanders use execute orders to implement~~
42 ~~the approved course of action. Also called EXORD. (This term and its definition~~
43 ~~modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next~~
44 ~~edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will~~
45 modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)
46

execution planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System ~~the~~ translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. Also called EP. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02 Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

feasibility. Operation plan review criterion. Predicts whether the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time frames contemplated by the plan. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

final plan. A plan for which drafts have been coordinated and approved and which has been signed by or on behalf of a competent authority. See also operation plan. (JP 1-02)

force package. In joint operation planning, a group of forces and resources that the supported commander requires to perform a function or conduct an operation described in the concept of operations. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

force planning. ~~(1.)~~ Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, ~~and Services,~~ and US Special Operations Command and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services. ~~(2.)~~ In the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, the planning conducted by the supported combatant command and its components to determine required force capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission, as well as by the Military Departments, Services, and Service component commands of the combatant commands, to develop forces lists, source and tailor required force capabilities with actual units, ~~develop force lists,~~ identify and resolve shortfalls, and ~~organize and time-phase their force lists into force modules that sequence the arrival of forces in-~~ determine the routing and time-phasing of forces into the operational area. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

functional plans. Operation plans in abbreviated format that are normally developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. ~~They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic~~

- 1 ~~Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the combatant commander (CINC), or as tasked by~~
2 ~~the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman~~
3 ~~of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required.~~
4 ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved~~
5 ~~for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this~~
6 ~~term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be~~
7 ~~included in JP 1-02.)~~
8
- 9 **host-nation support.** ~~Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces~~
10 ~~within its territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also~~
11 ~~called HNS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and~~
12 ~~are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.) Civil and/or military~~
13 ~~assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime,~~
14 ~~crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.~~
15 ~~Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)~~
16
- 17 **implementation.** ~~None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be~~
18 ~~removed from JP 1-02.)~~
19
- 20 **information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information
21 systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called
22 IO. (JP 1-02)
23
- 24 **information warfare.** Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to
25 achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also
26 called IW. See also information operations; operation. (JP 1-02)
27
- 28 ~~**initial draft plan.** A plan which has been drafted and coordinated by the originating~~
29 ~~headquarters, and is ready for external coordination with other military headquarters. It~~
30 ~~cannot be directly implemented by the issuing commander, but it may form the basis for~~
31 ~~an operation order issued by the commander in the event of an emergency. See also~~
32 ~~final plan; operation plan. (JP 1-02)~~
33
- 34 ~~**interagency.** A broad generic term that describes the collective elements or activities of the~~
35 ~~Department of Defense and other US Government agencies, regional and international~~
36 ~~organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and~~
37 ~~commercial organizations engaged in a common effort. (Approved for inclusion in the~~
38 ~~next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)~~
39
- 40 **interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the
41 coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged
42 US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and
43 international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)
44
- 45 **interdiction.** An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military
46 potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint interagency coordination group. A group of US Government civilian subject matter experts from other government agencies, accredited to a joint force commander and collocated with the joint force headquarters to facilitate interagency coordination during joint operations. Also called JIACG. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

joint operation planning. Planning activities associated with the preparation of joint operation plans, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the Single Integrated Operational Plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established Joint Operation Planning and Execution System policies and procedures. See also contingency plan; execution planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system of joint policies, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and computer systems, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. See also joint operation planning, joint planning and execution community. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

joint operation planning process. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)

joint planning and execution community. Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, deployment, employment, support, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of ~~military-joint~~ forces assigned or committed to a joint operation. It consists of the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), the combatant commands (and their Service component commands), the subordinate unified commands and other subordinate joint forces of the combatant commands, and the combat support agencies. Also called JPEC. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan ~~(JSCP)~~ provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish task and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions limited forces and resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The ~~JSCP-Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan~~ provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and Secretary of Defense. Also called JSCP. See also combatant commander; joint. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

Joint Strategic Planning System. The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews ~~contingency-joint operation~~ plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. ~~(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

~~**leverage.** The advantage achieved by the application of combat power against one point of an adversary's system in order to affect another, more decisive point indirectly. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)~~

line of communications. A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02)

lines of operations. Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. (JP 1-02)

1
2 **major operation.** A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by
3 various combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to
4 accomplish operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area.
5 These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a
6 common plan and are controlled by a single commander. (JP 1-02)
7

8 **maneuver.** 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage
9 over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on
10 a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to
11 perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces on the battlespace through
12 movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the
13 enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)
14

15 **military objective.** The ~~aims~~goals, derived from the strategic direction and guidance of the
16 President and Secretary of Defense, toward which military actions are taken in support
17 of national objectives. A military objective defines the results to be achieved by the
18 military and assigns tasks to commanders. See also national objectives. ~~(This term and~~
19 ~~its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion~~
20 ~~in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its~~
21 ~~definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-~~
22 ~~02.)~~
23

24 **military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military
25 capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions
26 can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national
27 power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)
28

29 **multinational.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition
30 partners. See also alliance; coalition. (JP 1-02)
31

32 **multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by
33 forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or
34 alliance. See also coalition. (JP 1-02)
35

36 **national defense strategy.** A strategic planning document developed by the Secretary of
37 Defense that establishes broad defense policy goals and priorities for the development,
38 employment, and sustainment of US military forces. The national defense strategy may
39 be published separately or as part of the Defense Planning Guidance. (Upon approval of
40 this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)
41

42 **national military strategy.** 1. The art and science of distributing and applying military
43 power to attain national objectives across the range of military operations. 2. A
44 strategic planning document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
45 provide advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense on

1 how the United States should employ its Armed Forces in support of the President's
2 national security strategy. Also called NMS. ~~(This term and its definition modify the~~
3 ~~existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint~~
4 ~~Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the~~
5 ~~existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

6
7 **national objectives.** The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a
8 national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.
9 See also military objective. (JP 1-02)

10
11 **national policy.** A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the
12 government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

13
14 **national security strategy.** 1. The art and science of developing, applying, and
15 coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, law
16 enforcement, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national
17 security. 2. A document prepared by the President and National Security Council that
18 outlines the national security strategy of the United States. Also called national strategy
19 or grand strategy. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its~~
20 ~~definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon~~
21 ~~approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and~~
22 ~~its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

23
24 **nuclear planning system.** A system composed of personnel, directives, and electronic data
25 processing systems to directly support geographic nuclear combatant commanders in
26 developing, maintaining, and disseminating nuclear operation plans. (JP 1-02)

27
28 **objective.** 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every
29 military operation should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for
30 example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the
31 commander's plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features).
32 (JP 1-02)

33
34 **operation.** 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training,
35 or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including
36 movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any
37 battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

38
39 **operational area.** An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for
40 geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include,
41 but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of
42 operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations
43 area, and area of operations. ~~See also amphibious objective area; area of operations;~~
44 ~~area of responsibility; joint operations area; joint special operations area; theater of~~
45 ~~operations; theater of war. (JP 1-02)~~

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also ~~administrative control; combatant command; combatant command (command authority); tactical control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.JP 1-02)~~

operational design. The key considerations used as a framework in the course of planning for a campaign or major operation. ~~(This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.JP 1-02)~~

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war, tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

~~**operational pause.** A temporary halt in offensive operations caused by logistic constraints or force shortfalls, normally for the purpose of regenerating combat power or~~

~~augmenting forces or sustainment for the next phase of the campaign or major operation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)~~

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operational Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing combatant commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN—An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the supported commander's concept of operations and a movement schedule of these resources to the operational area. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that ~~would may~~ require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the supported commander's concept of operations and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the supported commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Also called CONPLAN. See also operation order. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

1 **phase.** In joint operation planning, Aa definitive stage of an operation or campaign during
2 which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually
3 supporting activities for a common purpose. ~~(This term and its definition are approved~~
4 ~~for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and~~
5 ~~its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

6
7 **planning order.** A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs
8 the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military
9 course of action. See also execution planning. Also called PLANORD. ~~(This term and~~
10 ~~its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion~~
11 ~~in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its~~
12 ~~definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-~~
13 ~~02.)~~

14
15 **prepare to deploy order.** An order issued by competent authority to move forces or
16 prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). (Upon
17 approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term
18 “deployment preparation order” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

19
20 **psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and
21 indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
22 reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
23 and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce
24 foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called
25 PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

26
27 **readiness planning.** None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will
28 be removed from JP 1-02.)

29
30 **rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
31 circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or
32 continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-
33 02)

34
35 **sequel.** ~~A contingency option built into an operation plan for an operation that may follow~~
36 ~~the current operation major operation that follows the current major operation.~~ Plans for
37 a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (~~major success~~, success, stalemate, or
38 defeat) associated with the current operation. See also branch. ~~(This term and its~~
39 ~~definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in~~
40 ~~the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. JP 1-02)~~

41
42 **Service-common.** Equipment, materiel, supplies, and services adopted by a Military
43 Service for use by its own ~~Service~~ forces and activities. These include standard materiel
44 items, base operating support, and the supplies and services provided by a Military
45 Service to support and sustain its own ~~Service~~ forces, including those ~~Service~~ forces

1 assigned to the combatant commands. Items and services defined as Service-common
2 by one Military Service are not necessarily Service-common for all other Military
3 Services. See also special operations-peculiar. ~~(This term and its definition are~~
4 ~~approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.~~ Upon approval of this revision, this
5 term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)
6

7 **Service component command.** A command consisting of the Service component
8 commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments,
9 organizations and installations under the command including the support forces, that
10 have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate
11 unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)
12

13 **situation monitoring.** The continuous observation, analysis, and assessment of global,
14 regional, and operational events in the context of national and multinational security,
15 military strategies, and the elements of national power. (Upon approval of this revision,
16 this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)
17

18 **special operations-peculiar.** ~~Equipment, materiel, supplies, and services required for~~
19 ~~special operations missions and activities for which there is no Service-common~~
20 ~~requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by,~~
21 ~~special operations forces until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military~~
22 ~~Services; modifications approved by the commander of the U.S. Special Operations~~
23 ~~Command for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services;~~
24 ~~and items and services approved by the commander of the U.S. Special Operations~~
25 ~~Command as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations~~
26 ~~mission or activity. See also Service-common. (This term and its definition are~~
27 ~~approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.~~ Equipment, materiel, supplies, and
28 services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common
29 requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by,
30 special operations forces until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military
31 Service; modifications approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command
32 for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items
33 and services approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command as
34 critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission.
35 Also called SO-peculiar. See also Service-common. (JP 1-02)
36

37 **strategy determination.** None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition
38 will be removed from JP 1-02.)
39

40 **strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of
41 nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives
42 and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.
43 Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence
44 initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of
45 national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives;

and provide forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. See also supported commander; supporting plan. (JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. See also ~~administrative control~~; combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. JP 1-02)~~

1 **tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and
2 executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.
3 Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat
4 elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See
5 also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (JP 1-02)
6

7 **theater.** The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a
8 commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)
9

10 **theater of operations.** A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic
11 combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations.
12 Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be
13 geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations
14 are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time.
15 Also called TO. See also theater of war. (JP 1-02)
16

17 **theater of war.** ~~A theater of war is An~~ operational area defined by the President, Secretary
18 of Defense, or a geographic combatant commander. ~~It is~~ the area of air, land, and water
19 that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war
20 may encompass portions of more than one geographic combatant commander's area of
21 responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. See also theater of
22 operations. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and~~
23 ~~are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. Upon approval of this~~
24 ~~revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and~~
25 ~~will be included in JP 1-02.)~~
26

27 **theater security cooperation planning.** ~~Theater security cooperation (TSC) planning links~~
28 ~~the combatant commanders' security cooperation activities with broad national security~~
29 ~~objectives established by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The combatant~~
30 ~~commanders plan, conduct, and support many activities that produce multiple benefits~~
31 ~~in readiness, modernization, and engagement. TSC planning identifies, prioritizes, and~~
32 ~~integrates these activities to optimize their overall contribution to national security.~~
33 ~~(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)~~
34

35 **theater strategic environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and
36 influences in the theater that describes the diplomatic-military situation, affect the
37 employment of military forces, and affect the decisions of the operational chain of
38 command. ~~(This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~
39 ~~JP 1-02. Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP~~
40 ~~1-02.)~~
41

42 **theater strategy.** The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and
43 courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or
44 coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or
45 operations not involving the use of force within a theater. See also national military
46 strategy; national security strategy. (JP 1-02)

threat identification and assessment. ~~None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)~~

time phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimates of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)


transportation feasibility. Operation plans, operation plans in concept format and operation orders are considered transportation feasible when the capability to move forces, equipment, and supplies exists from the point of origin to the final destination according to the plan. Transportation feasibility determination will require concurrent analysis and assessment of available strategic and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands and restrictions. a. The supported combatant commander will analyze deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), and theater distribution of forces, equipment, and supplies to final destination. b. Supporting combatant commanders will provide an assessment on movement of forces from point of origin to aerial port of embarkation and/or seaport of embarkation. c. The Commander, United States Transportation Command will assess the strategic leg of the time-phased force and deployment data for transportation feasibility, indicating to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supported combatant commander that movements arrive at the port of debarkation consistent with the supported combatant commander's assessment of JRSOI and theater distribution. d. Following analysis of all inputs, the supported combatant commander is responsible for declaring a plan or order end-to-end executable. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

unified action. ~~A broad generic term~~ A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of ~~synergistic and integrated~~ actions (including the synchronization of ~~interagency and multinational~~ activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place ~~for a common purpose~~ within ~~combatant unified~~ commands, subordinate ~~joint unified~~ commands, ~~and or~~ joint task forces under the overall direction of the ~~joint force~~ commanders of these commands. ~~(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.JP 1-02)~~

1 **unified command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander
2 and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments,
3 that is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense
4 with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called
5 unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)
6

7 **warning order.** 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A
8 planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of
9 action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a
10 commander's estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates
11 forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning
12 guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. Also called WARNORD.
13 (~~This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved~~
14 ~~for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.~~Upon approval of this revision, this
15 term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be
16 included in JP 1-02.)
17

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 5-0** is in the **Plans** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

